“The Fuehrer and Reichskanzler has given a memorandum to the Col. General and the Reich War Minister which represents a general instruction for the execution thereof.
“It starts from the basic thought that the showdown with Russia is inevitable.”
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“The Colonel General reads the memorandum of the Fuehrer.”
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“If war should break out tomorrow we would be forced to take measures from which we might possibly still shy away at the present moment. They are, therefore, to be taken.”
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“All measures have to be taken just as if we were actually in the stage of imminent danger of war.” (EC-416).
There was no room for surmise in these utterances; Hitler was definitely and irrevocably committed to waging aggressive war. If Schacht ever had any doubts concerning Hitler’s firm resolve to carry out the program of aggressive war outlined in Mein Kampf; if, contrary to his statements to Mr. Messersmith and Ambassador Dodd, Schacht actually doubted in 1934 that the Nazis, whom he was faithfully serving, would inevitably plunge Europe into war; and if, despite the pressing sense of immediacy that had pervaded the Nazi war economy from the very outset, he had entertained lingering doubts concerning Hitler’s plans for armed aggression, all such doubts must have been removed by the clear and unequivocal pronouncements in the above-mentioned eventful meetings of 1936 in which he participated.
Yet, despite his knowledge of Hitler’s plans to wage aggressive war, despite the fact that he had grave technical doubts about the ability of the Reichsbank to finance further armaments through additional short term credits, and despite the fact that some directors of the Reichsbank had opposed further “mefo” financing, Schacht pledged another 3 billion Reichsmarks by the “mefo” bill method for further financing of armaments in March 1937 (EC-438).