“In case of ‘Barbarossa’, Supreme Naval Commander describes the occupation of Murmansk as an absolute necessity for the Navy. Chief of the Supreme Command, Armed Forces, considers compliance very difficult.” (C-170).
In the meantime, the entries show that Mussolini was crying out for a more active Nazi Mediterranean policy. The entry for 30 May reads:
“[Duce] demands urgently decisive offensive Egypt-Suez for fall 1941; 12 divisions are needed for that; ‘This stroke would be more deadly to the British Empire than the capture of London’; Chief Naval Operations agrees completely.” (C-170)
Finally, the entry for 6 June indicates the strategic views of Raeder and the German Navy at that stage:
“Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Memorandum of the Chief, Naval Operations. Observation on the strategic situation in the Eastern Mediterranean after the Balkan campaign and the occupation of Crete and further conduct of the war.”
* * * * * *
“The memorandum points with impressive clarity to the decisive aims of the war in the Near East. Their advancement has moved into grasping distance by the successes in the Aegean area, and the memorandum emphasizes that the offensive utilization of the present favorable situation must take place with the greatest acceleration and energy, before England has again strengthened her position in the Near East with help from the United States of America. The memorandum realizes the unalterable fact that the campaign against Russia would be opened very shortly; demands, however, that the undertaking ‘Barbarossa’, which because of the magnitude of its aims naturally stands in the foreground of the operational plans of the armed forces leadership, must under no circumstances lead to an abandonment, diminishing delay of the conduct of the war in the Eastern Mediterranean.” (C-170)
Thus Raeder, throughout, was seeking an active role for his Navy in the Nazi war plans.
Once Hitler had decided to attack Russia, Raeder sought a role for the Navy in the Russian campaign. The first naval operational plan against Russia was characteristically Nazi. The entry for 15 June 1941 in the notes of the German Naval War Staff reads:
“On the proposal of Chief Naval Operations, use of arms against Russian submarines, south of the northern boundary of the Poland warning area is permitted immediately; ruthless destruction is to be aimed at.” (C-170)