“* * * It is untrue that the Reich used forceful pressure to bring about this development, especially the assertion, which was spread later by the former Chancellor Schuschnigg, that the German Government had presented the Federal President with a conditional ultimatum. It is a pure invention.” (3287-PS)
According to the German ultimatum, Schuschnigg had to appoint a proposed candidate as Chancellor and form a Cabinet conforming to the proposals of the German Government. Otherwise the invasion of Austria by German troops was held in prospect. (See Section 3 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against Austria.) The second untruth:
“The truth of the matter is that the question of sending military or police forces from the Reich was only brought up when the newly formed Austrian Cabinet addressed a telegram, already published by the press, to the German Government, urgently asking for the dispatch of German troops as soon as possible, in order to restore peace and order and to avoid bloodshed. Faced with the immediately threatening danger of a bloody civil war in Austria the German Government then decided to comply with the appeal addressed to it.” (3287-PS)
(As to the inspired nature of the Austrian telegram, see Section 3 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against Austria.)
All that can be said is that it must have given von Neurath a certain macabre sort of humor to write that note (3287-PS) when the truth was the opposite, as shown by the report of Gauleiter Rainer to Buerckel (812-PS), the transcripts of Goering’s telephone conversations with Austria (2949-PS), and the entries in Jodl’s diary for 11, 13, and 14 February. (1780-PS)
According to Jodl’s diary—the entry for 10 March:
“At 13.00 hours General Keitel informs Chief of Operational Staff and Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign Office.” (1780-PS)
It is inconceivable when von Neurath had taken over the Foreign Office, was dealing with the matter and was co-operating with Goering to suit the susceptibilities of the Czechs, that he should have been so ignorant of the truth of events as to write that letter (3287-PS) in good faith.
Von Neurath’s position is shown equally clearly by the account which is given of him in the affidavit of Messersmith (2385-PS). Von Neurath’s style of activity at this crisis is described as follows:
“I should emphasize here in this statement that the men who made these promises were not only the dyed-in-the-wool Nazis, but more conservative Germans who already had begun to willingly lend themselves to the Nazi program.