3. The basic target maps of the Air Force objectives for Belgium and the Netherlands are ready for printing. Reproduction and distribution (including sector maps) will probably be possible only during October.
4. In general it must be emphasized that, unlike Czechoslovakia, there are relatively very few aerial photographs of Western European targets available.
G. Recommendations for our own Prosecution of the Air War.
1. A negative answer must be given to the question as to whether it is appropriate to postpone the massed commitment of our striking power until the spring. The balance of force would probably have altered by that time to our disadvantage due to further progress of French and British aircraft industry and imports from North America.
2. From a climatological point of view the autumn offers our forces greater prospect of success than the enemy, due to our relatively good training in instrument flying.
3. As our forces must be regarded as small, even if we accept the figure of 5 air forces as a basis, the task can only be fulfilled by concentrated blows directed against the enemy's weakest points.
For this purpose choice of targets must be made with the greatest care and must be restricted to the decisive points.
4. As long as only 2 air forces are available prosecution of the war on the basis of gaining time is advisable. This is seen in attacks against the enemy air forces in the airfields where they are deployed in Eastern France, with a view to prevent complete aerial predominance by the enemy.
Attacks on Paris should only be carried out as a reprisal, especially as the air defences in and around Paris are strong. Such attacks must however be possible at all times.
Direct cooperation with the Army is only considered desirable if the enemy deploys or advances in such strength as to endanger the Western German fortifications by a break through or out-flanking.