2. The ammunition situation has to be rendered precarious for the enemy as soon as possible. Therefore the armed forces should accompany the air attacks against the ammunition supplies with synchronized offensive thrusts. Special attention should be directed towards the ammunition supplies stored in the Maginot Line itself and accessible to air attack.
3. The Navy should hamper imports through the French Atlantic ports to as great an extent as is compatible with its other tasks and the forces available. Especially for some 2-3 months at the beginning of the attack against the fuel supply of France.
4. Belgium and the Netherlands would, in German hands, represent an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war against Great Britain as well as against France. Therefore it is held to be essential to obtain the opinion of the Army as to the conditions under which an occupation of this area could be carried out and how long it would take. In this case it would be necessary to reassess the commitment against Great Britain.
Signed: For: WOLTER
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Distribution:
Chief of German Air Force Operations Staff
General Staff/5th Section (Draft)
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2. copy with 1 inclosure
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 376-PS
SECRET
FUEHRER'S H.Q.
29/10/40
Major (General Staff) Freiherr von Falkenstein
[Addressed to an unspecified General] "Chefsache"
In order to supplement today's telephone conversation of 10:00 A.M. I take the liberty of submitting to you a brief resume of the military questions current here for your personal information before I go on leave. Major Queisner, my deputy, is informed of the questions touched on here and can supply further information if necessary.
The exception is Gibraltar, General Warlimont having requested that all inquiries be made to him, as this territory is regarded as a particularly ticklish business.
1. At the moment no intervention in Greece is intended. Nor for the moment is anything to be undertaken with regard to Crete.