4. Politically, the first 4 days of military action are the decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished facts must prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division of spoils!) and demoralize "Gruen".
Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and ruthless thrust by a motorized army. (e.g. via Pi past Pr) [Pilsen, Prague],
5. If possible, separation of transport movement "Rot" from "Gruen". A simultaneous strategic concentration "Rot" can lead "Rot" to undesired measures. On the other hand it must be possible to put "Fall Rot" into operation at any time.
C. Propaganda
1. Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia (Gruenland).
2. Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the Czechs (Gruenen).
Schm
[initialled by Schmundt]
Written by an officer
[The following are handwritten notes]
22 April
A. POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES
1. Sudden surprise attack out of clear sky not possible. World opinion can produce critical situation. Would be thinkable only for ultimate conflict without the threat of other opponents.
2. Action after a period of tension and constant aggravation of the situation.