As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a coordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on X Day.
The Army wishes to attack at dawn, i.e., about 0615; it also wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night, which, however, would not alarm the entire Czech front.
Air Force's time of attack depends on weather conditions. These could change the time of attack and also limit the area of operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance, would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100 due to low ceiling in Bavaria.
If the Luftwaffe were to attack at the time desired by the Army no tactical surprise of the enemy's air force would be achieved and it would necessitate certain changes in the method of attack (height of flight level). Consequently, from the outset the Luftwaffe has desired a later hour of attack on the part of the Army. Even so, there would be no definite guarantee of a well-timed coordinated attack of both Forces, as bad weather conditions on the day of attack might postpone the commitment of the Air Force on X Day in part or altogether.
If an early hour of attack on the part of the Army is regarded as indispensable, a simultaneous attack by the Air Force,—desirable as it may be,—may possibly have to be dispensed with.
Thus it is Proposed:
Attack by the Army—independent of the attack by the air force—at the time desired by the Army (0615) and permission for limited operations to take place before them, however, only to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front.
The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them.
J.
[Initialled by Jodl.]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 392-PS