Robert I. Bouck, special agent in charge of the Protective Research Section, testified that the information available to the Federal Government about Oswald before the assassination would, if known to PRS, have made Oswald a subject of concern to the Secret Service.[C8-123] Bouck pointed to a number of characteristics besides Oswald’s defection the cumulative effect of which would have been to alert the Secret Service to potential danger:
I would think his continued association with the Russian Embassy after his return, his association with the Castro groups would have been of concern to us, a knowledge that he had, I believe, been courtmartialed for illegal possession of a gun, of a hand gun in the Marines, that he had owned a weapon and did a good deal of hunting or use of it, perhaps in Russia, plus a number of items about his disposition and unreliability of character, I think all of those, if we had had them altogether, would have added up to pointing out a pretty bad individual, and I think that, together, had we known that he had a vantage point would have seemed somewhat serious to us, even though I must admit that none of these in themselves would be—would meet our specific criteria, none of them alone.
But it is when you begin adding them up to some degree that you begin to get criteria that are meaningful.[C8-124]
Mr. Bouck pointed out, however, that he had no reason to believe that any one Federal agency had access to all this information, including the significant fact that Oswald was employed in a building which overlooked the motorcade route.[C8-125]
Agent Hosty testified that he was fully aware of the pending Presidential visit to Dallas. He recalled that the special agent in charge of the Dallas office of the FBI, J. Gordon Shanklin, had discussed the President’s visit on several occasions, including the regular biweekly conference on the morning of November 22:
Mr. Shanklin advised us, among other things, that in view of the President’s visit to Dallas, that if anyone had any indication of any possibility of any acts of violence or any demonstrations against the President, or Vice President, to immediately notify the Secret Service and confirm it in writing. He had made the same statement about a week prior at another special conference which we had held. I don’t recall the exact date. It was about a week prior.[C8-126]
In fact, Hosty participated in transmitting to the Secret Service two pieces of information pertaining to the visit.[C8-127] Hosty testified that he did not know until the evening of Thursday, November 21, that there was to be a motorcade, however, and never realized that the motorcade would pass the Texas School Book Depository Building. He testified that he did not read the newspaper story describing the motorcade route in detail, since he was interested only in the fact that the motorcade was coming up Main Street, “where maybe I could watch it if I had a chance.”[C8-128]
Even if he had recalled that Oswald’s place of employment was on the President’s route, Hosty testified that he would not have cited him to the Secret Service as a potential threat to the President.[C8-129] Hosty interpreted his instructions as requiring “some indication that the person planned to take some action against the safety of the President of the United States or the Vice President.”[C8-130] In his opinion, none of the information in the FBI files—Oswald’s defection, his Fair Play for Cuba activities in New Orleans, his lies to Agent Quigley, his recent visit to Mexico City—indicated that Oswald was capable of violence.[C8-131] Hosty’s initial reaction on hearing that Oswald was a suspect in the assassination, was “shock, complete surprise,” because he had no reason to believe that Oswald “was capable or potentially an assassin of the President of the United States.”[C8-132]
Shortly after Oswald was apprehended and identified, Hosty’s superior sent him to observe the interrogation of Oswald.[C8-133] Hosty parked his car in the basement of police headquarters and there met an acquaintance, Lt. Jack Revill of the Dallas police force. The two men disagree about the conversation which took place between them. They agree that Hosty told Revill that the FBI had known about Oswald and, in particular, of his presence in Dallas and his employment at the Texas School Book Depository Building.[C8-134] Revill testified that Hosty said also that the FBI had information that Oswald was “capable of committing this assassination.”[C8-135] According to Revill, Hosty indicated that he was going to tell this to Lieutenant Wells of the homicide and robbery bureau.[C8-136] Revill promptly made a memorandum of this conversation in which the quoted statement appears.[C8-137] His secretary testified that she prepared such a report for him that afternoon[C8-138] and Chief of Police Jesse E. Curry and District Attorney Henry M. Wade both testified that they saw it later that day.[C8-139]
Hosty has unequivocally denied, first by affidavit and then in his testimony before the Commission, that he ever said that Oswald was capable of violence, or that he had any information suggesting this.[C8-140] The only witness to the conversation was Dallas Police Detective V. J. Brian, who was accompanying Revill. Brian did not hear Hosty make any statement concerning Oswald’s capacity to be an assassin but he did not hear the entire conversation because of the commotion at police headquarters and because he was not within hearing distance at all times.[C8-141]
Hosty’s interpretation of the prevailing FBI instructions on referrals to the Secret Service was defended before the Commission by his superiors. After summarizing the Bureau’s investigative interest in Oswald prior to the assassination, J. Edgar Hoover concluded that “There was nothing up to the time of the assassination that gave any indication that this man was a dangerous character who might do harm to the President or to the Vice President.”[C8-142] Director Hoover emphasized that the first indication of Oswald’s capacity for violence was his attempt on General Walker’s life, which did not become known to the FBI until after the assassination.[C8-143] Both Director Hoover and his assistant, Alan H. Belmont, stressed also the decision by the Department of State that Oswald should be permitted to return to the United States.[C8-144] Neither believed that the Bureau investigation of him up to November 22 revealed any information which would have justified referral to the Secret Service. According to Belmont, when Oswald returned from the Soviet Union,