These considerations have induced the Commission to believe that the determination of whether or not there should be a relocation of responsibilities and functions should be left to the Executive and the Congress, perhaps upon recommendations based on further studies by the Cabinet-level committee recommended above or the National Security Council.

Pending any such determination, however, this Commission is convinced of the necessity of better coordination and direction of the activities of all existing agencies of Government which are in a position to, and do, furnish information and services related to the security of the President. The Commission feels the Secret Service and the FBI, as well as the State Department and the CIA when the President travels abroad, could improve their existing capacities and procedures so as to lessen the chances of assassination. Without, therefore, coming to final conclusions respecting the long-range organization of the President’s security, the Commission believes that the facts of the assassination of President Kennedy point to certain measures which, while assuming no radical relocation of responsibilities, can and should be recommended by this Commission in the interest of the more efficient protection of the President. These recommendations are reviewed below.

General Supervision of the Secret Service

The intimacy of the Secret Service’s relationship to the White House and the dissimilarity of its protective functions to most activities of the Department of the Treasury have made it difficult for the Treasury to maintain close and continuing supervision. The Commission believes that the recommended Cabinet-level committee will help to correct many of the major deficiencies of supervision disclosed by the Commission’s investigation. Other measures should be taken as well to improve the overall operation of the Secret Service.

Daily supervision of the operations of the Secret Service within the Department of the Treasury should be improved. The Chief of the Service now reports to the Secretary of the Treasury through an Assistant Secretary whose duties also include the direct supervision of the Bureau of the Mint and the Department’s Employment Policy Program, and who also represents the Secretary of the Treasury on various committees and groups.[C8-232] The incumbent has no technical qualifications in the area of Presidential protection.[C8-233] The Commission recommends that the Secretary of the Treasury appoint a special assistant with the responsibility of supervising the Service. This special assistant should be required to have sufficient stature and experience in law enforcement, intelligence, or allied fields to be able to provide effective continuing supervision, and to keep the Secretary fully informed regarding all significant developments relating to Presidential protection.

This report has already pointed out several respects in which the Commission believes that the Secret Service has operated with insufficient planning or control. Actions by the Service since the assassination indicate its awareness of the necessity for substantial improvement in its administration. A formal and thorough description of the responsibilities of the advance agent is now in preparation by the Service.[C8-234] Work is going forward toward the preparation of formal understandings of the respective roles of the Secret Service and other agencies with which it collaborates or from which it derives assistance and support. The Commission urges that the Service continue this effort to overhaul and define its procedures. While manuals and memoranda are no guarantee of effective operations, no sizable organization can achieve efficiency without the careful analysis and demarcation of responsibility that is reflected in definite and comprehensive operating procedures.

The Commission also recommends that the Secret Service consciously set about the task of inculcating and maintaining the highest standard of excellence and esprit for all of its personnel. This involves tight and unswerving discipline as well as the promotion of an outstanding degree of dedication and loyalty to duty. The Commission emphasizes that it finds no causal connection between the assassination and the breach of regulations which occurred on the night of November 21 at Fort Worth. Nevertheless, such a breach, in which so many agents participated, is not consistent with the standards which the responsibilities of the Secret Service require it to meet.

Preventive Intelligence

In attempting to identify those individuals who might prove a danger to the President, the Secret Service has largely been the passive recipient of threatening communications to the President and reports from other agencies which independently evaluate their information for potential sources of danger. This was the consequence of the Service’s lack of an adequate investigative staff, its inability to process large amounts of data, and its failure to provide specific descriptions of the kind of information it sought.[C8-235]

The Secret Service has embarked upon a complete overhaul of its research activities.[C8-236] The staff of the Protective Research Section (PRS) has been augmented, and a Secret Service inspector has been put in charge of this operation. With the assistance of the President’s Office of Science and Technology, and of the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense, it has obtained the services of outside consultants, such as the Rand Corp., International Business Machines Corp., and a panel of psychiatric and psychological experts. It has received assistance also from data processing experts at the CIA and from a specialist in psychiatric prognostication at Walter Reed Hospital.[C8-237] As a result of these studies, the planning document submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Bureau of the Budget on August 31, 1964, makes several significant recommendations in this field.[C8-238] Based on the Commission’s investigation, the following minimum goals for improvements are indicated: