Mr. Griffin. Let's go back a little bit and let me ask you—when did you first give instructions to the men who were actually stationed along the route as to what they should do?
Captain Lawrence. I gave them those instructions on the morning of November 22 and I had with me at the time—I had the detail with me and some notes that I had written. I first told the men the approximate time of the arrival of the President's plane at Love Field. Then, I went over the route that the motorcade would take to the Trade Mart and then the approximate time they were scheduled to be at the Trade Mart and then to leave for Love Field.
I stated that there would be some assignments which we would call assignment No. 1, assignment No. 2 and assignment No. 3. Some officers would only have one assignment and some would have two and some would have three, and that these assignments would be given to them by Lieutenant Southard, that there would be supervisors stationed along the route, cruising the route, and would be able to assist them. I then covered the supervisory assignments, telling them where these sergeants would be stationed along the route, and if anything came up they were to contact them.
Mr. Griffin. The men you assigned, from the instructions that you gave them, what would you expect that these men would do besides simply keep people from running out into the motorcade of cars?
Captain Lawrence. They are crowd control—for the motorcade to move and I also gave the men instructions that it would be no violation—for persons to carry placards, that we expected very little of this, but that they were to be alert to any unusual movements in the crowd so that no one threw anything at the President, that there would be no repetition of the Ambassador Stevenson incident, that President Kennedy was the President of the United States and entitled to the courtesy and protection of this office, and it was their duty to see that this was done, and if there were any violations of the law of any type, that they would arrest individuals immediately, and these were the specific instructions.
Mr. Griffin. Now, if a man, captain, one of your men was placed at a station—was actually standing out there and acting pursuant to these orders, first of all, let me ask you what direction would he be looking; would he be looking toward the street or would he be turned around and facing the crowd?
Captain Lawrence. He would either be facing the crowd or facing the street, depending on the necessity at that time. He was given no specific instructions except that he was not told specifically that he would face the crowd on the traffic assignments, but he was told that he was to watch the crowd, so I wouldn't say that the man—that all of the men on the route were specifically instructed to face the crowd. I gave them no such instructions.
Mr. Griffin. As you drove down the route preceding the motorcade, did you observe just exactly what these men were doing?
Captain Lawrence. Yes; most of the men were watching the oncoming traffic and keeping it moving. They were keeping this oncoming traffic moving. Some of the men were trying to push the crowd back, especially in the downtown area. There were many of them facing the crowds there and trying to push the crowds back, and this was, I imagine, about a mile ahead of the motorcade.
Mr. Griffin. As a practical matter—stationing as you did two men at each intersection generally—could two men have effectively prevented anyone who was bent upon attacking the President, could they have effectively prevented him from rushing out and doing something?