Mr. Coleman. Did you send for the security file?
Mr. Seeley. No, sir; I did not.
Mr. Coleman. Why wouldn't you send for the security file if you get a telegram from a security agency saying that the gentleman who was down at the Russian Embassy in Mexico City is the same guy who in 1959 attempted to defect?
Mr. Seeley. I looked at this report strictly from a passport office point of view. The significance which, of course, might have great intelligence significance, had little or no significance insofar as any action that we would take in the Passport Office is concerned.
Mr. Coleman. Why would that be, sir?
Mr. Seeley. Well, we have to have some basis under our regulations to take any action.
Mr. Coleman. I mean why, if you get information which you can immediately realize may have intelligence significance, why wouldn't you look at it from a point of view of intelligence?
Mr. Seeley. Well, I am working for the Passport Office. Certainly, if I saw something that I could do something about, I would take whatever action I thought was necessary.
Mr. Coleman. Why didn't you, for example, write a letter to the FBI saying that this fellow is down in Mexico City, are you interested, or do you want to see the file?
Mr. Seeley. Well, I would say the probability is that a copy of this was apparently furnished to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.