The crisis of 1914 began with an unforeseen development in the old quarrel of Austria-Hungary and Russia over the Servian question. On June 28 the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir-apparent of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, paid a visit of ceremony to the town of Serajevo, in Bosnia, the administrative centre of the Austrian provinces of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. In entering the town, the Archduke and the Duchess narrowly escaped being killed by a bomb which was thrown at their carriage. Later in the day they were shot by assassins armed with Browning pistols. The crime was apparently planned by political conspirators who resented the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina (supra, [p. 54]), and who desired that these provinces should be united to Servia.
The Austrian Government, having instituted an inquiry, came to the conclusion that the bombs of the conspirators had been obtained from a Servian arsenal; that the crime had been planned in Belgrade, the Servian capital, with the help of a Servian staff-officer who provided the pistols; that the criminals and their weapons had been conveyed from Servia into Bosnia by officers of Servian frontier-posts and by Servian customs-officials. At the moment the Austrian Government published no proof of these conclusions,[[25]] but, on July 23, forwarded them to the Servian Government in a formal note containing certain demands which, it was intimated, must be satisfactorily answered by Servia within forty-eight hours.[[26]] This ultimatum included a form of apology to be published on a specified date by the Servian Government, and ten engagements which the Servian Government were to give the Austro-Hungarian Government. The extraordinary nature of some of these engagements is explained in the [next chapter] (pp. 103-7).
On July 24 this note was communicated by Austria-Hungary to the other Powers of Europe,[[27]] and on July 25 it was published in a German paper, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. It was therefore intended to be a public warning to Servia. On July 24 the German Government told the Powers that it approved the Austrian note, as being necessitated by the 'Great-Servian' propaganda, which aimed at the incorporation in the Servian monarchy of the southern Slav provinces belonging to Austria-Hungary; that Austria, if she wished to remain a Great Power, could not avoid pressing the demands contained in the note, even, if necessary, by military measures; and that the question was one which concerned no Powers except Austria-Hungary and Servia.[[28]]
Russia did not agree that the Austrian note was directed against Servia alone. On July 24 the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs told the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that Austria's conduct was provocative and immoral; that some of her demands were impossible of acceptance; that Austria would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted; that if Austria began military measures against Servia, Russia would probably mobilize. The Russian Minister hoped that England would proclaim its solidarity with France and Russia on the subject of the Austrian note; doubtless Servia could accept some of the Austrian demands.[[29]] To the Austro-Hungarian Government the Russian Minister sent a message, on the same day, July 24, that the time-limit allowed to Servia for her reply was quite insufficient, if the Powers were to help in smoothing the situation; and he urged that Austria-Hungary should publish the proofs of the charges against Servia.[[30]] On July 25 Russia told England[[31]] that Servia would punish those proved to be guilty, but would not accept all the demands of Austria; that no independent state could do so. If Servia appealed to arbitration, as seemed possible, Russia was, she said, prepared to leave the arbitration in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy—the four Powers whom Sir Edward Grey had suggested as possible mediators.
On the day on which Russia made this suggestion, July 25, the Servian Government replied to the Austrian note, conceding part of the Austrian demands, and announcing its readiness to accept, on the other points, the arbitration of the Hague Tribunal or of the Great Powers. The Austrian Government found the Servian note unsatisfactory, and criticized its details in an official memorandum.[[32]] The Austro-Hungarian Minister left Belgrade on July 25; on July 26 a part of the Austro-Hungarian army was mobilized; and on July 28 Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia.
Sir Edward Grey had from the first declined to 'announce England's solidarity' with Russia and France on the Servian question. On and after July 26 he was taking active steps to bring about the mediation, between Austria-Hungary and Servia, of four Powers (Italy, Germany, France, England). To this mediation Russia had already agreed, July 25; and Italy and France were ready to co-operate with England.[[33]] Germany, however, made difficulties on the ground that anything like formal intervention would be impracticable, unless both Austria and Russia consented to it.[[34]] Russia had already (July 25) prepared the ukase ordering mobilization,[[35]] but had not yet issued it; on July 27 the Russian Foreign Minister announced his readiness to make the Servian question the subject of direct conversations with Vienna.[[36]] This offer was at first declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government, but subsequently accepted; and conversations were actually in progress between the representatives of the two Powers as late as August 1.[[37]]
No doubt the hesitation of Austria was due to the fact that, on July 28, the Russian Government warned Germany of the mobilization of the southern military districts of Russia, to be publicly proclaimed on July 29.[[38]] Austria replied to this intimation by offering assurances that she would respect the integrity and independence of Servia;[[39]] these assurances, considered inadequate by the Russian Government, seem to have been the subject of the last conversations between Russia and Austria-Hungary.
Russia persisted that Germany was the real obstacle to a friendly settlement; and this conviction was not affected by the appeals for peace which the Kaiser telegraphed to the Tsar on July 28, July 29, and July 31.[[40]] On July 29 Germany told England that the Russian mobilization was alarming, and that France was also making military preparations;[[41]] at the same time Germany threatened to proclaim 'imminent state of war' (drohende Kriegsgefahr) as a counter measure to the French preparations;[[42]] German military preparations, by July 30, had in fact gone far beyond the preliminary stage which she thus indicated.[[43]] Germany had already warned England, France, and Russia that, if Russia mobilized, this would mean German mobilization against both France and Russia.[[44]] But on July 27, Russia had explained that her mobilization would in no sense be directed against Germany, and would only take place if Austrian forces crossed the Servian frontier.[[45]] On July 29, the day on which Russia actually mobilized the southern districts, Russia once more asked Germany to participate in the 'quadruple conference' now proposed by England, for the purpose of mediating between Austria and Servia. This proposal was declined by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg.[[46]] Germany in fact believed, or professed to believe, that the Russian mobilization, though not proclaimed, was already far advanced.[[47]]
On July 30 Austria, although her conversations with Russia were still in progress, began the bombardment of Belgrade. The next day, July 31, Russia ordered general mobilization; on August 1 France and Germany each took the like step; Germany presented an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that Russian mobilization should cease, and another ultimatum to France asking what course she would take in the event of war between Germany and Russia.
Before these decisive steps of July 30-August 1, and while Sir Edward Grey was still engaged in efforts of mediation, Germany made overtures to England, with the object of securing England's neutrality in the event of a war between Germany and France. On July 29 Germany offered, as the price of English neutrality, to give assurances that, if victorious, she would make no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France; but refused to give a similar assurance respecting French colonies, or to promise to respect Belgian neutrality.[[48]] These proposals were refused by England on July 30.[[49]] On August 1 the German Ambassador unofficially asked England to remain neutral on condition that Germany would not violate Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey replied that England's hands were still free, and that he could not promise neutrality on that condition alone.[[50]]