A Biography of Henry Clay, the Senator from Kentucky / Containing Also, a Complete Report of All His Speeches; Selections From His Private Correspondence; Eulogies in the Senate and House; and a Poem, by George D. Prentice, Esq.

by Unknown

I HAVE been anxious to catch the eye of the chairman for a few moments, to reply to some of the observations which have fallen from various gentlemen. I am aware that, in doing this, I risk the loss of what is of the utmost value—the kind favor of the house, wearied as its patience is, by this prolonged debate. But when I feel what a deep interest the union at large, and particularly that quarter of it whence I come, has, in the decision of the present question, I cannot omit any opportunity of earnestly urging upon the house the propriety of retaining the important power which this question involves. It will be recollected, that if unfortunately there should be a majority both against the abstract proposition asserting the power, and against its practical execution, the power is gone for ever—the question is put at rest, so long as the constitution remains as it is; and with respect to any amendment, in this particular, I confess I utterly despair. It will be borne in mind, that the bill which passed congress on this subject, at the last session, was rejected by the late president of the United States; that at the commencement of the present session, the president communicated his clear opinion, after every effort to come to a different conclusion, that congress does not possess the power contended for, and called upon us to take up the subject, in theshape of an amendment to the constitution; and, moreover, that the predecessor of the present and late presidents, has also intimated his opinion, that congress does not possess the power. With the great weight and authority of the opinions of these distinguished men against the power, and with the fact, solemnly entered upon the record, that this house, after a deliberate review of the ground taken by it at the last session, has decided against the existence of it, (if such, fatally, shall be the decision,) the power, I repeat, is gone—gone for ever, unless restored by an amendment of the constitution. With regard to the practicability of obtaining such an amendment, I think it altogether out of the question. Two different descriptions of persons, entertaining sentiments directly opposed, will unite and defeat such an amendment; one embracing those who believe that the constitution, fairly interpreted, already conveys the power; and the other, those who think that congress has not and ought not to have it. As a large portion of congress, and probably a majority, believes the power to exist, it must be evident, if I am right in supposing that any considerable number of that majority would vote against an amendment which they do not believe necessary, that any attempt to amend would fail. Considering, as I do, the existence of the power as of the first importance, not merely to the preservation of the union of the states, paramount as that consideration ever should be over all others, but to the prosperity of every great interest of the country, agriculture, manufactures, commerce, in peace and in war, it becomes us solemnly, and deliberately, and anxiously, to examine the constitution, and not to surrender it, if fairly to be collected from a just interpretation of that instrument.

With regard to the alarm sought to be created, as to the nature of the power, by bringing up the old theme of ‘state rights,’ I would observe, that if the illustrious persons just referred to are against us in the construction of the constitution, they are on our side as to the harmless and beneficial character of the power. For it is not to be conceived, that each of them would have recommended an amendment to the constitution, if they believed that the possession of such a power, by the general government, would be detrimental, much less dangerous, to the independence and liberties of the states. What real ground is there for this alarm? Gentlemen have not condescended to show how the subversion of the rights of the states is to follow from the exercise of the power of internal improvements by the general government. We contend for the power to make roads and canals, to distribute the intelligence, force, and productions of the country, through all its parts and for such jurisdiction only over them, as is necessary to their preservation from wanton injury and from gradual decay. Suppose such a power is sustained and in full operation; imagine it to extend to every canal made, or proposed to be made, and toevery post-road; how inconsiderable and insignificant is the power in a political point of view, limited as it is, with regard to place and to purpose, when contrasted with the great mass of powers retained by the state sovereignties! What a small subtraction from the mass! Even upon these roads and canals, the state governments, according to our principles, will still exercise jurisdiction over every possible case arising upon them, whether of crime or of contract, or any other human transaction, except only what immediately affects their existence and preservation. Thus defined, thus limited, and stripped of all factitious causes of alarm, I will appeal to the candor of gentlemen to say, if the power really presents any thing frightful in it? With respect to post-roads, our adversaries admit the right of way in the general government. There have been, however, on this question, some instances of conflict, but they have passed away without any serious difficulty. Connecticut, if I have been rightly informed, disputed, at one period, the right of passage of the mail on the Sabbath. The general government persisted in the exercise of the right, and Connecticut herself, and every body else, have acquiesced in it.

The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. H. Nelson) has contended, that I do not adhere, in the principles of construction which I apply to the constitution, to the republican doctrines of 1798, of which that gentleman would have us believe he is the constant disciple. Let me call the attention of the committee to the celebrated state paper to which we both refer for our principles in this respect—a paper which, although I have not seen it for sixteen years, (until the gentleman had the politeness to furnish me with it during this debate,) made such an impression on my mind, that I shall never forget the satisfaction with which I perused it. I find that I have used, without having been aware of it, when I formerly addressed the committee, almost the same identical language employed by Mr. Madison in that paper. It will be recollected, that I claimed no right to exercise any power under the constitution, unless such power was expressly granted, or necessary and proper to carry into effect some granted power. I have not sought to derive power from the clause which authorizes congress to appropriate money. I have been contented with endeavoring to show, that according to the doctrines of 1798, and according to the most rigid interpretation which any one will put upon the instrument, it is expressly given in one case, and fairly deducible in others.

[Here Mr. Clay read sundry passages from Mr. Madison’s report to the Virginia legislature, in an answer to the resolutions of several states, concerning the alien and sedition laws, showing that there were no powers in the general government but what were granted; and that, whenever a power was claimed to be exercised by it, such power must be shown to be granted, or to be necessary and proper to carry into effect one of the specified powers.]

It will be remarked, that Mr. Madison, in his reasoning on the constitution, has not employed the language fashionable during this debate; he has not said, that an implied power must be absolutely necessary to carry into effect the specified power, to which it is appurtenant, to enable the general government to exercise it. No! This was a modern interpretation of the constitution. Mr. Madison has employed the language of the instrument itself, and has only contended that the implied power must be necessary and proper to carry into effect the specified power. He has only insisted, that when congress applied its sound judgment to the constitution in relation to implied powers, it should be clearly seen that they were necessary and proper to effectuate the specified powers. These are my principles; but they are not those of the gentleman from Virginia and his friends on this occasion. They contend for a degree of necessity absolute and indispensable; that by no possibility can the power be otherwise executed.

That there are two classes of powers in the constitution, I believe has never been controverted by an American politician. We cannot foresee and provide specifically for all contingences. Man and his language are both imperfect. Hence the existence of construction, and of constructive powers. Hence also the rule, that a grant of the end is a grant of the means. If you amend the constitution a thousand times, the same imperfection of our nature and our language will attend our new works. There are two dangers to which we are exposed. The one is, that the general government may relapse into the debility which existed in the old confederation, and finally dissolve from the want of cohesion. The denial to it of powers plainly conferred, or clearly necessary and proper to execute the conferred powers, may produce this effect. And I think, with great deference to the gentleman on the other side, this is the danger to which their principles directly tend. The other danger, that of consolidation, is, by the assumption of powers not granted nor incident to granted powers, or the assumption of powers which have been withheld or expressly prohibited. This was the danger of the period of 1798–9. For instance, that, in direct contradiction to a prohibitory clause of the constitution, a sedition act was passed; and an alien law was also passed, in equal violation of the spirit, if not of the express provisions, of the constitution. It was by such measures that the federal party, (if parties might be named,) throwing off the veil, furnished to their adversaries the most effectual ground of opposition. If they had not passed those acts, I think it highly probable that the current of power would have continued to flow in the same channel; and the change of parties in 1801, so auspicious to the best interests of the country, as I believe, would never have occurred.

I beg the committee—I entreat the true friends of the confederated union of these states—to examine this doctrine of state rights,and see to what abusive, if not dangerous consequences, it may lead, to what extent it has been carried, and how it has varied by the same state at different times. In alluding to the state of Massachusetts, I assure the gentlemen from that state, and particularly the honorable chairman of the committee to whom the claim of Massachusetts has been referred, that I have no intention to create any prejudice against that claim. I hope that when the subject is taken up it will be candidly and dispassionately considered, and that a decision will be made on it consistent with the rights of the union, and of the state of Massachusetts. The high character, amiable disposition, and urbanity of the gentleman to whom I have alluded, (Mr. Mason, of Massachusetts,) will, if I had been otherwise inclined, prevent me from endeavoring to make impressions unfavorable to the claim, whose justice that gentleman stands pledged to manifest. But in the period of 1798–9, what was the doctrine promulgated by Massachusetts? It was, that the states, in their sovereign capacity, had no right to examine into the constitutionality or expediency of the measures of the general government.

[Mr. Clay here quoted several passages from the answer of the state of Massachusetts to the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions, concerning the alien and sedition laws, to prove his position.]

We see here an express disclaimer, on the part of Massachusetts, of any right to decide on the constitutionality or expediency of the acts of the general government. But what was the doctrine which the same state, in 1813, thought proper to proclaim to the world, and that, too, when the union was menaced on all sides? She not only claimed but exercised the right which, in 1799, she had so solemnly disavowed. She claimed the right to judge of the propriety of the call made by the general government for her militia, and she refused the militia called for. There is so much plausibility in the reasoning employed by that state in support of her modern doctrine of state rights, that, were it not for the unpopularity of the stand she took in the late war, or had it been in other times, and under other circumstances, she would very probably have escaped a great portion of that odium which has so justly fallen to her lot. The constitution gives to congress power to provide for calling out the militia to execute the laws of the union, to suppress insurrections, and to repel invasions; and in no other cases. The militia was called out by the general government, during the late war, to repel invasions. Massachusetts said, as you have no right to the militia, but in certain contingences, she was competent to decide whether those contingences had or had not occurred. And, having examined the facts, what then? She said, all was peace and quietness in Massachusetts—no non-execution of the laws; no insurrection at home; no invasion from abroad,nor any immediate danger of invasion. And, in truth, I believe there was no actual invasion for nearly two years after the requisition. Under these circumstances, were it not for the supposed motive of her conduct, would not the case which Massachusetts made out have looked extremely plausible? I hope it is not necessary for me to say, that it is very far from my intention to convey any thing like approbation of the conduct of Massachusetts. No! My doctrine is, that the states, as states, have no right to oppose the execution of the powers which the general government asserts. Any state has undoubtedly the right to express its opinion, in the form of resolution or otherwise, and to proceed, by constitutional means, to redress any real or imaginary grievance; but it has no right to withhold its military aid, when called upon by the high authorities of the general government, much less to obstruct the execution of a law regularly passed. To suppose the existence of such an alarming right, is to suppose, if not disunion itself, such a state of disorder and confusion as must inevitably lead to it.

Greatly as I venerate the state which gave me birth, and much as I respect the judges of its supreme court, several of whom are my personal friends, I am obliged to think that some of the doctrines which that state has recently held concerning state rights, are fraught with much danger. If those doctrines had been asserted during the late war, a large share of the public disapprobation which has been given to Massachusetts would have fallen to Virginia. What are these doctrines? The courts of Virginia assert, that they have a right to determine on the constitutionality of any law or treaty of the United States, and to expound them according to their own views, even if they should vary from the decision of the supreme court of the United States. They assert more—that from their decision there can be no appeal to the supreme court of the United States; and that there exists in congress no power to frame a law, obliging the court of the state, in the last resort, to submit its decision to the supervision of the supreme court of the United States; or, if I do not misunderstand the doctrine, to withdraw from the state tribunal, controversies involving the laws of the United States, and to place them before the federal judiciary. I am a friend, a true friend, to state rights; but not in all cases as they are asserted. The states have their appointed orbit; so has the union; and each should be confined within its fair, legitimate, and constitutional sphere. We should equally avoid that subtle process of argument which dissipates into air the powers of this government, and that spirit of encroachment which would snatch from the state, powers not delegated to the general government. We shall thus escape both the dangers I have noticed—that of relapsing into the alarming weakness of the confederation, which is described as a mere rope of sand; and also that other, perhaps not the greatest danger, consolidation. No man deprecates morethan I do, the idea of consolidation; yet, between separation and consolidation, painful as would be the alternative, I would greatly prefer the latter.