[Mr. Nelson said, he had not drawn that distinction, having only stated the fact.]
Other roads, in other parts of the union, have, it seems, been likewise ordered, or their execution, at the public expense, sanctioned by the executive, without the concurrence of congress. If the president has the power to cause these public improvements to be executed at his pleasure, whence is it derived? If any member will stand up in this place and say the president is clothed with this authority, and that it is denied to congress, let us hear from him; and let him point to the clause of the constitution which vests it in the executive and withholds it from the legislative branch.
There is no such clause; there is no such exclusive executive power. The power is derivable by the executive only from those provisions of the constitution which charge him with the duties of commanding the physical force of the country, and the employment of that force in war, and the preservation of the public tranquillity, and in the execution of the laws. But congress has paramount powers to the president. It alone can declare war, can raise armies, can provide for calling out the militia, in the specified instances, and can raise and appropriate the ways and means necessary to those objects. Or is it come to this, that there are to be two rules of construction for the constitution—one, an enlarged rule, for the executive, and another, a restricted rule, for the legislature? Is it already to be held, that, according to the genius and nature of our constitution, powers of this kind may be safely intrusted to the executive, but, when attempted to be exercised by the legislature, are so alarming and dangerous, that a war with all the allied powers would be less terrible, and that the nation should clothe itself straightway in sackcloth and ashes! No, sir; if the power belongs only by implication to the chief magistrate, it is placed both by implication and express grant in the hands of congress. I am so far from condemning the act of the president, to which I have referred, that I think it deserving of high approbation. That it was within the scope of his constitutional authority, I have no doubt; and I sincerely trust, that the secretary at war will, in time of peace, constantly employ in that way the military force. It will at the same time guard that force against the vicesincident to indolence and inaction, and correct the evil of subtracting from the mass of the labor of society, where labor is more valuable than in any other country, that portion of it which enters into the composition of the army. But I most solemnly protest against any exercise of powers of this kind by the president, which are denied to congress. And, if the opinions expressed by him, in his message, were communicated, or are to be used here, to influence the judgment of the house, their authority is more than countervailed by the authority of his deliberate acts.
Some principles drawn from political economists have been alluded to, and we are advised to leave things to themselves, upon the ground that, when the condition of society is ripe for internal improvements—that is, when capital can be so invested with a fair prospect of adequate remuneration, they will be executed by associations of individuals, unaided by government. With my friend from South Carolina (Mr. Lowndes) I concur in this as a general maxim; and I also concur with him that there are exceptions to it. The foreign policy which I think this country ought to adopt, presents one of those exceptions. It would perhaps be better for mankind, if, in the intercourse between nations, all would leave skill and industry to their unstimulated exertions. But this is not done; and if other powers will incite the industry of their subjects, and depress that of our citizens, in instances where they may come into competition, we must imitate their selfish example. Hence the necessity to protect our manufactures. In regard to internal improvements, it does not follow, that they will always be constructed whenever they will afford a competent dividend upon the capital invested. It may be true generally that, in old countries, where there is a great accumulation of surplus capital, and a consequent low rate of interest, they will be made. But, in a new country, the condition of society may be ripe for public works long before there is, in the hands of individuals, the necessary accumulation of capital to effect them; and, besides, there is generally, in such a country, not only a scarcity of capital, but such a multiplicity of profitable objects presenting themselves as to distract the judgment. Further; the aggregate benefit resulting to the whole society, from a public improvement, may be such as to amply justify the investment of capital in its execution, and yet that benefit may be so distributed among different and distant persons, that they can never be got to act in concert. The turnpike roads wanted to pass the Alleghany mountains, and the Delaware and Chesapeake canal, are objects of this description. Those who will be most benefited by these improvements, reside at a considerable distance from the sites of them; many of those persons never have seen and never will see them. How is it possible to regulate the contributions, or to present to individuals so situated a sufficiently lively picture of their real interests, to get them to make exertionsin effectuating the object, commensurate with their respective abilities? I think it very possible that the capitalist, who should invest his money in one of these objects, might not be reimbursed three per centum annually upon it; and yet society, in various forms, might actually reap fifteen or twenty per centum. The benefit resulting from a turnpike road, made by private associations, is divided between the capitalist who receives his tolls, the lands through which it passes, and which are augmented in their value, and the commodities whose value is enhanced by the diminished expense of transportation. A combination, upon any terms, much less a just combination, of all those interests, to effect the improvement, is impracticable. And if you await the arrival of the period when the tolls alone can produce a competent dividend, it is evident that you will have to suspend its execution long after the general interests of society would have authorized it.
Again, improvements, made by private associations, are generally made by local capital. But ages must elapse before there will be concentrated in certain places, where the interests of the whole community may call for improvements, sufficient capital to make them. The place of the improvement, too, is not always the most interested in its accomplishment. Other parts of the union—the whole line of the seaboard—are quite as much, if not more interested, in the Delaware and Chesapeake canal, as the small tract of country through which it is proposed to pass. The same observation will apply to turnpike roads passing through the Alleghany mountain. Sometimes the interest of the place of the improvement is adverse to the improvement and to the general interest. I would cite Louisville, at the rapids of the Ohio, as an example, whose interest will probably be more promoted by the continuance, than the removal of the obstruction. Of all the modes in which a government can employ its surplus revenue, none is more permanently beneficial than that of internal improvement. Fixed to the soil, it becomes a durable part of the land itself, diffusing comfort, and activity, and animation, on all sides. The first direct effect is on the agricultural community, into whose pockets comes the difference in the expense of transportation between good and bad ways. Thus, if the price of transporting a barrel of flour by the erection of the Cumberland turnpike should be lessened two dollars, the producer of the article would receive that two dollars more now than formerly.
But, putting aside all pecuniary considerations, there may be political motives sufficiently powerful alone to justify certain internal improvements. Does not our country present such? How are they to be effected, if things are left to themselves? I will not press the subject further. I am but too sensible how much I have abused the patience of the committee by trespassing so long upon its attention. The magnitude of the question, and the deep interestI feel in its rightful decision, must be my apology. We are now making the last effort to establish our power, and I call on the friends of congress, of this house, or the true friends of state rights, (not charging others with intending to oppose them,) to rally round the constitution, and to support by their votes, on this occasion, the legitimate powers of the legislature. If we do nothing this session but pass an abstract resolution on the subject, I shall, under all circumstances, consider it a triumph for the best interests of the country, of which posterity will, if we do not, reap the benefit. I trust, that by the decision which shall be given, we shall assert, uphold, and maintain, the authority of congress, notwithstanding all that has been or may be said against it.
[The resolution of giving the power of congress, first, to appropriate money to the construction of military and post roads, make canals, and improve water-courses, was adopted: yeas ninety; nays seventy-five: secondly, to construct such roads: lost: yeas eighty-two; nays eighty-four: thirdly, to construct roads and canals for commercial purposes: lost: yeas seventy-one; nays ninety-five: fourthly, to construct canals for military purposes: lost: eighty-one to eighty-three.]
ON THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 24, 1818.