No guarantee for the conduct of nations or individuals ought to be stronger than that which honor imposes; but for those who put no confidence in its obligations, I have an argument to urge of more conclusive force. It is founded upon the interests of England. Excluded almost as she is from the continent, the commerce of America, South and North, is worth to her more than the commerce of the residue of the world. That to all Spanish America has been alone estimated at fifteen millions sterling. Its aggregate value to Spanish America and the United States may be fairlystated at upwards of one hundred thousand dollars. The effect of a war with the two countries would be, to divest England of this great interest, at a moment when she is anxiously engaged in repairing the ravages of the European war. Looking to the present moment only, and merely to the interests of commerce, England is concerned more than even this country, in the success of the cause of independence in Spanish America. The reduction of the Spanish power in America has been the constant and favorite aim of her policy for two centuries; she must blot out her whole history, reverse the maxims of all her illustrious statesmen, extinguish the spirit of commerce which animates, directs, and controls all her movements, before she can render herself accessary to the subjugation of Spanish America. No commercial advantages which Spain may offer by treaty, can possess the security for her trade, which independence would communicate. The one would be most probably of limited duration, and liable to violation from policy, from interest, or from caprice. The other would be as permanent as independence. That I do not mistake the views of the British cabinet, the recent proclamation of the prince regent I think proves. The committee will remark, that the document does not describe the patriots as rebels, or insurgents, but, using a term which I have no doubt has been well weighed, it declares the existence of a ‘state of warfare.’ And with regard to English subjects, who are in the armies of Spain, although they entered the service without restriction as to their military duties, it requires that they shall not take part against the colonies. The subjects of England freely supply the patriots with arms and ammunition, and an honorable friend of mine (Colonel Johnson) has just received a letter from one of the West India islands, stating the arrival there from England of the skeletons of three regiments, with many of the men to fill them, destined to aid the patriots. In the Quarterly Review of November last, a journal devoted to the ministry, and a work of the highest authority, as it respects their views, the policy of neutrality is declared and supported as the true policy of England; and that, even if the United States were to take part in the war; and Spain is expressly notified, that she cannot and must not expect aid from England.
‘In arguing, therefore, for the advantage of a strict neutrality, we must enter an early protest against any imputations of hostility to the cause of genuine freedom, or of any passion for despotism and the inquisition. We are no more the panegyrists of legitimate authority in all times, circumstances, and situations, than we are advocates for revolution in the abstract,’ and so forth. ‘But it has been plausibly asserted, that, by abstaining from interference in the affairs of South America, we are surrendering to the United States all the advantages which might be secured to ourselves from this revolution; that we are assisting to increase the trade and power of a nation which alone can ever be the maritime rival of England. It appears to us extremely doubtful, whether any advantage, commercial or political, can be lost to England by a neutral conduct; it must be observed, that the United States themselves, have given every public proof of their intention to pursue the same line of policy. Butadmitting that this conduct is nothing more than a decent pretext; or admitting, still further, that they will afford to the independents direct and open assistance, our view of the case would remain precisely the same,’ and so forth. ‘To persevere in force, unaided, is to miscalculate her (Spain’s) own resources, even to infatuation. To expect the aid of an ally in such a cause would, if that ally were England, be to suppose this country as forgetful of its own past history as of its immediate interests and duties. Far better would it be for Spain, instead of calling for our aid, to profit by our experience; and to substitute, ere it be too late, for efforts like those by which the North American colonies were lost to this country, the conciliatory measures by which they might have been retained.’
In the case of the struggle between Spain and her colonies, England, for once, at least, has manifested a degree of wisdom highly deserving our imitation, but unfortunately the very reverse of her course has been pursued by us. She has so conducted, by operating upon the hopes of the two parties, as to keep on the best terms with both; to enjoy all the advantages of the rich commerce of both. We have, by a neutrality bill containing unprecedented features, and still more by a late executive measure, to say the least of it, of doubtful constitutional character, contrived to dissatisfy both parties. We have the confidence neither of Spain nor the colonies.
It remains for me to defend the proposition which I meant to submit, from an objection which I have heard intimated, that it interferes with the duties assigned to the executive branch. On this subject I feel the greatest solicitude; for no man, more than myself, respects the preservation of the independence of the several departments of government, in the constitutional orbits which are prescribed to them. It is my favorite maxim, that each, acting within its proper sphere, should move with its constitutional independence, and under its constitutional responsibility, without influence from any other. I am perfectly aware that the constitution of the United States—and I admit the proposition in its broadest sense—confides to the executive the reception and the deputation of ministers. But, in relation to the latter operation, congress has concurrent will, in the power of providing for the payment of their salaries. The instrument nowhere says or implies that the executive act of sending a minister to a foreign country, shall precede the legislative act which provides for the payment of his salary. And, in point of fact, our statutory code is full of examples of legislative action prior to executive action, both in relation to the deputation of agents abroad, and to the subject matter of treaties. Perhaps the act of sending a minister abroad, and the act of providing for the allowance of his salary, ought to be simultaneous; but if, in the order of precedence, there be more reason on the one side than on the other, I think it is in favor of the priority of the legislative act, as the safer depository of power. When a minister is sent abroad, although the legislature may be disposed to think his mission useless; although, if previously consulted, they would have said they would not consent to paysuch a minister; the duty is delicate and painful to refuse to pay the salary promised to him whom the executive has even unnecessarily sent abroad. I can illustrate my idea by the existing missions to Sweden and to the Netherlands. I have no hesitation in saying, that if we had not ministers of the first grade there, and if the legislature were asked, prior to sending them, whether it would consent to pay ministers of that grade, I would not, and I believe congress would not, consent to pay them.
If it be urged that, by avowing our willingness, in a legislative act, to pay a minister not yet sent, and whom the president may think it improper to send abroad, we operate upon the president by all the force of our opinion; it may be retorted, that when we are called upon to pay any minister, sent under similar circumstances, we are operated upon by all the force of the president’s opinion. The true theory of our government, at least, supposes that each of the two departments, acting on its proper constitutional responsibility, will decide according to its best judgment, under all the circumstances of the case. If we make the previous appropriation, we act upon our constitutional responsibility, and the president afterwards will proceed upon his. And so if he makes the previous appointment. We have the right, after a minister is sent abroad, and we are called upon to pay him, and we ought, to deliberate upon the propriety of his mission; we may and ought to grant or withhold his salary. If this power of deliberation is conceded subsequently to the deputation of the minister, it must exist prior to that deputation. Whenever we deliberate, we deliberate under our constitutional responsibility. Pass the amendment I propose, and it will be passed under that responsibility. Then the president, when he deliberates on the propriety of the mission, will act under his constitutional responsibility. Each branch of government, moving in its proper sphere, will act with as much freedom from the influence of the other, as is practically attainable.
There is great reason, from the peculiar character of the American government, for a perfect understanding between the legislative and executive branches, in relation to the acknowledgment of a new power. Every where else the power of declaring war resides with the executive. Here it is deposited with the legislature. If, contrary to my opinion, there be even a risk that the acknowledgment of a new state may lead to war, it is advisable that the step should not be taken without a previous knowledge of the will of the war-making branch. I am disposed to give to the president all the confidence which he must derive from the unequivocal expression of our will. This expression I know may be given in the form of an abstract resolution, declaratory of that will; but I prefer at this time proposing an act of practical legislation. And if I have been so fortunate as to communicate to the committee, in any thing like that degree of strength in which I entertain them,the convictions that the cause of the patriots is just; that the character of the war, as waged by Spain, should induce us to wish them success; that we have a great interest in that success; that this interest, as well as our neutral attitude, requires us to acknowledge any established government in Spanish America; that the United Provinces of the river Plate is such a government; that we may safely acknowledge its independence, without danger of war from Spain, from the allies, or from England; and that, without unconstitutional interference with the executive power, with peculiar fitness, we may express, in an act of appropriation, our sentiments, leaving him to the exercise of a just and responsible discretion; I hope the committee will adopt the proposition which I have now the honor of presenting to them, after a respectful tender of my acknowledgments for their attention and kindness, during, I fear, the tedious period I have been so unprofitably trespassing upon their patience.
EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 28, 1818.
[THE house having again resolved itself into a committee of the whole on the general appropriation bill, to which Mr. Clay had moved an amendment, which was still pending, to introduce an appropriation for a mission to Buenos Ayres (as stated in the last foregoing speech), Mr. Clay said, that as no other gentleman appeared disposed to address the chair, he would avail himself of this opportunity of making some remarks in reply to the opponents of his motion. The members who had spoken against the measure were Messrs. Lowndes, of South Carolina, Forsyth, of Georgia, Smith, of Maryland, Smyth and H. Nelson, of Virginia, and Poindexter, of Mississippi; while those who supported it were Messrs. Robertson, of Louisiana, Holmes, of Massachusetts, Floyd and Tucker, of Virginia, and R. M. Johnson, of Kentucky. The amendment was rejected by a vote of one hundred and fifteen to forty-five; a result which was reversed in 1820.]