He warmly espoused the cause of the people of Orleans Territory, who were desirous of forming a constitution and government. Accordingly, on the twentieth of April of the same session, he succeeded in causing such action to be taken relative to the subject, as to secure an amendment of a bill before the senate, so as to require the laws, records and legislative proceedings of the state, to be in the English language. A few days subsequent, leave of absence was granted him during the remainder of the session.
On the third day of December, 1810, the commencement of the third session of the eleventh congress, Mr. Clay was found in his place in the senate. A subject that had been much agitated in private many months previous, and up to that time, was now brought forward for public discussion—that of re-chartering the United States bank. This was the all absorbing topic of the session, and called into exercise Mr. Clay’s most vigorous powers. His instructions from the legislature of Kentucky required him to oppose the re-charter of that institution, and these were in coincidence with his own views relative to it. It had been his design to limit his opposition to merely recording his vote against the renewal of its charter, without entering into the discussion which would probably ensue, but the virulent and menacing character of the proceedings of those advocating its re-charter, unsealed his lips, and caused him to apply the lash of his eloquence to their backs with most tremendous effect. These embraced the whole body of the federal, and many of the democratic party—an array of members and strength which might have deterred any ordinary man from confronting. Against this, he stood almost alone, deserted even by Mr. Pope, his colleague: yet he stood firm; and, from the effect that followed his exertions, proved himself more deserving the title of ‘Macedonian Phalanx,’ than the federal party to whom he had applied it. The attack was provoked by that party, and it was made in the spirit of conscious might, which not only meets opposition with the utmost certainty of overthrowing, but which seeks it. He alluded to that deep-seated prejudice in the public mind, against the bank, and the foundation of that prejudice. It did not escape his notice that the bank was created by the federal party—its warmest and most devoted friends, then resorting toevery expedient and means to prolong its existence. He was also well aware of the aid rendered that party, by Mr. Crawford and others, who had in this measure left the democratic ranks and gone over to it. He referred, also, to the astounding fact, that the institution was in reality in the hands of foreigners, since foreign capitalists were more deeply interested in its continuance than our own, who owned a moiety only of its stock; neither did he fail to suggest, that perhaps the violent struggle then going on to keep it in existence, was instigated and maintained, to no inconsiderable extent, by foreign influence. In no equivocal manner he depicted the absurdity, to say nothing of the danger, of permitting Great Britain to acquire such an influence as she evidently could acquire, by having her monetary interests, to so great an extent, identified with the United States bank—an influence which would place facilities in her hands, that, in case she felt disposed, she could use to our most serious detriment. These and many other considerations, he brought forward as furnishing good and valid ground of alarm, and legitimately calculated to awaken patriotic opposition. But his greatest fundamental objection was one which he derived from the constitution itself, and one which he urged with a vehemence sure to prevail. He maintained that no specific provision was found in that instrument, authorizing or permitting the charter of the bank, neither could it be so construed as to imply the power to that effect. In opposing, therefore, the renewal of its charter, his remarks were principally confined to the objectionable feature of its unconstitutionality; and they furnish one of the strongest arguments against a national bank ever made, and one that is often referred to as authority of a high order. It may be well to insert a portion of his speech, illustrative of their pertinence and beauty.
‘This vagrant power to erect a bank, after having wandered throughout the whole constitution in quest of some congenial spot to fasten upon, has been at length located, by the gentleman from Georgia, on that provision which authorized congress to lay and collect taxes. In 1791 the power is referred to one part of the instrument, and in 1811 to another. Sometimes it is alleged to be deducible from the power to regulate commerce. Hard pressed here, it disappears, and shows itself under the grant to coin money.
‘What is the nature of the government? It is emphatically federal, vested with an aggregate of specific powers for general purposes, conceded by existing sovereignties, who have themselves retained what is not so conceded. It is said that there are cases in which it must act on implied powers. This is not controverted, but the implication must be necessary, and obviously flow from the enumerated power with which it is allied. The power to charter companies is not specified in the grant, and I contend is of a nature not transferable by mere implication. It is one of the most exalted acts of sovereignty. In the exercise of this giganticpower we have seen an East India Company erected, which has carried dismay, desolation and death, throughout one of the largest portions of the habitable world—a company which is in itself a sovereignty, which has subverted empires, and set up new dynasties, and has not only made war, but war against its legitimate sovereign. Under the influence of this power we have seen arise a South Sea Company, and a Mississippi Company, that distracted and convulsed all Europe, and menaced a total overthrow of all credit and confidence, and universal bankruptcy. Is it to be imagined that a power so vast would have been left by the constitution to doubtful inference? It has been alleged that there are many instances in the constitution, where powers in their nature incidental, and which would necessarily have been vested along with the principal, are nevertheless expressly enumerated, and the power to make rules and regulations for the government of the land and naval forces, which it is said is incidental to the power to raise armies and provide a navy, is given as an example. What does this prove? How extremely cautious the convention were to leave as little as possible to implication. In all cases where incidental powers are acted on, the principal and incidental ought to be congenial with each other, and partake of a common nature. The incidental power ought to be strictly subordinate, and limited to the end proposed to be attained by the specific power. In other words, under the name of accomplishing one object which is specified, the power implied ought not to be made to embrace other objects which are not specified in the constitution. If then, as is contended, you could establish a bank to collect and distribute the revenue, it ought to be expressly restricted to the purpose of such collection and distribution. It is mockery worse than usurpation, to establish it for a lawful object, and then to extend it to other objects which are not lawful. In deducing the power to create corporations, such as I have described it, from the power to collect taxes, the relation of principal and incident are prostrated and destroyed. The accessory is exalted above the principal. As well might it be said that the great luminary of day is an accessory, a satellite to the humblest star that twinkles forth its feeble light in the firmament of heaven.
‘Suppose the constitution had been silent as to an individual department of the government, could you, under the power to lay and collect taxes, establish a judiciary? I presume not; but if you could derive the power by mere implication, could you vest it with any other authority than to enforce the collection of the revenue? A bank is made for the ostensible purpose of aiding in the collection of the revenue, and whilst it is engaged in this, the most inferior and subordinate of all its functions, it is made to diffuse itself throughout society, and to influence all the great operations of credit, circulation, and commerce. Like the Virginia justice,you tell the man whose turkey had been stolen, that your books of precedents furnish no form for his case, but then you will grant him a precept to search for a cow, and when looking for that he may possibly find his turkey! You say to this corporation, we cannot authorize you to discount—to emit paper—to regulate commerce—no! our book has no precedents of that kind. But then we can authorize you to collect the revenue, and whilst occupied with that, you may do whatever else you please.
‘What is a corporation, such as the bill contemplates? It is a splendid association of favored individuals, taken from the mass of society, and invested with exemptions, and surrounded by immunities and privileges. The honorable gentleman from Massachusetts has said that the original law establishing the bank was justly liable to the objection of vesting in that institution an exclusive privilege,—the faith of the government being pledged that no other bank should be authorized during its existence. This objection, he supposes, is obviated by the bill under consideration; but all corporations enjoy exclusive privileges—that is, the corporators have privileges which no others possess; if you create fifty corporations instead of one, you have only fifty privileged bodies instead of one. I contend that the states have the exclusive power to regulate contracts, to declare the capacities and incapacities to contract, and to provide as to the extent of the responsibility of debtors to their creditors. If congress have the power to create an artificial body and say it shall be endowed with the attributes of an individual, if you can bestow on this object of your own creation the ability to contract, may you not in contravention of state rights confer upon slaves, infants, and femes covert, the ability to contract? And if you have the power to say that an association of individuals shall be responsible for their debts only in a certain limited degree, what is to prevent an extension of a similar exemption to individuals? Where is the limitation upon this power to set up corporations? You establish one in the heart of a state, the basis of whose capital is money. You may erect others, whose capital shall consist of land, slaves, and personal estate, and thus the whole property within the jurisdiction of a state might be absorbed by those political bodies. The existing bank contends that it is beyond the power of a state to tax it, and if this pretension be well founded, it is in the power of congress by chartering companies to dry up all the sources of state revenue. This government has the power to lay taxes, to raise armies, provide munitions, make war, regulate commerce, coin money, etc., etc. It would not be difficult to show as intimate a connection between a corporation established for any purpose whatever, and some one or other of those great powers, as there is between the revenue and the bank of the United States.’
Mr. Clay noticed the danger to which the United States wereexposed from the fact that the capital of the bank was principally subject to foreign control, in the following glowing language.
‘The power of a nation is said to consist in the sword and the purse. Perhaps at last all power is resolvable into that of the purse, for with it you may command almost every thing else. The specie circulation of the United States is estimated by some calculators at ten millions of dollars; and if it be no more, one moiety is in the vaults of this bank. May not the time arrive when the concentration of such a vast portion of the circulating medium of the country in the hands of any corporation will be dangerous to our liberties? By whom is this immense power wielded? By a body who, in derogation of the great principle of all our institutions, responsibility to the people, is amenable only to a few stockholders, and they chiefly foreigners. Suppose an attempt to subvert this government—would not the traitor first aim, by force or corruption, to acquire the treasure of this company? Look at it in another aspect. Seven tenths of its capital are in the hands of foreigners, chiefly English subjects. We are possibly on the eve of a rupture with that nation. Should such an event occur, do you apprehend that the English premier would experience any difficulty in obtaining the entire control of the institution. Republics, above all other governments, ought most seriously to guard against foreign influence. All history proves that the internal dissensions excited by foreign intrigue, have produced the downfall of almost every free government that has hitherto existed; and yet gentlemen contend that we are benefited by the possession of this foreign capital!’
His powerful arguments and convincing reasoning prevailed—resulting in a most signal victory over those opposed to him, who entered on the discussion with sanguine expectations of success. The charter was not then renewed. Many more subjects of interest came before the senate during the session of 1810–11, in the consideration of which he displayed his usual zeal and solicitude in behalf of the interests of the commonwealth, which were now with favor generally recognized. Mr. Clay had produced an impression of his eloquent powers and brilliant talents, that was not confined to his associates and those witnessing their every day exercise, but it was as extensive as his country. His reputation as a debater, orator, and sound logical reasoner, was now immovably established. The star of his fame, which first appeared in the political horizon, under circumstances of doubt and gloom, struggling through dense clouds of indigence and obscurity, emitting what political animosity termed an ignis fatuus glare around the cabins of the emigrant and the hunter in western forests, was now in the ascendant, illuminating and vivifying, not only the woody homes, the rural hamlets, and sylvan abodes of his own forest land, but mingling its bright beams most beautifully with those that streamed fromLiberty’s altar. Henceforth it will be our delightful duty to mark it steadily careering its glorious way upwards, higher and higher, making its blessed influences to be felt in every nook and corner of our extensive country, penetrating the kingly court, flashing amid the diadems of crowned heads, and introducing hope and peace into the tenement of the oppressed on distant shores. It was obvious to the least penetrative vision that it was then rapidly and steadfastly approaching the zenith, when its effulgence would illumine the world.
At the close of his second term of service, which was for two years, he returned to Kentucky, but his fame had preceded him—the eyes of Kentuckians had been fixed gratefully on him during his senatorial services, and they were prepared to return him speedily to the halls of congress, to adorn which, he had given such abundant proof of his capability. According to the proclamation of the president, congress convened on the fourth day of November, 1811, and on the first ballot for speaker to the house of representatives, Mr. Clay was elected by a majority of thirty-one over the opposing candidates. When it is recollected that this was his first appearance in that body, it must be regarded as a remarkable occurrence, and entirely aside from the ordinary course of events; indeed, as an instance of early and strong confidence reposed in one, to which a parallel cannot be found in the history of any individual. There were many circumstances, however, explanatory of this hasty, unreserved reliance. He was known to have acted in that capacity in the legislature of Kentucky, and to have discharged its duties with singular ability and acceptance; also of his conspicuity in the senate they were not ignorant, and perhaps a desire to see Mr. Randolph, of Virginia, restrained in his gross violations of order and decorum, for which he was noted, whom it was imagined Mr. Clay could curb, induced several members to vote for him, who otherwise had not supported him for the office. That confidence so generously, spontaneously, and by him so unexpectedly yielded, he very appropriately noticed, in a pertinent speech made by him on assuming the responsible station, and he proved by his faithfulness, zeal, and decision, with which he discharged its onerous duties, that it was most judiciously confided. He showed himself equal to the task of curbing Mr. John Randolph, or any other turbulent spirit in the assembly over which he presided. He was subsequently chosen several times to fill the same important post, and never did he betray his trust, or disappoint the just expectations of his friends. The manner in which he exercised his authority may be considered as somewhat stern, slightly approximating to arbitrariness, evincing great decision and firmness of character, and a disposition not to tolerate the slightest disrespect or indignity towards the house. During the long period in which he discharged the functions of speaker, including many sessionsof great turbulence and strife, not one of his decisions was ever reversed on an appeal from the chair. This fact speaks volumes in his praise.