ON THE SPANISH TREATY.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, APRIL 3, 1820.
[A PERUSAL of this speech will be always gratifying and instructive, to all who would wish to be well informed in the political history of the United States. While it shows, in a striking manner, the foresight and sagacity of Mr. Clay, as an American statesman, it contains facts of much importance with regard to the settlement of the southern boundaries of the United States and the acquisition of Florida.It will be seen, that Mr. Clay disapproved of the treaty between this country and Spain, made in 1819, by the administration of Mr. Monroe, for reasons stated in this speech, which was made before the treaty was ratified by Spain. His principal objection to the treaty appears to have been, that it relinquished our claim to Texas, which territory Mr. Clay considered of much greater value to us than Florida. The settlement of these questions, by the subsequent ratification of the treaty, in October, 1820, by which we relinquished Texas and acquired Florida, does not diminish the value of this record of Mr. Clay’s views on a subject, which has increased in importance since the independence of both Mexico and Texas has been established.]
THE house having resolved itself into a committee of the whole, on the state of the union, and the following resolutions, submitted some days ago by Mr. Clay (the speaker) being under consideration:
First, resolved, that the constitution of the United States vests in congress the power to dispose of the territory belonging to them; and that no treaty, purporting to alienate any portion thereof, is valid without the concurrence of congress:
Second, resolved, that the equivalent proposed to be given by Spain to the United States in the treaty concluded between them, on the twenty-second of February, 1819, for that part of Louisiana lying west of the Sabine, was inadequate; and that it would be inexpedient to make a transfer thereof to any foreign power, or to renew the aforesaid treaty:
Mr. Clay said, that, whilst he felt very grateful to the house for the prompt and respectful manner in which they had allowed him to enter upon the discussion of the resolutions which he had the honor of submitting to their notice, he must at the same time frankly say, that he thought their character and consideration, in the councils of this country, were concerned in not letting the present session pass off without deliberating upon our affairs withSpain. In coming to the present session of congress, it had been his anxious wish to be able to concur with the executive branch of the government in the measures which it might conceive itself called upon to recommend on that subject, for two reasons, of which the first, relating personally to himself, he would not trouble the committee with further noticing. The other was, that it appeared to him to be always desirable, in respect to the foreign action of this government, that there should be a perfect coincidence in opinion between its several coördinate branches. In time of peace, however, it might be allowable, to those who are charged with the public interests, to entertain and express their respective views, although there might be some discordance between them. In a season of war there should be no division in the public councils; but a united and vigorous exertion to bring the war to an honorable conclusion. For his part, whenever that calamity may befall his country, he would entertain but one wish, and that is, that success might crown our struggle, and the war be honorably and gloriously terminated. He would never refuse to share in the joys incident to the victory of our arms, nor to participate in the griefs of defeat and discomfiture. He conceded entirely in the sentiment once expressed by that illustrious hero, whose recent melancholy fall we all so sincerely deplore, that fortune may attend our country in whatever war it may be involved.
There are two systems of policy, he said, of which our government had had the choice. The first was, by appealing to the justice and affections of Spain, to employ all those persuasives which could arise out of our abstinence from any direct countenance to the cause of South America, and the observance of a strict neutrality. The other was, by appealing to her justice also, and to her fears, to prevail upon her to redress the injuries of which we complain—her fears by a recognition of the independent governments of South America, and leaving her in a state of uncertainty as to the further step we might take in respect to those governments. The unratified treaty was the result of the first system. It could not be positively affirmed, what effect the other system would have produced; but he verily believed that, whilst it rendered justice to those governments, and would have better comported with that magnanimous policy which ought to have characterized our own, it would have more successfully tended to an amicable and satisfactory arrangement of our differences with Spain.
The first system has so far failed. At the commencement of the session, the president recommended an enforcement of the provisions of the treaty. After three months’ deliberation, the committee of foreign affairs, not being able to concur with him, has made us a report, recommending the seizure of Florida in the nature of a reprisal. Now the president recommends our postponement of the subject until the next session. It had been his intention, wheneverthe committee of foreign affairs should engage the house to act upon their bill, to offer, as a substitute for it, the system which he thought it became this country to adopt, of which the occupation of Texas, as our own, would have been a part, and the recognition of the independent governments of South America another. If he did not now bring forward this system, it was because the committee proposed to withdraw their bill, and because he knew too much of the temper of the house and of the executive, to think that it was advisable to bring it forward. He hoped that some suitable opportunity might occur during the session, for considering the propriety of recognising the independent governments of South America.