A short time after, a proposal from the English ministry to negotiate with us at Gottingen was accepted, and Messrs. Clay and Jonathan Russell were selected commissioners, who, in connection with the three in Russia, were invested with full power to treat with lord Gambier, Henry Goulborne, and William Adamos, commissioners on the part of the British government.
Although Gottingen had been first agreed upon as the city where to conduct the negotiation, subsequently it was determined that Ghent should be the place. The sixth of August, 1814, found the plenipotentiaries of both nations (except Mr. Gallatin, who joined them soon after,) at the latter city, ready to proceed with their legitimate business. They commenced by a mutual interchange of kind feeling, evincing a disposition to approach the subject in the true spirit of conciliation, and to frame their stipulations so as to subserve the interests of the powers they represented. In consequence of the proximity of the British ministers to their government, they enjoyed a superior advantage over the American commissioners, of which they availed themselves freely, for whenever they received from the latter a note of any importance, it was directly sent to London, where its contents were carefully scrutinized by the English ministry, who prepared and sent back an answer containing instructions, which were to govern their actions in relation to it. This mode of procedure adopted by them, greatly retarded the negotiation, while the remoteness of the American negotiators from their government, made it impossible for them to resort to a similar method. The plan which they adopted on receiving a communication from the former, was to consider its contents deliberately, and with great circumspection; after which it was committed to the care of one of their number deputed to prepare an answer. This underwent a rigid examination, when each member considered it in private, making such alterations as he deemed proper. Afterwards they all assembled and subjectedthem to a thorough scrutiny, which terminated in their adoption or rejection. Their proceedings in detail were never reported, so that it is impossible to state to what extent they were influenced by each member of the diplomacy, but it is matter of general credence that Mr. Clay, in their joint colloquial meetings, bore a prominent part and exercised a controlling power over the character of the stipulations. It is understood that Mr. Gallatin drew up more official communications than any one of his associates, that Mr. Adams ranked next, and Mr. Clay next. The various papers prepared by these gentlemen during the period of their negotiation, which continued about five months, furnish some of the finest specimens of English composition. For purity of diction, terseness of style, happy illustration, and logical construction, they will not suffer in comparison with the best political disquisitions in the English language.
The favorable indications which appeared at the commencement of the negotiation, soon gave place to those of a different character. The tone of the British commissioners, in laying the foundation of the treaty, soon became so dictatorial as almost to preclude the possibility of proceeding with it. In enumerating the various subjects which they designed to review and determine, besides the seizure of mariners from merchantmen on the high seas, boundary line, and the privileges heretofore enjoyed by the United States in carrying on their fisheries within the limits of British jurisdiction, they declared as a sine qua non to the completion of the treaty, that it must embrace provisions for rendering pacific the various Indian tribes within our borders, for settling their boundaries by a specific treaty with Great Britain, and that the right to purchase their lands without her consent must be unconditionally ceded. On such grounds the American commissioners unhesitatingly and unanimously refused to advance. The overbearing and haughty pretensions and arbitrary demands thus set up and insisted on at the very outset, seemed to interpose an insurmountable barrier towards effecting an amicable and honorable arrangement with our foe. Not only did she by prescription unadvised with us, exhibit an intention to have it all in her own way, but she avowed her design to obtain the control of certain islands in Passamaquoddy Bay, over which our right of jurisdiction had not been questioned up to that time, and to cause us to agree not to keep any naval force on the lakes, nor garrison soldiers on their eastern shores. The thought of submitting for a moment to such obnoxious exactions and requisitions could not be tolerated, and the American commissioners peremptorily informed them that negotiation under such circumstances was entirely out of the question, and that an unqualified abandonment of the objectionable portion of their demands must be complied with, before their consent to proceed another step in the business could be obtained. Theysaw it was requisite to be thus decided, in order to put an early and effectual stop to such unwarrantable assumptions and encroachments, which, if quietly submitted to, they clearly foresaw (by their maintaining a right to ‘vary and regulate their demands,’) would be indefinitely extended. In their first despatches to Washington, therefore, instead of holding out any encouragement of success, they stated that there was no ‘hope of peace.’ Immediately after their arrival, they were spread before the people by the public journalists, whose indignation was greatly augmented, on becoming acquainted with treatment ostensibly given for the purpose of consummating a treaty of peace on grounds of mutual reciprocity, but which in reality recognized the nation with whom it was to be effected, as enslaved rather than free. The demands of England were characterized as ‘arrogant, insulting to the United States, meriting instantaneous rejection, and demanding the united exertions of every citizen of these states, in the vigorous prosecution of the war until it shall be terminated in a just and honorable peace.’
The publication of their despatches was not anticipated by our commissioners, and great was their astonishment on perusing them in the newspapers at Ghent. Their fears were excited lest it should have an unfavorable bearing on the negotiations, if it did not put an abrupt period to them. The English negotiators maintained a guarded silence on the subject. Mr. Clay being solicitous to ascertain their opinions in relation thereto, addressed them, beginning with lord Gambier, whom he accosted by saying, ‘you perceive, my lord, that our government has published our despatches, and that now the whole world knows what we are doing here.’ ‘Yes,’ said he, ‘I have seen it with infinite surprise, and the proceeding is without example in the civilized world.’ ‘Why, my lord,’ said Mr. Clay, mildly, ‘you must recollect that at the time of the publication of those despatches, our government had every reason to suppose, from the nature of the pretensions and demands which yours brought forward, that our negotiation would not terminate successfully, and that the publication would not find us here together. I am quite sure that if our government had anticipated the present favorable aspect of our deliberations, the publication of the despatches would not have been ordered. Then your lordship must also recollect, that if, as you truly asserted, the publication of despatches pending a negotiation is not according to the custom of European diplomacy, our government is organized on principles totally different from those on which European governments are constituted. With us, the business in which we are here engaged is the people’s business. We are their servants, and they have a right to know how their business is going on. The publication, therefore, was to give the people information of what ultimately affected them.’
Although unable to controvert this explanation by Mr. Clay, of the reasons for publishing the official papers relative to the negotiation, he expressed himself not perfectly satisfied with it, and his opinion was concurred in by his colleagues. However, the injurious consequences apprehended from their publication were not experienced, and the business of the treaty proceeded as if it had not been made.
Mr. Clay reciprocated an act of kindness of Mr. Goulborne, who had sent him a British periodical containing an account of the taking of Washington by the arms of his nation, by sending to him some American papers which he had recently received, describing a splendid victory won on lake Champlain or lake Erie, by the navy of his country over that of the British.
After the receipt of such unpleasant intelligence from Ghent, it was resolved that redoubled energy should be put forth in pushing forward the war, which caused the noble feats of our gallant navy and army to be greatly multiplied. At Plattsburgh, Chippewa, and many other places, victory perched upon our banner. The hearts of our hardy sailors gathered fresh strength, whose successful attempts in annoying the enemy by capturing his trading vessels, caused the most bitter lamentations throughout his realm, and underwriters to advance their rates of insurance between England and Ireland from three-fourths of one to five per cent. The determined spirit thus evinced by us, Great Britain correctly attributed to the arbitrarily assumptive course which she attempted to pursue in conducting the negotiations at Ghent; a spirit which she had the sagacity to discover would never brook the slightest shade of vassalage, or permit the acceptance of dishonorable terms, and also the wisdom to avert the destructive consequences which her varied and wide-spread interests would certainly sustain from the aggressions of those actuated by it, in speedily removing the causes by which it was aroused. A recession was immediately made, not only by the British ministers, who reduced their sine qua non so as to require only the effection of Indian pacification, but by the public journalists in both England and her provinces. They spoke in more respectful terms of the United States, and abated to a good extent their domineering attempts. Still some of the objectionable terms proposed at first as the basis of an arrangement, were adhered to. The cession of such a portion of our territory as should secure a permanent and safe communication to England between Quebec and Halifax, was required pertinaciously. The American commissioners assumed the responsibility, at the risk of breaking off the negotiation, of rejecting such terms, and indeed all that did not come within the limit of their instructions, by informing the English commissioners, that it was perfectly fruitless, besides a waste of time, to bring forward and attempt to connect with the treaty, subjectsrespecting which they were not empowered to negotiate; subjects which were many of them foreign to their purpose, had no natural relation to it, and which if desirable might be definitely settled by subsequent negotiation, without being made a party to their present proposed arrangement. They affirmed that they had ‘no relation to the subsisting differences between the two countries; they are inconsistent with acknowledged principles of public law; they are founded neither on reciprocity nor on any of the usual bases of negotiation, neither on that of the uti possidetis or of status ante bellum; they would inflict the most vital injury on the United States by dismembering their territory, by arresting their natural growth and increase of population, and by leaving their northern and western frontiers equally exposed to British invasion and Indian aggression; they are above all dishonorable to the United States, in demanding from them to abandon territory and a portion of their citizens, to admit a foreign interference in their domestic concerns, and to cease to exercise their natural rights on their own shores and in their own waters. A treaty concluded on such terms would be but an armistice. It cannot be supposed that America would long submit to conditions so injurious and degrading. It is impossible, in the natural course of events, that she should not, at the first favorable opportunity, recur to arms for the recovery of her territory, of her rights, and her honor. Instead of settling existing difficulties, such a peace would only create new causes of war, sow the seeds of permanent hatred, and lay the foundation of hostilities for an indefinite period. It is not necessary to refer such demands to the American government for its instruction. They will be only a fit subject of deliberation when it becomes necessary to decide upon the expediency of an absolute surrender of national independence.’
There was no mistaking the meaning of such language, respectful but pungent, expressing perspicuously the true principles of diplomatic action. Although it was self-evident that the spirit which dictated such sentiments as that communication contained, would not allow any truckling or swerving, still the British negotiators appeared determined to persevere until they accomplished what from the very commencement seemed to be to them a favorite feature in the treaty, viz: the exposure of our whole northern frontier to the mercy of their nation. She found that the Indian hordes could be advantageously employed by her, indeed she had already employed them to such an extent as to give, so far as she was concerned, a most truculent aspect to the war; hence the invincible determination manifested by her legalized commissioners, to have the treaty so framed as to secure to her their absolute control. This disposition was regarded by the American commissioners with feelings not only of regret, but of horror, who protested against ‘the employment of savages, whose known ruleof warfare is the indiscriminate torture and butchery of women, children, and prisoners,’ as constituting ‘a departure from the principles of humanity observed between all civilized and christian nations even in war.’ They stated that instead of endeavoring to effect that control, it would be much more comportable with the dignity and grandeur of the British nation to abandon forever the barbarous practice, and to stipulate with America to that purpose in case of waging any future war with her. They would not recede an inch from the ground which they had taken, in relation to the Indians and northern frontier. After directing their combined diplomatic artillery against them for the space of several weeks incessantly, to drive them from it, but without the slightest success, the British diplomatists finally abandoned it. Soon after the American commissioners proposed to guaranty the pacification of the Indians when the treaty should be ratified, and expressed their unaltered determination to treat upon no subjects respecting which they had received no instructions. To this their opponents acceded, and the negotiation proceeded, the American commissioners dictating nearly all the terms, and finally issued in the production of a treaty, on the twenty-fourth of December, 1814.
Throughout the negotiation the utmost unanimity prevailed among our ministers, and never was there a difference of opinion, except in one instance. This related to certain fishery privileges, and the navigation of the Mississippi river.
In a treaty of peace concluded in 1783, between Great Britain and the United States, it was stipulated that the latter should enjoy the liberty of taking fish of every kind on all the banks of Newfoundland, Grand Bank, gulf of St. Lawrence, and in all other places where the inhabitants of both countries had been accustomed to fish—that the same should be enjoyed on all the coasts, bays and creeks of his Britannic majesty’s dominions in America; that she should have full permission to dry and cure fish in the unsettled bays, &c. of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands, and Labrador, so long as they should remain unsettled, but that after they were settled, such permission must be sanctioned by their occupants; and also that the Mississippi river should be open forever to the navigation of both nations, from its mouth to its source. The latter stipulation was included in a treaty negotiated by Mr. Jay, in 1794.