A Biography of Henry Clay, the Senator from Kentucky / Containing Also, a Complete Report of All His Speeches; Selections From His Private Correspondence; Eulogies in the Senate and House; and a Poem, by George D. Prentice, Esq.

by Unknown

It is one of the admirable properties of the existing system, that it contains within itself and carries along principles of conservation and safety. In the progress of its operation, new states become identified with the old, in feeling, in thinking, and in interest. Now, Ohio is as sound as any old state in the union, in all her views relating to the public lands. She feels that her share in the exterior domain is much more important than would be an exclusive right to the few millions of acres left unsold, within her limits, accompanied by a virtual surrender of her interest in all the other public lands of the United States. And I have no doubt, that now, the people of the other new states, left to their own unbiased sense of equity and justice, would form the same judgment. They cannot believe that what they have not bought, what remains the property of themselves and all their brethren of the United States, in common, belongs to them exclusively. But if I am mistaken, if they have been deceived by erroneous impressions on their mind, made by artful men, as the sales proceed, and the land is exhausted,and their population increased, like the state of Ohio, they will feel that their true interest points to their remaining copartners in the whole national domain, instead of bringing forward an unfounded pretension to the inconsiderable remnant which will be then left in their own limits.

And now, Mr. President, I have to say something in respect to the particular plan brought forward by the committee of manufactures, for a temporary appropriation of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands.

The committee say that this fund is not wanted by the general government; that the peace of the country is not likely, from present appearances, to be speedily disturbed; and that the general government is absolutely embarrassed in providing against an enormous surplus in the treasury. While this is the condition of the federal government, the states are in want of, and can most beneficially use, that very surplus with which we do not know what to do. The powers of the general government are limited; those of the states are ample. If those limited powers authorized an application of the fund to some objects, perhaps there are some others, of more importance, to which the powers of the states would be more competent, or to which they may apply a more provident care.

But the government of the whole and of the parts, at last is but one government of the same people. In form they are two, in substance one. They both stand under the same solemn obligation to promote, by all the powers with which they are respectively intrusted, the happiness of the people; and the people, in their turn, owe respect and allegiance to both. Maintaining these relations, there should be mutual assistance to each other afforded by these two systems. When the states are full-handed, and the coffers of the general government are empty, the states should come to the relief of the general government, as many of them did, most promptly and patriotically, during the late war. When the conditions of the parties are reversed, as is now the case, the states wanting what is almost a burden to the general government, the duty of this government is to go to the relief of the states.

They were views like these which induced a majority of the committee to propose the plan of distribution, contained in the bill now under consideration. For one, however, I will again repeat the declaration, which I made early in the session, that I unite cordially with those who condemn the application of any principle of distribution among the several states, to surplus revenue derived from taxation. I think income derived from taxation stands upon ground totally distinct from that which is received from the public lands. Congress can prevent the accumulation, at least for any considerable time, of revenue from duties, by suitable legislation, lowering or augmenting the imposts; but it cannot stop the sales of the public lands, without the exercise of arbitrary and intolerablepower. The powers of congress over the public lands are broader and more comprehensive, than those which they possess over taxation, and the money produced by it.

This brings me to consider, first, the power of congress to make the distribution. By the second part of the third section of the fourth article of the constitution, congress ‘have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property of the United States.’ The power of disposition is plenary, unrestrained, unqualified. It is not limited to a specified object or to a defined purpose, but left applicable to any object or purpose which the wisdom of congress shall deem fit, acting under its high responsibility.

The government purchased Louisiana and Florida. May it not apply the proceeds of lands within those countries, to any object which the good of the union may seem to indicate? If there be a restraint in the constitution, where is it, what is it?

The uniform practice of the government has conformed to the idea of its possessing full powers over the public lands. They have been freely granted, from time to time, to communities and individuals, for a great variety of purposes. To states for education, internal improvements, public buildings; to corporations for education; to the deaf and dumb; to the cultivators of the olive and the vine; to preëmptioners; to general Lafayette, and so forth.

The deeds from the ceding states, far from opposing, fully warrant the distribution. That of Virginia ceded the land as ‘a common fund for the use and benefit of such of the United States as have become, or shall become, members of the confederation or federal alliance of the said states, Virginia inclusive.’ The cession was for the benefit of all the states. It may be argued, that the fund must be retained in the common treasury, and thence paid out. But by the bill reported, it will come into the common treasury, and then the question, how it shall be subsequently applied for the use and benefit of such of the United States as compose the confederacy, is one of modus only. Whether the money is disbursed by the general government directly, or is paid out upon some equal and just principle, to the states, to be disbursed by them, cannot affect the right of distribution. If the general government retained the power of ultimate disbursement, it could execute it only by suitable agents; and what agency is more suitable than that of the states themselves? If the states expend the money, as the bill contemplates, the expenditure will, in effect, be a disbursement for the benefit of the whole, although the several states are organs of the expenditure; for the whole and all the parts are identical. And, whatever redounds to the benefit of all the parts, necessarily contributes, in the same measure, to the benefit of the whole. The great question should be, is the distribution upon equal and just principles? And this brings me to consider,

Secondly, the terms of the distribution proposed by the bill of the committee of manufactures. The bill proposes a division of the net proceeds of the sales of the public lands, among the several states composing the union, according to their federal representative population, as ascertained by the last census; and it provides for new states, that may hereafter be admitted into the union. The basis of the distribution, therefore, is derived from the constitution itself, which has adopted the same rule, in respect to representation and direct taxes. None could be more just and equitable.