Mr. Clay denied that the constitution gave to the president ten days to consider bills, except at the long session. At that session, the period of its termination is uncertain, and dependent upon the will of congress. To guard against a sudden adjournment, by which the president might be deprived of due time to deliberate on an important bill, the constitution provides for ten days at that session. But, at the short session, it is not an adjournment but a dissolution of congress, on the third of March, and the day of that dissolution is fixed in the constitution itself, and known to all.
Mr. Clay contended, therefore, that the act of withholding the bill was arbitrary and unconstitutional, by which congress, and the senate especially, in which the bill originated, were deprived of their constitutional right of passing on the bill, after the president had exercised his powers. Respect to congress required of the president, if he really had not time to form a judgment on the bill, or, having formed it, had not time to lay his reasons before the body, a communication to that effect. But, without condescending to transmit one word upon the subject to congress, he suffered the session to terminate, and the members to go home destitute of all information, until this day, of his intentions.
Mr. Benton then withdrew his motion to take up the bill.
ON THE REMOVAL OF THE PUBLIC DEPOSITS FROM THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES.
IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, DECEMBER 26, 1833.
[THE house of representatives, on the second of March, 1833, adopted, by a vote of one hundred and ten to forty-six, the following resolution: ‘that the government deposits may, in the opinion of the house, be safely continued in the bank of the United States.’ Notwithstanding this resolution, the president of the United States, (general Jackson,) in September following, read a paper to his cabinet, declaring his intention to cause the deposits to be removed from the bank. He then removed the secretary of the treasury, Mr. Duane, from office, in consequence of his refusal to comply with the president’s orders in this respect, and appointed Mr. Taney secretary in his place; who removed the deposits from the United States bank, on the first of October, 1833, and placed them in sundry state banks. At the ensuing session of congress, the secretary of the treasury, Mr. Taney, having made his report on that transaction, the subject came up for consideration in the senate, when Mr. Clay submitted the following resolutions, which he accompanied with the subjoined speech.]
RESOLVED, that by dismissing the late secretary of the treasury, because he would not, contrary to his sense of his own duty, remove the money of the United States in deposit with the bank of the United States and its branches, in conformity with the president’s opinion; and by appointing his successor to effect such removal, which has been done, the president has assumed the exercise of a power over the treasury of the United States not granted to him by the constitution and laws, and dangerous to the liberties of the people.
Resolved, that the reasons assigned by the secretary of the treasury for the removal of the money of the United States, deposited in the bank of the United States and its branches, communicated to congress on the third of December, 1833, are unsatisfactory and insufficient.
WE are in the midst of a revolution, hitherto bloodless, but rapidly tending towards a total change of the pure republican character of the government, and to the concentration of all power in the hands of one man. The powers of congress are paralysed, except when exerted in conformity with his will, by frequent and an extraordinary exercise of the executive veto, not anticipated by the founders of our constitution, and not practiced by any of the predecessors of the present chief magistrate. And, to cramp them still more, a new expedient is springing into use, of withholdingaltogether bills which have received the sanction of both houses of congress, thereby cutting off all opportunity of passing them, even if, after their return, the members should be unanimous in their favor. The constitutional participation of the senate in the appointing power is virtually abolished by the constant use of the power of removal from office, without any known cause, and by the appointment of the same individual to the same office, after his rejection by the senate. How often have we, senators, felt that the check of the senate, instead of being, as the constitution intended, a salutary control, was an idle ceremony? How often, when acting on the case of the nominated successor, have we felt the injustice of the removal? How often have we said to each other, well, what can we do? the office cannot remain vacant, without prejudice to the public interest, and, if we reject the proposed substitute, we cannot restore the displaced; and, perhaps, some more unworthy man may be nominated.