This is in strict consonance with the act creating the treasury department in 1789. The secretary of the treasury is by that act constituted the agent of congress; he is required to report to congress annually the state of the finances, and his plans respecting them; and if congress in either of its branches shall require it, he is to report at any time on any particular branch of the fiscal concerns of the country. He is the agent of congress to watch over the safety of the national deposits; and if, from any peculiar circumstances, the removal of them shall be required, he is to report the fact—to whom? to the president? No, sir; he must report to congress, together with his reasons therefor. By the charter of the bank, the president of the United States is clothed with two powers respecting it, and two only. By one of its clauses he is authorized to nominate, and by and with the consent of the senate, to appoint the government directors, and to remove them, by the other clause he is empowered to issue a scire facias when he shall apprehend that the charter of the institution has been violated. These, I say, are the only powers given him by the charter; all others are denied to him, and are given to others. The bank is not bound to report the state of its affairs to him, but to the secretary of the treasury; and it is thus to report whenever he shall call upon it for information; but when it becomes necessary to go further, a committee of congress is authorized to examine the books of the bank, and to look into the whole state of its affairs, and to report, not to the president, but to congress, who appointed them.The president, as I have said, is restricted to the two powers of appointing directors, and issuing a scire facias.
And has the president any power over the treasury by the constitution? None, sir—none. The constitution requires that no money shall be drawn from the treasury except by appropriation, thus placing it entirely under the control of congress. But the president himself says; ‘upon him has been devolved, by the constitution and the suffrages of the American people, the duty of superintending the operation of the executive departments of the government, and seeing that the laws are faithfully executed.’ Sir, the president, in another part of this same paper, refers to the same suffrages of the American people, as the source of some other and new powers over and above those in the constitution, or at least as expressive of their approbation of the exercise of them. Sir, I differ from the president on this point; and though it does not belong exactly in this place in the argument, I will add a remark or two on this idea. His reëlection resulted from his presumed merits generally, and the confidence and attachment of the people; and from the unworthiness of his competitor; nor was it intended thereby to express their approbation of all the opinions he was known to hold. Sir, it cannot be believed that the great state of Pennsylvania, for instance, which has so justly been denominated the key-stone of our federal arch, in voting again and again for the present chief magistrate, meant by that act to reverse her own opinions on the subject of domestic industry. Sir, the truth is, that the reëlection of the president proves as little an approbation by the people of all the opinions he may hold, even if he had ever unequivocally expressed what those opinions were, (a thing which he never, so far as my knowledge extends, has yet done,) as it would prove that if the president had a carbuncle or the king’s evil, they meant, by reëlecting him, to approve of his carbuncle.
But the president says, that the duty ‘has been devolved upon him,’ to remove the deposits, ‘by the constitution and the suffrages of the American people.’ Sir, does he mean to say that these suffrages created of themselves a new source of power? That he derived an authority from them which he did not hold as from any other source? If he means that their suffrages made him the president of the United States, and that, as president, he may exercise every power pertaining to that office under the constitution and the laws, there are none who controvert it; but then there could be no need to add the suffrages to the constitution. But his language is, ‘the suffrages of the American people and the constitution.’ Sir, I deny it. There is not a syllable in the constitution which imposes any such duty upon him. There is nothing of any such thing; no color to the idea. It is true, that by law, all the departments, with the exception of the treasury, are placed under the general care of the president. He says this is done by theconstitution. The laws, however, have appointed but three executive departments; and it is true, that the secretaries are often required by law to act in certain cases according to the directions of the president. So far it is admitted that they have been, by the law, (not by the constitution,) placed under the direction of the president. Yet, even as to the state department, there are duties devolving upon the secretary over which the president has no control; and for the non-performance of which that officer is responsible, not to the president, but to the legislative tribunals or to the courts of justice. This is no new opinion. The supreme court, in the case of Marbury and Madison, expressed it in the following terms:
‘By the constitution of the United States, the president is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which, he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience. To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain officers, who act by his authority, and in conformity to his orders.
‘In such cases, their acts are his acts: and whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and being intrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive. The application of this remark will be perceived by adverting to the act of congress for establishing the department of foreign affairs. This officer, as his duties were prescribed by that act, is to conform precisely to the will of the president. He is the mere organ by whom that will is communicated. The acts of such an officer, as an officer, can never be examined by the courts.
‘But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts, (that is, when he is not placed under the direction of the president,) when the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts, he is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights of others.
‘The conclusion from this reasoning is that where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the president, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.’
Though the president is mistaken in his assertion, that the constitution devolves upon the president the superintendence of the departments, there is one clause of that instrument which he has very correctly quoted, and which makes it his duty to ‘see that the laws are faithfully executed,’ as it is mine now to examine what authority he obtains by this clause in the case before us. Under it, the most enormous pretensions have been set up for the president.
It has been contended, that if a law shall pass which the president does not conceive to be in conformity with the constitution, he is not bound to execute it; and if a treaty shall have been made, which, in his opinion, has been unconstitutional in its stipulations, he is not bound to enforce them. And it necessarily follows, that,if the courts of justice shall give a decision, which he shall in like manner deem repugnant to the constitution, he is not expected or bound to execute that law. Sir, let us look a little into this principle, and trace it out into some of its consequences.