A Biography of Henry Clay, the Senator from Kentucky / Containing Also, a Complete Report of All His Speeches; Selections From His Private Correspondence; Eulogies in the Senate and House; and a Poem, by George D. Prentice, Esq.

by Unknown

Mr. Gerry, afterwards the republican vice-president of the United States, contended, ‘that we are making these officers the mere creatures of the president; they dare not exercise the privilege of their creation, if the president shall order them to forbear; because he holds their thread of life. His power will be sovereign over them, and will soon swallow up the small security we have in the senate’s concurrence to the appointment; and we shall shortly need no other than the authority of the supreme executive officer, to nominate, appoint, continue, or remove.’ Was not that prophecy; and do we not feel and know that it is prophecy fulfilled?

There were other members who saw clearly into the future, and predicted, with admirable forecast, what would be the practical operation of this power. But there was one eminently gifted in this particular. It seems to have been specially reserved for a Jackson to foretell what a Jackson might do. Speaking of some future president, Mr. Jackson—(I believe of Georgia—that was his name. What a coincidence!) ‘If he wants to establish an arbitrary authority, and finds the secretary of finance, (Mr. Duane,) not inclined to second his endeavors, he has nothing more to do than to remove him, and get one appointed, (Mr. Taney,) of principles more congenial with his own. Then, says he, I have got the army; let me have but the money, and I will establish my throne upon the ruins of your visionary republic. Black, indeed, is the heart of that man who even suspects him, (WASHINGTON,) to be capable of abusing powers. But, alas! he cannot be with us for ever; he is but mortal,’ and so forth. ‘May not a man with a Pandora’s box in his breast come into power, and give us sensible cause to lament our present confidence and want of foresight?’

In the early stages, and during a considerable portion of the debate, the prevailing opinion seemed to be, not that the president was invested by the constitution with the power, but that it should be conferred upon him by act of congress. In the progress of it, the idea was suddenly started, that the president possessed the power from the constitution, and the first opinion was abandoned. It was finally resolved to shape the acts, on the passage of which the question arose, so as to recognise the existence of the power of removal in the president.

Such is the solitary precedent on which the contemners of all precedents rely for sustaining this tremendous power in one man! A precedent established against the weight of argument, by a house of representatives greatly divided, in a senate equally divided, under the influence of a reverential attachment to the father of his country, upon the condition that, if the power were applied as we know it has been in hundreds of instances recently applied, the president himself would be justly liable to impeachment and removal from office, and which, until this administration, has never, since its adoption, been thoroughly examined or considered—a power, the abuses of which, as developed under this administration, if they be not checked and corrected, must inevitably tend to subvert the constitution, and overthrow public liberty. A standing army has been, in all free countries, a just object of jealousy and suspicion. But is not a corps of one hundred thousand dependents upon government, actuated by one spirit, obeying one will, and aiming at one end, more dangerous and formidable than a standing army? The standing army is separated from the mass of society, stationed in barracks or military quarters, and operates by physical force. The official corps is distributed and ramified throughout the whole country, dwelling in every city, village, and hamlet, having daily intercourse with society, and operates on public opinion. A brave people, not yet degenerated, and devoted to liberty, may successfully defend themselves against a military force. But if the official corps is aided by the executive, by the post-office department, and by a large portion of the public press, its power is invincible. That the operation of the principle, which subjects to the will of one man the tenure of all offices, which he may vacate at pleasure, without assigning any cause, must be to render them subservient to his purposes, a knowledge of human nature, and the short experience which we have had, clearly demonstrate.

It may be asked, why has this precedent of 1789 not been reviewed? Does not the long acquiescence in it prove its propriety? It has not been reëxamined for several reasons. In the first place, all feel and own the necessity of some more summary and less expensive and less dilatory mode of dismissing delinquents from subordinate offices, than that of impeachment, which, strictly speaking, was perhaps the only one in the contemplation of the framers of the constitution; certainly it is the only one for which it expressly provides. Then, under all the predecessors of the president, the power was mildly and beneficially exercised, having been always, or with very few exceptions, applied to actual delinquents. Notwithstanding all that has been said about the number of removals which were made during Mr. Jefferson’s administration, they were, in fact, comparatively few. And yet he came into power as the head of a great party, which for years hadbeen systematically excluded from the executive patronage; a plea which cannot be urged in excuse for the present chief magistrate. It was reserved for him to act on the bold and daring principle of dismissing from office, those who had opposed his election; of dismissing from office for mere difference of opinion!

But it will be argued, that if the summary process of dismission be expedient in some cases, why take it away altogether? The bill under consideration does not disturb the power. By the usage of the government, not I think by the constitution, the president practically possesses the power to dismiss those who are unworthy of holding these offices. By no practice or usage but that which he himself has created, has he the power to dismiss meritorious officers only because they differ from him in politics. The principal object of the bill, is, to require the president, in cases of dismission, to communicate the reasons which have induced him to dismiss the officer; in other words, to make an arbitrary and despotic power a responsible power. It is not to be supposed that, if the president is bound publicly to state his reasons, that he would act from passion or caprice, or without any reason. He would be ashamed to avow that he discharged the officer because he opposed his election. And yet this mild regulation of the power is opposed by the friends of the administration! They think it unreasonable that the president should state his reasons. If he has none, perhaps it is.

But, Mr. President, although the bill is, I think, right in principle, it does not seem to me to go far enough. It makes no provision for the insufficiency of the reasons of the president, by restoring or doing justice to the injured officer. It will be some but not sufficient restraint against abuses. I have, therefore, prepared an amendment which I beg leave to offer, but which I will not press against the decided wishes of those having the immediate care of the bill.By this amendment,[22] as to all offices created by law, with certain exceptions, the power at present exercised is made a suspensory power. The president may, in the vacation of the senate, suspend the officer and appoint a temporary successor. At the next session of the senate, he is to communicate his reasons; and if they are deemed sufficient, the suspension is confirmed, and the senate will pass upon the new officer. If insufficient, the displaced officer is to be restored. This amendment is substantiallythe same proposition, as one which I submitted to the consideration of the senate at its last session. Under this suspensory power, the president will be able to discharge all defaulters or delinquents; and it cannot be doubted that the senate will concur in all such dismissions. On the other hand, it will insure the integrity and independence of the officer, since he will feel that if he honestly and faithfully discharges his official duties, he cannot be displaced arbitrarily, or from mere caprice, or because he has independently exercised the elective franchise.

It is contended, that the president cannot see that the laws are faithfully executed unless he possesses the power of removal. That injunction of the constitution, imports a mere general superintendence, except where he is specially charged with the execution of a law. It is not necessary that he should have the power of dismission. It will be a sufficient security against the abuses of subordinate officers, that the eye of the president is upon them, and that he can communicate their delinquency. The state executives do not possess this power of dismission. In several, if not all, the states, the governor cannot even dismiss the secretary of state; yet we have heard no complaints of the inefficiency of state executives, or of the administration of the laws of the states. The president has no power to dismiss the judiciary; and it might be asked, with equal plausibility, how he could see that the laws are executed if the judges will not conform to his opinion, and he cannot dismiss them?

But it is not necessary to argue the general question, in considering either the original bill or the amendment. The former does not touch the power of dismission, and the latter only makes it conditional instead of being absolute.

It may be said, that there are certain great officers, heads of departments and foreign ministers, between whom and the president entire confidence should exist. That is admitted. But, surely, if the president remove any of them, the people ought to know the cause. The amendment, however, does not reach those classes of officers. And supposing, as I do, that the legislative authority is competent to regulate the exercise of the power of dismission, there can be no just cause to apprehend, that it will fail to make such modifications and exceptions as may be called for by the public interest; especially as whatever bill may be passed must obtain the approbation of the chief magistrate. And if it should attempt to impose improper restrictions upon the executive authority, that would furnish a legitimate occasion for the exercise of the veto. In conclusion, I shall most heartily vote for the bill, with or without the amendment which I have proposed.