And how do they surmount these insuperable obstacles? By a series of far-fetched implications, which, if every one of them were as true as they are believed to be incorrect or perverted, would stop far short of maintaining the power which was exercised.
The first of these implied powers is, that of dismissal, which is claimed for the president. Of all the questioned powers ever exercised by the government, this is the most questionable. From the first congress down to the present administration, it had never been examined. It was carried then, in the senate, by the casting vote of the vice-president. And those who, at that day, argued in behalf of the power, contended for it upon conditions which have been utterly disregarded by the present chief magistrate. The power of dismissal is nowhere in the constitution granted, in express terms, to the president. It is not a necessary incident to any granted power; and the friends of the power have never been able to agree among themselves as to the precise part of the constitution from which it springs.
But, if the power of dismissal was as incontestable as it is justly controvertible, we utterly deny the consequences deduced from it. The argument is, that the president has, by implication, the power of dismissal. From this first implication, another is drawn, and that is, that the president has the power to control the officer, whom he may dismiss, in the discharge of his duties, in all cases whatever; and that this power of control is so comprehensive as to include even the case of a specific duty expressly assigned by law to the designated officer.
Now, we deny these results from the dismissing power. That power, if it exists, can draw after it only a right of general superintendence. It cannot authorize the president to substitute his will to the will of the officer charged with the performance of official duties. Above all, it cannot justify such a substitution in a case where the law, as in the present instance, assigns to a designated officer exclusively the performance of a particular duty, and commands him to report, not to the president, but to congress, in a case regarding the public purse of the nation, committed to the exclusive control of congress.
Such a consequence as that which I am contesting would concentrate in the hands of one man the entire executive power of the nation, uncontrolled and unchecked.
It would be utterly destructive of all official responsibility. Instead of each officer being responsible, in his own separate sphere, for his official acts, he would shelter himself behind the orders of the president. And what tribunal, in heaven above or on earth below, could render judgment against any officer for an act, however atrocious, performed by the express command of the president, which, according to the argument, he was absolutely bound to obey?
Whilst all other official responsibility would be utterly annihilated in subordinated officers, there would be no practical or available responsibility in the president himself.
But the case has been supposed, of a necessity for the removalof the deposits, and a refusal of the secretary of the treasury to remove them; and it is triumphantly asked if, in such a case, the president may not remove him, and command the deed to be done. That is an extreme case, which may be met by another. Suppose the president, without any necessity, orders the removal from a place of safety to a place of hazard. If there be danger that a president may neglect his duty, there is equal danger that a president may abuse his authority. Infallibility is not a human attribute. And there is more security for the public in holding the secretary of the treasury to the strict performance of an official duty specially assigned to him, under all his official responsibility, than to allow the president to wrest the work from his hands, annihilate his responsibility, and stand himself practically irresponsible. It is far better that millions should be lost by the neglect of a secretary of the treasury, than to establish the monstrous principle that all the checks and balances of the executive government shall be broken down, the whole power absorbed by one man, and his will become the supreme rule. The argument which I am combating places the whole treasury of the nation at the mercy of the executive. It is in vain to talk of appropriations by law, and the formalities of warrants upon the treasury. Assuming the argument to be correct, what is to prevent the execution of an order from the president to the secretary of the treasury to issue a warrant, without the sanction of a previous legal appropriation, to the comptroller to countersign it, to the register to register it, and to the treasurer to pay it? What becomes of that quadruple security which the precaution of the law provided? Instead of four substantive and independent wills, acting under legal obligations, all are merged in the executive voters.
But there was in point of fact, no cause, none whatever for the measure. Every fiscal consideration, (and no other had the secretary or the president a right to entertain,) required the deposits to be left undisturbed in the place of perfect safety where by law they were. We told you so at the time. We asserted that the charges of insecurity and insolvency of the bank were without the slightest foundation. And time, that great arbiter of human controversies, has confirmed all that we said. The bank, from documents submitted to congress by the secretary of the treasury at the present session, appears to be able not only to return every dollar of the stock held in its capital by the public, but an addition of eleven per centum beyond it.
Those who defend the executive act, have to maintain not only that the president may assume upon himself the discharge of a duty especially assigned to the secretary of the treasury, but that he may remove that officer, arbitrarily, and without any cause, because he refused to remove the public deposits without cause.