A Biography of Henry Clay, the Senator from Kentucky / Containing Also, a Complete Report of All His Speeches; Selections From His Private Correspondence; Eulogies in the Senate and House; and a Poem, by George D. Prentice, Esq.

by Unknown

‘The importance of the principles involved in the inquiry, whether it will be proper to recharter the bank of the United States, requires that I should again call the attention of congress to the subject. Nothing has occurred to lessen, in any degree, the dangers which many of our citizens apprehend from that institution, as at present organized. In the spirit of improvement and compromise which distinguishes our country and its institutions, it becomes us to inquire, whether it be not possible to secure the advantages afforded by the present bank, through the agency of a bank of the United States, so modified in its principles as to obviate constitutional and other objections.

‘It is thought practicable to organize such a bank, with the necessary officers, as a branch of the treasury department, based on the public and individual deposits, without power to make loans, or purchase property, which shall remit the funds of government; and the expense of which may be paid, if thought advisable, by allowing its officers to sell bills of exchange, to private individuals, at a moderate premium. Not being a corporate body, having no stockholders, debtors, and property, and but few officers, it would not be obnoxious to the constitutional objections which are urged against the present bank; and having no means to operate on the hopes, fears, or interests, of large masses of the community, it would be shorn of the influence which makes that bank formidable.’

In this message president Jackson, after again adverting to the imaginary dangers of a bank of the United States, recurs to his favorite project, and inquires, ‘whether it be not possible to secure the advantages afforded by the present bank, through the agency of a bank of the United States, so modified in its principles and structure as to obviate constitutional and other objections.’ And to dispel all doubts of the timid, and to confirm the wavering, he declares, that it is thought practicable to organize such a bank, with the necessary officers, as a branch of the treasury department. As a branch of the treasury department! The very scheme now under consideration. And, to defray the expenses of such an anomalous institution, he suggests, that the officers of the treasury departmentmay turn bankers and brokers, and sell bills of exchange to private individuals at a moderate premium!

In his annual message of the year 1831, upon this subject, he was brief and somewhat covered in his expressions. But the fixed purpose which he entertained is sufficiently disclosed to the attentive reader. He announces, that ‘entertaining the opinions heretofore expressed in relation to the bank of the United States, as at present organized, I felt it my duty, in my former messages, frankly to disclose them, in order that the attention of the legislature and the people should be seasonably directed to that important subject, and that it might be considered, and finally disposed of, in a manner best calculated to promote the ends of the constitution, and subserve the public interests.’ What were the opinions ‘heretofore’ expressed, we have clearly seen. They were adverse to the bank of the United States, as at present organized, that is to say, an organization with any independent corporate government; and in favor of a national bank which should be so constituted as to be subject to exclusive executive control.

At the session of 1831–2, the question of the recharter of the bank of the United States came up; and although the attention of congress and the country had been repeatedly and deliberately before invited to the consideration of it by president Jackson himself, the agitation of it was now declared by him and his partisans to be precipitate and premature. Nevertheless, the country and congress conscious of the value of a safe and sound uniform currency, conscious that such a currency had been eminently supplied by the bank of the United States, and unmoved by all the outcry raised against that admirable institution, the recharter commanded large majorities in both houses of congress. Fatally for the interests of this country, the stern self-will of general Jackson prompted him to risk every thing upon its overthrow. On the tenth of July, 1832, the bill was returned with his veto; from which the following extract is submitted to the attentive consideration of the senate.

‘A bank of the United States is, in many respects, convenient for the government and useful to the people. Entertaining this opinion, and deeply impressed with the belief that some of the powers and privileges possessed by the existing bank are unauthorized by the constitution, subversive of the rights of the states, and dangerous to the liberties of the people, I felt it my duty, at an early period of my administration, to call the attention of congress to the practicability of organizing an institution, combining all its advantages, and obviating these objections. I sincerely regret that, in the act before me, I can perceive none of those modifications of the bank charter which are necessary, in my opinion, to make it compatible with justice, with sound policy, or with the constitution of our country.

‘That a bank of the United States, competent to all the duties which may be required by government, might be so organized as not to infringe upon our own delegated powers, or the reserved rights of the states, I do not entertain a doubt. Had the executive been called upon to furnish the project of such an institution, the duty would have been cheerfully performed. In the absence of such a call, it is obviously proper that he should confine himself to pointing out those prominent features in the act presented, which, in his opinion, make it incompatible with the constitution and sound policy.’

President Jackson admits, in the citation which has just been made, that a bank of the United States is, in many respects, convenient for the government; and reminds congress that he had, at an early period of his administration, called its attention to the practicability of so organizing such an institution as to secure all its advantages, without the defects of the existing bank. It is perfectly manifest, that he alludes to his previous recommendations of a government, a treasury bank. In the same message he tells congress, that if he had been called upon to furnish the project of such an institution, the duty would have been cheerfully performed. Thus it appears, that he had not only settled in his mind the general principle, but had adjusted the details of a government bank, to be subjected to executive control; and congress is even chided for not calling upon him to present them. The bill now under consideration, beyond all controversy, is the very project which he had in view, and is to consummate the work which he began. I think, Mr. President, that you must now concur with me in considering the first proposition as fully maintained. I pass to the second and third, which, on account of their intimate connection, I will consider together.

Second, that with the view of establishing a government bank, it was the settled aim and intention of the late administration, to overthrow the whole banking system of the United States, as existing in the United States when that administration came into power, beginning with the bank of the United States, and ending with the state banks.

Third, that the attack was first confined, from considerations of policy, to the bank of the United States; but that, after its overthrow was accomplished, it was then directed, and has since been continued, against the state banks.