A Biography of Henry Clay, the Senator from Kentucky / Containing Also, a Complete Report of All His Speeches; Selections From His Private Correspondence; Eulogies in the Senate and House; and a Poem, by George D. Prentice, Esq.

by Unknown

The next case in which the petitioners ask the exercise of the power of congress, relates to slavery in the territory of Florida.

Florida is the extreme southern portion of the United States. It is bounded on all its land sides by slave states, and is several hundred miles from the nearest free state. It almost extends within the tropics, and the nearest important island to it, on the water side, is Cuba, a slave island. This simple statement of its geographical position should of itself decide the question. When, by the treaty of 1819 with Spain, it was ceded to the United States, slavery existed within it. By the terms of that treaty, the effects and property of the inhabitants are secured to them, and they are allowed to remove and take them away, if they think proper to do so, without limitation as to time. If it were expedient, therefore, to abolish slavery in it, it could not be done consistently with the treaty, without granting to the ancient inhabitants a reasonable time to remove their slaves. But further. By the compromise which took place on the passage of the act for the admission of Missouri into the union, in the year 1820, it was agreed and understood, that the line of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes of north latitude, should mark the boundary between the free states and the slave states, to be created in the territories of the United States, ceded by the treaty of Louisiana; those situated south of it being slave states, and those north of it, free states. But Florida is south of that line, and consequently, according to the spirit of the understanding which prevailed at the period alluded to, should be a slave state. It may be true, that the compromise does not in terms embrace Florida, and that it is not absolutely binding and obligatory; but all candid and impartial men must agree, that it ought not to be disregarded without the most weighty considerations, and that nothing could be more to be deprecated than to open anew the bleeding wounds which were happily bound up and healed by that compromise. Florida is the only remaining territory to be admitted into the union with the institution of domestic slavery, while Wisconsin and Iowa are now nearly ripe for admission without it.

The next instance in which the exercise of the power of congress is solicited, is that of prohibiting what is denominated by the petitioners the slave-trade between the states, or, as it is described inabolition petitions, the traffic in human beings between the states. This exercise of the power of congress is claimed under that clause of the constitution which invests it with authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes. The power to regulate commerce among the several states, like other powers in the constitution, has hitherto remained dormant in respect to the interior trade by land between the states. It was a power granted, like all the other powers of the general government, to secure peace and harmony among the states. Hitherto it has not been necessary to exercise it. All the cases in which, during the progress of time, it may become expedient to exert the general authority to regulate commerce between the states, cannot be conceived. We may easily imagine, however, contingencies which, if they were to happen, might require the interposition of the common authority. If, for example, the state of Ohio were, by law, to prohibit any vessel entering the port of Cincinnati, from the port of Louisville, in Kentucky, if that case be not already provided for by the laws which regulate our coasting trade, it would be competent to the general government to annul the prohibition emanating from state authority. Or if the state of Kentucky were to prohibit the introduction, within its limits, of any articles of trade, the production of the industry of the inhabitants of the state of Ohio, the general government might, by its authority, supersede the state enactment. But I deny that the general government has any authority, whatever, from the constitution, to abolish what is called the slave trade, or, in other words, to prohibit the removal of slaves from one slave state to another slave state.

The grant in the constitution is of a power of regulation, and not prohibition. It is conservative, not destructive. Regulation ex vi termini implies the continued existence or prosecution of the thing regulated. Prohibition implies total discontinuance or annihilation. The regulation intended was designed to facilitate and accommodate, not to obstruct and incommode the commerce to be regulated. Can it be pretended that, under this power to regulate commerce among the states, congress has the power to prohibit the transportation of live stock, which, in countless numbers, are daily passing from the western and interior states, to the southern, southwestern, and Atlantic states? The moment the incontestable fact is admitted, that negro slaves are property, the law of movable property irresistibly attaches itself to them, and secures the right of carrying them from one to another state, where they are recognised as property, without any hindrance whatever from congress.

But, Mr. President, I will not detain the senate longer on the subject of slavery within the district and in Florida, and of the right of congress to prohibit the removal of slaves from one state to another. These, as I have already intimated, with ultra-abolitionists, are but so many masked batteries, concealing the real andultimate point of attack. That point of attack is the institution of domestic slavery, as it exists in these states. It is to liberate three millions of slaves held in bondage within them. And now allow me, sir, to glance at the insurmountable obstacles which lie in the way of the accomplishment of this end, and at some of the consequences which would ensue if it were possible to attain it.

The first impediment is the utter and absolute want of all power on the part of the general government to effect the purpose. The constitution of the United States creates a limited government, comprising comparatively few powers, and leaving the residuary mass of political power in the possession of the several states. It is well known, that the subject of slavery interposed one of the greatest difficulties in the formation of the constitution. It was happily compromised and adjusted in a spirit of harmony and patriotism. According to that compromise, no power whatever was granted to the general government in respect to domestic slavery, but that which relates to taxation and representation, and the power to restore fugitive slaves to their lawful owners. All other power in regard to the institution of slavery was retained exclusively by the states, to be exercised by them severally, according to their respective views of their own peculiar interest. The constitution of the United States never could have been formed upon the principle of investing the general government with authority to abolish the institution at its pleasure. It never can be continued for a single day, if the exercise of such a power be assumed or usurped.

But it may be contended by these ultra-abolitionists, that their object is, not to stimulate the action of the general government, but to operate upon the states themselves, in which the institution of domestic slavery exists. If that be their object, why are these abolition societies and movements all confined to the free states? Why are the slave states wantonly and cruelly assailed? Why do the abolition presses teem with publications tending to excite hatred and animosity, on the part of the inhabitants of the free states, against those of the slave states? Why is congress petitioned? The free states have no more power or right to interfere with institutions in the slave states, confided to the exclusive jurisdiction of those states, than they would have to interfere with institutions existing in any foreign country. What would be thought of the formation of societies in Great Britain, the issue of numerous inflammatory publications, and the sending out of lecturers throughout the kingdom, denouncing and aiming at the destruction of any of the institutions of France? Would they be regarded as proceedings warranted by good neighborhood? Or what would be thought of the formation of societies in the slave states, the issuing of violent and inflammatory tracts, and the deputation of missionaries, pouring out impassioned denunciationsagainst institutions under the exclusive control of the free states? Is their purpose to appeal to our understandings, and to actuate our humanity? And do they expect to accomplish that purpose by holding us up to the scorn, and contempt, and detestation of the people of the free states and the whole civilized world? The slavery which exists amongst us is our affair, not theirs; and they have no more just concern with it than they have with slavery as it exists throughout the world. Why not leave it to us, as the common constitution of our country has left it, to be dealt with, under the guidance of Providence, as best we may or can?

The next obstacle in the way of abolition, arises out of the fact of the presence in the slave states of three millions of slaves. They are there, dispersed throughout the land, part and parcel of our population. They were brought into the country originally under the authority of the parent government, whilst we were colonies, and their importation was continued, in spite of all the remonstrances of our ancestors. If the question were an original question, whether, there being no slaves within the country, we should introduce them, and incorporate them into our society, that would be a totally different question. Few, if any, of the citizens of the United States, would be found to favor their introduction. No man in it would oppose, upon that supposition, their admission with more determined resolution and conscientious repugnance than I should. But that is not the question. The slaves are here; no practical scheme for their removal or separation from us has been yet devised or proposed; and the true inquiry is, what is best to be done with them. In human affairs we are often constrained, by the force of circumstances and the actual state of things, to do what we would not do, if that state of things did not exist. The slaves are here, and here must remain, in some condition; and, I repeat, how are they to be best governed? What is best to be done for their happiness and our own? In the slave states the alternative is, that the white man must govern the black, or the black govern the white. In several of those states, the number of the slaves is greater than that of the white population. An immediate abolition of slavery in them, as these ultra abolitionists propose, would be followed by a desperate struggle for immediate ascendency of the black race over the white race, or rather it would be followed by instantaneous collisions between the two races, which would break out into a civil war, that would end in the extermination or subjugation of the one race or the other. In such an alternative, who can hesitate? Is it not better for both parties that the existing state of things should be preserved, instead of exposing them to the horrible strifes and contests which would inevitably attend an immediate abolition? This is our true ground of defence, for the continued existence of slavery in our country It is that which our revolutionary ancestors assumed. It is thatwhich, in my opinion, forms our justification in the eyes of all christendom.

A third impediment to immediate abolition is to be found in the immense amount of capital which is invested in slave property. The total number of slaves in the United States, according to the last enumeration of the population, was a little upwards of two millions. Assuming their increase at a ratio, which it probably is, of five per centum per annum, their present number would be three millions. The average value of slaves at this time, is stated by persons well informed, to be as high as five hundred dollars each. To be certainly within the mark, let us suppose that it is only four hundred dollars. The total value, then, by that estimate, of the slave property in the United States, is twelve hundred millions of dollars. This property is diffused throughout all classes and conditions of society. It is owned by widows and orphans, by the aged and infirm, as well as the sound and vigorous. It is the subject of mortgages, deeds of trust, and family settlements. It has been made the basis of numerous debts contracted upon its faith, and is the sole reliance, in many instances, of creditors, within and without the slave states, for the payment of the debts due to them. And now it is rashly proposed, by a single fiat of legislation, to annihilate this immense amount of property! To annihilate it without indemnity and without compensation to its owners! Does any considerate man believe it to be possible to effect such an object, without convulsion, revolution, and bloodshed?

I know that there is a visionary dogma, which holds that negro slaves cannot be the subject of property. I shall not dwell long on this speculative abstraction. That is property which the law declares to be property. Two hundred years of legislation have sanctioned and sanctified negro slaves as property. Under all the forms of government which have existed upon this continent during that long space of time—under the British government—under the colonial government—under all the state constitutions and governments—and under the federal government itself—they have been deliberately and solemnly recognised as the legitimate subjects of property. To the wild speculations of theorists and innovators, stands opposed the fact, that in an uninterrupted period of two hundred years’ duration, under every form of human legislation, and by all the departments of human government, African negro slaves have been held and respected, have descended and been transferred, as lawful and indisputable property. They were treated as property in the very British example which is so triumphantly appealed to as worthy of our imitation. Although the West India planters had no voice in the united parliament of the British isles, an irresistible sense of justice extorted from that legislature the grant of twenty millions of pounds sterling, to compensate the colonists for their loss of property.