‘In whatever light, therefore, this great subject is viewed, the transfer of the public lands from the whole people of the United States, for whose benefit they are now held, to the people inhabiting the new states, must be regarded as the most momentous measure ever presented to the consideration of congress. If such a measure could find any justification, it must arise out of some radical and incurable defect in the construction of the general government properly to administer the public domain. But the existence of any such defect is contradicted by the most successful experience. No branch of the public service has evinced more system, uniformity, and wisdom, or given more general satisfaction, than that of the administration of the public lands.

‘If the proposed cession to the new states were to be made at a fair price, such as the general government could obtain from individual purchasers under the present system, there would be no motive for it, unless the new states are more competent to dispose of the public lands than the common government. They are now sold under one uniform plan, regulated and controlled by a single legislative authority, and the practical operation is perfectly understood. If they were transferred to the new states, the subsequent disposition would be according to laws emanating from various legislative sources. Competition would probably arise between the new states, in the terms which they would offer to purchasers. Each state would be desirous of inviting the greatest number of emigrants, not only for the laudable purpose of populating rapidly its own territories, but with the view to the acquisition of funds to enable it to fulfil its engagements with the general government. Collisions between the states would probably arise, and their injurious consequences may be imagined. A spirit of hazardous speculation would be engendered. Various schemes in the new states would be put afloat to sell or divide the public lands. Companies and combinations would be formed in this country, if not in foreign countries, presenting gigantic and tempting but delusive projects; and the history of legislation, in some of the states of the union, admonishes us that a too ready ear is sometimes given by a majority, in a legislative assembly, to such projects.

‘A decisive objection to such a transfer, for a fair equivalent, is, that it would establish a new and dangerous relation between the general government and the new states. In abolishing the credit which had been allowed to purchasers of the public lands prior to the year 1820, congress was principally governed by the consideration of the expediency and hazard of accumulating a large amount of debt in the new states all bordering on each other. Such an accumulation was deemed unwise and unsafe. It presented a new bond of interest, of sympathy, and of union, partially operating to the possible prejudice of the common bond of the whole union. But that debt was a debt due from individuals, and it was attended with this encouraging security, that purchasers, as they successively completed the payments for their lands, would naturally be disposed to aid the government in enforcing payment from delinquents. The project which the committee are now considering, is, to sell to the states, in their sovereign character, and consequently, to render them public debtors to the general government to an immense amount. This would inevitably createbetween the debtor states a common feeling and a common interest, distinct from the rest of the union. These states are all in the western and southwestern quarter of the union, remotest from the centre of federal power. The debt would be felt as a load from which they would constantly be desirous to relieve themselves; and it would operate as a strong temptation, weakening, if not dangerous, to the existing confederacy. The committee have the most animating hopes and the greatest confidence in the strength, and power, and durability of our happy union; and the attachment and warm affection of every member of the confederacy cannot be doubted; but we have authority, higher than human, for the instruction, that it is wise to avoid all temptation.

‘In the state of Illinois, with a population at the last census of one hundred and fifty-seven thousand four hundred and forty-five, there are thirty-one million three hundred and ninety-five thousand six hundred and sixty-nine acres of public land, including that part on which the Indian title remains to be extinguished. If we suppose it to be worth only half the minimum price, it would amount to nineteen million six hundred and twenty-two thousand four hundred and eighty dollars. How would that state be able to pay such an enormous debt? How could it pay even the annual interest upon it?

‘Supposing the debtor states to fail to comply with their engagements, in what mode could they be enforced by the general government? In treaties between independent nations, the ultimate remedy is well known. The apprehension of an appeal to that remedy, seconding the sense of justice and the regard for character, which prevail among christian and civilized nations, constitutes, generally, adequate security for the performance of national compacts. But this last remedy would be totally inadmissible in case of a delinquency on the part of the debtor states. The relations between the general government and the members of the confederacy are happily those of peace, friendship, and fraternity, and exclude all idea of force and war. Could the judiciary coerce the debtor states? On what could their process operate? Could the property of innocent citizens, residing within the limits of those states, be justly seized by the general government, and held responsible for debts contracted by the states themselves in their sovereign character? If a mortgage upon the lands ceded, were retained, that mortgage would prevent or retard subsequent sales by the states; and if individuals bought, subject to the incumbrance, a parental government could never resort to the painful measure of disturbing them in their possessions.

‘Delinquency, on the part of the debtor states, would be inevitable, and there would be no effectual remedy for the delinquency. They would come again and again to congress, soliciting time and indulgence, until, finding the weight of the debt intolerable, congress, wearied by reiterated applications for relief, would finally resolve to spunge the debt; or, if congress attempted to enforce its payment, another and a worse alternative would be embraced.

‘If the proposed cession be made for a price merely nominal, it would be contrary to the express conditions of the original cessions from primitive states to congress, and contrary to the obligations which the general government stands under to the whole people of these United States, arising out of the fact, that the acquisitions of Louisiana and Florida, and from Georgia, were obtained at a great expense, borne from the common treasure, and incurred for the common benefit. Such a gratuitous cession could not be made without a positive violation of a solemn trust, and without manifest injustice to the old states. And its inequality among the new states would be as marked as its injustice to the old would be indefensible. Thus Missouri, with a population of one hundred and forty thousand four hundred and fifty-five, would acquire thirty-eight million two hundred and ninety-two thousand one hundred and fifty-one acres; and the state of Ohio, with a population of nine hundred and thirty-five thousand eight hundred and eighty-four, would obtain only five million five hundred and eighty-six thousand eight hundred and thirty-four acres. Supposing a division of the land among the citizens of those two states respectively; the citizen of Ohio would obtain less than six acres for his share, and the citizen of Missouri upwards of two hundred and seventy-two acres as his proportion.

‘Upon full and thorough consideration, the committee have come to the conclusion, that it is inexpedient either to reduce the price of the public lands, or to cede them to the new states. They believe, on the contrary, that sound policy coincides with the duty which has devolved on the general government to the whole of the states, and the whole of the people of the union, and enjoins the preservation of the existing system, as having been tried and approved, after a long and triumphant experience. But, in consequence of the extraordinary financial prosperity which the UnitedStates enjoys, the question merits examination, whether, whilst the general government steadily retains the control of this great national resource in its own hands, after the payment of the public debt, the proceeds of the sales of the public lands, no longer needed to meet the ordinary expenses of government, may not be beneficially appropriated to some other objects for a limited time.’

The senator from New York has adverted, for another purpose, to the twenty-eight millions of surplus divided a few years ago among the states. He has said, truly, that it arose from the public lands. Was not that, in effect, distribution? Was it not so understood at the time? Was it not voted for, by senators, as practical distribution? The senator from North Carolina, (Mr. Mangum,) has stated that he did. I did. Other senators did; and no one, not the boldest, will have the temerity to rise here and propose to require or compel the states to refund that money. If, in form, it was a deposit with the states, in fact, and in truth, it was distribution. So it was then regarded. So it will ever remain.

Let us now see, Mr. President, how this plan of cession will operate among the new states themselves. And I appeal more especially to the senators from Ohio. That state has about a million and a half of inhabitants. The United States have(as will probably be shown when the returns are published of the late census[25]) a population of about fifteen millions. Ohio, then, has within her limits one tenth part of the population of the United States. Now, let us see what sort of a bargain the proposed cession makes for Ohio.