But while there had been no such thing in practice as an encroachment by the federal upon the state governments, there had been, within the federal government itself, a constant encroachment by the executive upon the legislative department.

First, it attacked the treaty-making power. None could now read the language of the constitution, without at once coming to the conclusion, that the intention of the authors of that instrument was, that the senate should be consulted by the president, not merely in the ratification, but in the inception, of all treaties; that, in the commencement of the negotiations, the instructions of the ministers appointed to treat, the character and provisions of the treaty, the senate should be consulted, and should first yield its assent. And such had, in fact, been the interpretation put upon the treaty-making power, in the first and purest years of our government. Every one must recollect the early history of the exercise of the power, and the high sanction for such a usage. The first president had been wont to come to the senate, there to propose a foreign mission, and to consult with his constitutional advisers, the members of the senate, on the instructions to be given to the minister who should be sent. But this practice had since been abandoned. The president now, without a word of consultation with the senate, on his own mere personal sense of propriety, concluded a treaty, and promised to the foreign power its ratification; and then after all this had been done, and the terms of the treaty agreed upon, he, for the first time, submitted it to the senate for ratification. Now, every one must see, that there was a great difference between rejecting what had been already actually done, and refusing to do that thing if asked beforehand. All must feel, that they often gave their official assent to what they never would have sanctioned, but for the consideration that the treaty was already concluded, and that the faith of the nation was in some sort pledged for its ratification. Another consequence of this executive encroachment, was one from whichforeign powers often experienced great inconvenience; he meant the amendments of treaties by the senate, after they were at length submitted. So great had the inconvenience from this source been, that, in more recent treaties, it had come to be the practice to insert, in the body of the treaty itself, a provision against all alteration; so that it must be ratified in its existing form, or not ratified at all.

The next executive encroachment he should notice, was that which occurred in the dismissal from office of persons appointed by and with the consent of the senate. The effect of this practice was virtually to destroy all agency and coöperation of the senate, in such appointments. Of what avail was it that the senate should to-day solemnly ratify and confirm the appointment of an individual to an office under the government, when the president could to-morrow reverse the effect of their act by his mere breath? Every one knew that the power of removal had been grossly perverted. In the early days of the constitution, it had been maintained, that that power could be exercised only in case of malfeasance or misfeasance in office; and that the president who should dare to employ it for any other end, would subject himself to impeachment. But our history and experience has gone to show, that this liability to impeachment was a mere scarecrow, and that it could never have any practical effect in a popular government, constituted as ours was, and in a country politically divided as ours was ever like to be. By the free exercise of this power of removal, the senate had lost its practical influence on the whole subject of appointment to office. Instance after instance had occurred, where an individual had been dismissed by the executive, whom the senate would gladly have replaced in office, but whom they were unable to retain there, and were therefore compelled to sanction the nomination of a successor. The actual result of such a state of things was, he repeated it, that the coöperation of the senate with the president, in the matter of appointments, had been almost completely nullified for years past. Indeed, so perfectly was this understood, that when the senate were deliberating with closed doors, on executive nominations, Mr. Clay frequently walked out of the chamber. Deliberation, in such a case, was one of the idlest things in the world, because every one knew that all resistance must be unavailing. And, even should the objections against the nominee be so gross and undeniable that resistance to his appointment should succeed, they might generally calculate on another nomination, not more to the taste of the senate; and when at length the office was filled, the tenure of the incumbent was not on the joint will of the president and senate acting together, but upon the single will, upon the mere arbitrary breath of one man.

Mr. Clay said, it was not his purpose to go into all the details of these encroachments by the executive, upon the constitutional powers and prerogatives of a single legislative branch of thegovernment. He would now pass to its attacks on the powers of the congress of the United States.

And the first instance of this to which he should refer, was the creation of officers and the designation of their salaries, without the consent of congress, or any consultation with it. Another, and a more formidable instance, was to be found in the assumption within the last few years, of the purse of the nation. He alluded, as every body must understand, to the seizure made by a late executive, of the public deposits placed by law in the bank of the United States—a removal which had been effected under the avowed claim of power to employ the prerogative of removal as a means to compel subordinate executive officers to comply with the will of the president, on the principle that the executive was a unit, and that a single will must control the entire executive department. This seizure of the public deposits had yet been unprovided against; the congressional power to control them had been unresumed, and thus a state of things was permitted to continue, by which the nation was virtually placed at the feet of the executive.

Let not gentlemen mock him, by talking about the impossibility of the president’s drawing money out of the treasury, except under an appropriation by congress. Let them not tell him of the responsibility of public officers; let them look at facts; let them look at what had actually occurred, on the removal of two or three secretaries of the treasury, in order to accomplish this very seizure of the public treasure; and then let them look at the dismissal of a countless host of subordinate officers, because they did not happen to hold the same political opinions that were held by the president. Of what avail were laws? The president had nothing to do but say to his secretary, issue your warrant for such a sum of money, and direct the register and comptroller to sign it, and if they should talk about a regard for their oaths, and boggle at obeying, tell them to do what I command them, and if not, I will find men who will. And he would here say, to all those who professed to be desirous of guarding against such abuses of trust, that unless it were done by an amendment of the constitution, or by a revival and resumption of the power already possessed by congress, under the constitution, they never could effect their purpose. All efforts, all devices, all guards, all guarantees, all attempts of whatever kind, to separate the purse from the sword, would prove in practice utterly vain and ineffectual. There was a third instance of this encroachment, which he was authorized by facts to state, but on which he should not at this time dwell. Not only had the purse of the nation been seized; not only did it still remain in the hands of the president, but the nation had seen armies raised, by executive mandate, not only without authority or shadow of authority of law, but, as in the case of the Florida volunteers, after a law had been asked for, and positively refused. Other instances might be cited, in which a military force had been raised, without the sanction of congress.

Without, therefore, going any further, Mr. Clay said, that he thought a careful review of the operations of this government, down to the present havoc, would fully demonstrate that, while it had made no encroachment on the states, there had been a constant encroachment by the executive on the legislative authority.

And was not this in the nature of things? The executive branch of the government was eternally in action; it was ever awake; it never slept; its action was continuous and unceasing, like the tides of some mighty river, which continued flowing and flowing on, swelling, and deepening, and widening, in its onward progress, till it swept away every impediment, and broke down and removed every frail obstacle which might be set up to impede its course. Let gentlemen look at all history, and they would find that it had ever been so. The legislative branch of government met only periodically; its power lay in its assembling and acting; the moment it adjourned, its power disappeared; it was dissipated, gone; but there stood the president at the head of the executive department, ever ready to enforce the law, and to seize upon every advantage which presented itself, for the extension and augmentation of its power.

And now he would, upon principle, examine for a few moments the motives which might be supposed to have actuated the members of the convention, in conferring upon the executive this veto power. Let us throw ourselves back to the period in which they lived and acted, and then institute a comparison between the expectations in which they had indulged, and the actual facts, as they had since occurred.

On principle, certainly, the executive ought to have no agency in the formation of laws. Laws were the will of the nation authoritatively expressed. The carrying of those laws into effect was the duty which ought to be assigned to the executive, and this ought to be his sole duty, for it was an axiom in all free governments that the three great departments, legislative, executive, and judicial, should ever be kept separate and distinct. And a government was the most perfect when most in conformity with this fundamental principle. To give, then, to the executive, any agency in the ascertainment and expression of the will of the nation, was so far a violation of this great leading principle. But it was said that the framers of our constitution had, nevertheless, been induced to place the veto upon the list of executive powers, by two considerations; the first was a desire to protect the executive against the power of the legislative branch, and the other was a prudent wish to guard the country against the injurious effects of crude and hasty legislation. But where was the necessity to protect the executive against the legislative department? were not both bound by their solemn oaths, to support the constitution? The judiciary had no veto. If the argument was a sound one, why was not the sameprotection extended to the judiciary also? Was there not ample security against the encroachments of the legislative power, in the absence of the veto? First, there was the solemn oath of office; then there was the authority of the judiciary; then there was the responsibility of individual members to the people, and this responsibility continually kept up by a frequent appeal to the people; and, lastly, there was the ultimate conflict of the president and the legislature before the grand tribunal of the nation itself, in case of any attempt, by the legislature, to deprive him of the rightful exercise of his authority. Besides, if a veto be necessary, as a defence against legislative power, why was there no veto against the highest description of all legislation, the fundamental legislation by a convention? There was no veto there; there was no apprehension of hasty action; no necessity was recognised for the controlling will of one man to save the nation from the heedless acts of its own representatives. But in the case of ordinary legislation, why should such apprehensions be indulged? On this subject, experience was our safest guide. Now, Mr. Clay had taken the pains to look into the provisions of twenty-six state constitutions, in relation to this matter of the veto, and the result was highly curious and interesting. The states were in this respect divided, as equally as their number would admit, into three distinct classes. Nine of them gave to the executive the veto power, unless controlled by two thirds of the legislature. Eight other states conferred the veto, but controlled it by a second veto of a majority, as was proposed in the amendment now under consideration. While the nine remaining states had not inserted the veto at all, and at the head of these stood one which had been called the mother of states—Virginia. Now some of these state constitutions were of a date anterior to that of the constitution of the United States itself. If there had been this very great danger of executive encroachment and of hasty legislation, one would suppose it would have been heard of in these nine states. Had any instance yet occurred to show that such a danger did exist? Mr. Clay had heard of none, read of none; and he put it to the advocates of this arbitrary and monarchical power, he put it especially to democrats, who, while they professed themselves, and, he doubted not, honestly and conscientiously professed themselves friends of the people, came out in the contest between monarchical prerogative on the one hand, and civil freedom on the other, as the avowed advocates of prerogative; he put it to all of them to tell, if such dangers both of encroachment and rashness as were pretended as a pretext for the veto did actually exist, how it happened that in the nine states he had named, during so long a period as had elapsed since their constitutions were formed, no instances had occurred, either of encroachment by the legislature on the powers of the executive, or of such rash and hasty legislation as called for the restraint and safeguard of a single sovereign will.