Notwithstanding these difficulties, it was resolved to signalize the year 1759 by the complete conquest of Canada. The plan of the campaign was, that three powerful armies should enter the French possessions by three different routes, and attack all their strong-holds at nearly the same time. At the head of one division of the army, brigadier-general Wolfe, a young officer who had signalized himself at the siege of Louisbourg, was to ascend the St. Lawrence and lay siege to Quebec, escorted by a strong fleet to co-operate with his troops. The central and main army, composed of British and provincials, was to be conducted against Ticonderoga and Crown Point by general Amherst, the new commander-in-chief, who, after making himself master of these places, was to proceed over lake Champlain and by the way of Richelieu river to the St. Lawrence, and, descending that river, form a junction with general Wolfe before the walls of Quebec. The third army, to be composed principally of provincials, reinforced by a strong body of friendly Indians, was to be commanded by general Prideaux, who was to lead this division first against Niagara, and, after the reduction of that place, to embark on lake Ontario, and proceed down the St. Lawrence against Montreal. It has been observed by a recent author, ‘Had the elements been laid, and the enemy spell-bound, the whole of this brilliant plan could not have helped succeeding.’ This sentence, however, betrays a very limited view of a plan that was well worthy of the mind of Pitt. In this arrangement immediate advantage was not sacrificed; while the more remote results exhibited a prospect highly calculated to excite the ambition of the leaders, and to arouse all the energies of the troops. It is in thus affording motives which tend to bring physical force into most effective and persevering action, that intellectual superiority becomes manifest, confounding the calculations of ordinary minds.
Early in the winter, general Amherst commenced preparations for his part of the enterprise; but it was not till the last of May that his troops were assembled at Albany; and it was as late as the 22d of July, when he appeared before Ticonderoga. As the naval superiority of Great Britain had prevented France from sending out reinforcements, none of the posts in this quarter were able to withstand so great a force as that of general Amherst. Ticonderoga was immediately abandoned; the example was followed at Crown Point; and the only way in which the enemy seemed to think of preserving their province was by retarding the English army with shows of resistance till the season of operation should be past, or till, by the gradual concentration of their forces, they should become numerous enough to make an effectual stand. From Crown Point they retreated to Isle-aux-Noix, where general Amherst understood there was a body of between three and four thousand men, and a fleet of several armed vessels. The English made great exertions to secure a naval superiority; and had it not been for a succession of adverse storms upon the lake, they would most probably have accomplished the original design of forming a junction at Quebec, instead of being obliged to go into winter quarters at Crown Point.
In prosecution of the enterprise against Niagara, general Prideaux had embarked with an army on lake Ontario; and on the 6th of July landed without opposition within about three miles of the fort, which he invested in form. While directing the operations of the siege he was killed by the bursting of a cohorn, and the command devolved on Sir William Johnson. That general, prosecuting with judgment and vigor the plan of his predecessor, pushed the attack of Niagara with an intrepidity that soon brought the besiegers within a hundred yards of the covered way. Meanwhile, the French, alarmed at the danger of losing a post which was a key to their interior empire in America, had collected a large body of regular troops from the neighboring garrisons of Detroit, Venango, and Presqu’ Isle, with which, and a party of Indians, they resolved, if possible, to raise the siege. Apprised of their intention to hazard a battle, general Johnson ordered his light infantry, supported by some grenadiers and regular foot, to take post between the cataract of Niagara and the fortress; placed the auxiliary Indians on his flanks; and, together with this preparation for an engagement, took effectual measures for securing his lines, and bridling the garrison. About nine in the morning of the 24th of July, the enemy appeared, and the horrible sound of the war-whoop from the hostile Indians was the signal of battle. The French charged with great impetuosity, but were received with firmness; and in less than an hour were completely routed. This battle decided the fate of Niagara. Sir William Johnson the next morning opened negotiations with the French commandant; and in a few hours a capitulation was signed. The garrison, consisting of six hundred and seven men, were to march out with the honors of war, to be embarked on the lake, and carried to New York; and the women and children were to be carried to Montreal. The reduction of Niagara effectually cut off the communication between Canada and Louisiana.
The expedition against the capital of Canada was the most daring and important. Strong by nature, and still stronger by art, Quebec had obtained the appellation of the Gibraltar of America; and every attempt against it had failed. It was now commanded by Montcalm, an officer of distinguished reputation; and its capture must have appeared chimerical to any one but Pitt. He judged rightly, however, that the boldest and most dangerous enterprises are often the most successful, especially when committed to ardent minds glowing with enthusiasm, and emulous of glory. Such a mind he had discovered in general Wolfe, whose conduct at Louisbourg had attracted his attention. He appointed him to conduct the expedition, and gave him for assistants brigadier-generals Monckton, Townshend, and Murray; all, like himself, young and ardent. Early in the season he sailed from Halifax with eight thousand troops, and, near the last of June, landed the whole army on the island of Orleans, a few miles below Quebec. From this position he could take a near and distinct view of the obstacles to be overcome. These were so great, that even the bold and sanguine Wolfe perceived more to fear than to hope. In a letter to Mr. Pitt, written before commencing operations, he declared that he saw but little prospect of reducing the place.
Quebec stands on the north side of the St. Lawrence, and consists of an upper and lower town. The lower town lies between the river and a bold and lofty eminence, which runs parallel to it far to the westward. At the top of this eminence is a plain, upon which the upper town is situated.Below, or east of the city, is the river St. Charles, whose channel is rough, and whose banks are steep and broken. At a short distance farther down is the Montmorency; and between these two rivers, and reaching from one to the other, was encamped the French army, strongly entrenched, and at least equal in number to that of the English. General Wolfe took possession of Point Levi, on the southern bank of the St. Lawrence, and there erected batteries against the town. The cannonade which was kept up, though it destroyed many houses, made but little impression on the works, which were too strong and too remote to be materially affected; their elevation, at the same time, placing them beyond the reach of the fleet.
Siege of Quebec.
Convinced of the impossibility of reducing the place, unless he could erect batteries on the north side of the St. Lawrence, Wolfe soon decided on more daring measures. The northern shore of the St. Lawrence, to a considerable distance above Quebec, is so bold and rocky as to render a landing in the face of an enemy impracticable. If an attempt were made below the town, the river Montmorency passed, and the French driven from their entrenchments, the St. Charles would present a new, and perhaps an insuperable barrier. With every obstacle fully in view, Wolfe, heroically observing that ‘a victorious army finds no difficulties,’ resolved to pass the Montmorency, and bring Montcalm to an engagement. In pursuance of this resolution, thirteen companies of English grenadiers, and part of the second battalion of royal Americans, were landed at the mouth of that river, while two divisions, under generals Townshend and Murray, prepared to cross it higher up. Wolfe’s plan was to attack first a redoubt, close to the water’s edge, apparently beyond reach of the fire from the enemy’s entrenchments, in the belief that the French, by attempting to support that fortification, would put it in his power to bring on a general engagement; or, if they should submit to the loss of the redoubt, that he could afterwards examine their situation with coolness, and advantageously regulate his future operations.
On the approach of the British troops the redoubt was evacuated; andthe general, observing some confusion in the French camp, changed his original plan, and determined not to delay an attack. Orders were immediately despatched to the generals Townshend and Murray to keep their divisions in readiness for fording the river; and the grenadiers and royal Americans were directed to form on the beach until they could be properly sustained. These troops, however, not waiting for support, rushed impetuously toward the enemy’s entrenchments; but they were received with so strong and steady a fire from the French musketry, that they were instantly thrown into disorder, and obliged to seek shelter at the redoubt which the enemy had abandoned. Detained here awhile by a dreadful thunder storm, they were still within reach of a severe fire from the French; and many gallant officers, exposing their persons in attempting to form the troops, were killed, the whole loss amounting to nearly five hundred men. The plan of attack being effectually disconcerted, the English general gave orders for repassing the river, and returning to the isle of Orleans.
Compelled to abandon the attack on that side, Wolfe deemed that advantage might result from attempting to destroy the French fleet, and by distracting the attention of Montcalm with continual descents upon the northern shore. General Murray, with twelve hundred men in transports, made two vigorous but abortive attempts to land; and though more successful in the third, he did nothing more than burn a magazine of warlike stores. The enemy’s fleet was effectually secured against attacks, either by land or by water, and the commander-in-chief was again obliged to submit to the mortification of recalling his troops. At this juncture, intelligence arrived that Niagara was taken, that Ticonderoga and Crown Point had been abandoned, but that general Amherst, instead of pressing forward to their assistance, was preparing to attack the Isle-aux-Noix.