Among other measures tending to promote the general welfare, congress resolved that a line of posts should be appointed from Falmouth, in New England, to Savannah, in Georgia; and Benjamin Franklin was unanimously chosen postmaster-general. They also directed the establishment of an hospital, adequate to the necessities of an army consisting of twenty thousand men;and Dr. Church was appointed director and physician of the establishment.[112]
General Washington, on his first arrival in camp, found the materials for a good army; but they were in the crudest state. The troops having been raised by different colonial governments, no uniformity existed among the regiments; and imbued with the spirit of that very liberty for which they were preparing to fight, and unaccustomed to discipline, they neither felt an inclination to be subject to military rules, nor realized the importance of being so. The difficulty of establishing subordination was greatly increased by the shortness of the terms of enlistment, some of which were to expire in November, and none to continue longer than December. Various causes operated to lead congress to the almost fatal plan of temporary military establishments. Among the most important of these were a prospect of accommodation with the parent state, and the want of experience in the management of war upon an extensive scale.
The fear of accumulating expenses which the resources of the country could not discharge, had a further influence to deter the American government from the adoption of permanent military establishments; for, although the recommendations of congress, and the regulations of state conventions, had, in the day of enthusiasm, the force of law, yet the ruling power thought it inexpedient to attempt to raise large sums by direct taxes, at a time when the commerce of the country was annihilated, and the cultivators of the ground were subjected to heavy services in the field of war. The only recourse was to a paper medium, without funds for its redemption, or for the support of its credit, and therefore of necessity subject to depreciation, and, in its nature, capable of only a temporary currency;congress, therefore, was justly afraid of the expense of a permanent army. Jealousy of a standing army had also a powerful influence upon the military arrangements of America. Indeed this spirit early insinuated itself into the legislative bodies of the colonies, and was displayed in many of their measures: an indication of this feeling appears in the address presented by the provincial assembly of New York to general Washington, while on his journey to the American camp. ‘We have the fullest assurance,’ say they, ‘that whenever this important contest shall be decided, by that fondest wish of each American soul, an accommodation with our mother country, you will cheerfully resign the important deposit committed to your hands, and reassume the character of our worthiest citizen.’
The want of subordination was by no means the only difficulty with which the commander-in-chief had to contend; he soon made the alarming discovery, that there was no more powder than would furnish each man with nine cartridges. Although this dangerous deficiency was carefully concealed from the enemy, yet the want of bayonets, which was very considerable, could not be kept secret. The army was also so destitute of tents as to be unavoidably lodged in barracks, a circumstance extremely unfavorable to sudden movements, to health, and to discipline. There was no commissary-general, and therefore no systematic arrangement for obtaining provisions; and a supply of clothes was rendered peculiarly difficult by the non-importation agreements. Added to this there was a total want of engineers, and a great deficiency of working tools.
The general, happily qualified at once to meet difficulties and to remove them, took immediate care to organize the troops, to fit them for actual service, and to make arrangements for the necessary supplies. Next to these objects, he considered the re-enlistment of the army the most interesting. To this essential point he had early solicited the attention of congress, assuring that body that he must despair of the liberties of his country, unless he were furnished with an army that should stand by him until the conclusion of their enterprise. Congress at length resolved to raise a standing army, to consist of about seventy-five thousand men, to serve for the term of three years, or during the war; and that it should be composed of eighty-eight battalions, to be raised in the colonies, according to their respective abilities. Recruiting orders were accordingly issued; but the progress in raising recruits was by no means proportioned to the public exigencies. On the last day of December, when all the old troops not engaged on the new establishments were disbanded, there had been enlisted for the army of 1776 no more than nine thousand six hundred and fifty men. An earnest recommendation of general Washington to congress to try the influence of a bounty was not acceded to until late in January; but during the winter the number of recruits was considerably augmented. ‘The history of the winter campaign,’ says the biographer of Washington, ‘is a history of continued and successive struggles on the part of the American general, under the vexations and difficulties imposed by the want of arms, ammunition, and permanent troops, on a person in an uncommon degree solicitous to prove himself, by some grand and useful achievement, worthy of the high station to which the voice of his country had called him.’
In the space of time between the disbanding the old army and the constitution of an effective force from the new recruits, the lines were often ina defenceless state; the English must have known the fact, and no adequate reason can be assigned why an attack was not made. ‘It is not,’ says general Washington in his communications to congress, ‘in the pages of history to furnish a case like ours. To maintain a post within musket shot of the enemy, for six months together, without ammunition, and, at the same time, to disband one army and recruit another, within that distance of twenty odd British regiments, is more, probably, than ever was attempted. But if we succeed as well in the last as we have heretofore in the first, I shall think it the most fortunate event of my whole life.’ Such a measure, with the organization and discipline of the men, will be supposed to have employed every active power of the general; yet this did not satisfy his mind. He knew that congress anxiously contemplated more decisive steps, and that the country looked for events of greater magnitude. The public was ignorant of his actual situation, and conceived his means for offensive operations to be much greater than they were and they expected from him the capture or expulsion of the British army in Boston. He felt the importance of securing the confidence of his countrymen by some brilliant action, and was fully sensible that his own reputation was liable to suffer if he confined himself solely to measures of defence.
To publish to his anxious country the state of his army, would be to acquaint the enemy with his weakness, and to hazard his destruction. The firmness and patriotism of general Washington were displayed, in making the good of his country an object of higher consideration than the applause of those who were incapable of forming a correct opinion of the propriety of his measures. While he resolutely rejected every measure which in his calm and deliberate judgment he did not approve, he daily pondered the practicability of a successful attack upon Boston. As a preparatory step, he took possession of Plowed hill, Cobble hill, and Lechmere’s point, and erected fortifications upon them. These posts brought him within half a mile of the enemy’s works on Bunker’s hill; and, by his artillery, he drove the British floating batteries from their stations in Charles river. He erected floating batteries to watch the movements of his enemy, and to aid in any offensive operations that circumstances might warrant. He took the opinion of his general officers a second time respecting the meditated attack; they again unanimously gave their opinion in opposition to the measure, and this opinion was immediately communicated to congress. Congress appeared still to favor the attempt, and, that an apprehension of danger to the town of Boston might not have an undue influence upon the operations of the army, resolved, ‘That if general Washington and his council of war should be of opinion that a successful attack might be made on the troops in Boston, he should make it in any manner he might think expedient, notwithstanding the town, and property therein, might thereby be destroyed.’
General Howe had, in October, succeeded general Gage in the command of the British army, and through the winter confined himself to measures of defence. The inability of the American general to accomplish the great object of the campaign, repeatedly pointed out by congress, was doubtless a source of extreme mortification to him; but he indulged the hope of success in some military operations during the winter that would correspond with the high expectations of his country, and procure him honor in hisexalted station of commander-in-chief of the American army. Early in January he summoned a council of war, in which it was resolved, ‘That a vigorous attempt ought to be made on the ministerial troops in Boston, before they can be reinforced in the spring, if the means can be provided, and a favorable opportunity shall offer.’
It was not, however, till the middle of February, that the ice became sufficiently strong for general Washington to march his forces upon it into Boston; he was then inclined to risk a general assault upon the British posts, although he had not powder to make any extensive use of his artillery; but his general officers in council voted against the attempt, and in their decision he reluctantly acquiesced. By the end of the month the stock of powder was considerably increased, and the regular army amounted to fourteen thousand men, which was reinforced by six thousand of the militia of Massachusetts. General Washington now resolved to take possession of the heights of Dorchester, in the prospect that this movement would bring on a general engagement with the enemy under favorable circumstances; or, should this expectation fail, that from this position he would be enabled to annoy the ships in the harbor, and the troops in the town. To mask the design, a severe cannonade and bombardment were opened on the British works and lines for several nights in succession. As soon as the firing began on the night of the 4th of March, a strong detachment marched from Roxbury over the neck of land connecting Roxbury with Dorchester heights, and, without discovery, took possession of the heights. General Ward, who commanded the division of the army in Roxbury, had fortunately provided fascines before the resolution passed to fortify the place; these were of great use, as the ground was deeply frozen; and, in the course of the night, the party, by uncommon exertions, erected works sufficient for their defence.
When the British discovered these works, nothing could exceed their astonishment. Their only alternative was either to abandon the town, or to dislodge the provincials. General Howe, with his usual spirit, chose the latter part of the alternative, and took measures for the embarkation on that very evening of five regiments, with the light infantry and grenadiers, on the important but most hazardous service. The transports fell down in the evening towards the castle with the troops, amounting to about two thousand men; but a tremendous storm at night rendered the execution of the design absolutely impracticable. A council of war was called the next morning, which agreed to evacuate the town as soon as possible. A fortnight elapsed before that measure was effected. Meanwhile, the Americans strengthened and extended their works; and on the morning of the 17th of March the king’s troops, with those Americans who were attached to the royal cause, began to embark; before ten, all of them were under sail. As the rear embarked, general Washington marched triumphantly into Boston, where he was joyfully received as a deliverer.