The military force, which the President in his annual message informed congress he had ordered to take a position “between the Neuces and the Del Norte,” was for some months concentrated under General Taylor at Corpus Christi: but, on learning the probable refusal of the Mexican government to receive our envoy; and moreover, Texas having by her act of a previous date, declared the Rio del Norte to be her boundary, the President, in January, directed General Taylor to remove from Corpus Christi, and to concentrate his troops on the left bank of the Del Norte. At the same time all aggressive acts were strictly forbidden.
Accordingly, on the 11th of March the troops were put in motion, and on the 28th of that month arrived on the left bank of the Del Norte, opposite to Matamoras. About the same time a depôt was established at Point Isabel, near the Brasos Santiago, thirty miles in the rear of the encampment.
These measures, adopted by the President, by which the American troopspassed the Neuces, the boundary claimed by Mexico, was considered by a large portion of the people of the United States as impolitic, if not unjust; and strongly tending to strengthen the misunderstanding already existing between the two governments. At least, the territory thus occupied was a subject of dispute, and by many its occupation was deemed a belligerent act.
It was naturally so considered by Ampudia, who was commanding the Mexican forces at Matamoras, and who notified the American general to break up his camp within twenty four hours, and retire beyond the Neuces. On the 24th of April, General Arista superseded Ampudia in command, and forthwith communicated to General Taylor, that “he considered hostilities commenced, and should prosecute them.” On the same day, a party of dragoons of sixty-three men and officers from the American camp, who had been despatched up the Del Norte to reconnoitre, were attacked by a body of Mexican troops. Sixteen were killed and wounded, and the remainder taken prisoners.
For a time following the occupation of the left bank of the Del Norte, the situation of the American army was considered exceedingly critical. In point of numbers, it fell far short of the Mexican force under General Arista, and supplies of food were difficult to be obtained. In this situation, General Taylor availed himself of authority given him by the President to call upon the governor of Texas for four regiments of state troops, and on the governor of Louisiana for four regiments, to be sent him as soon as practicable. These eight regiments were expected to make a force of nearly 5000 men, and were, in the opinion of General Taylor, sufficient: but General Gaines, having command in the southern department, under an apprehension that a much larger force would be necessary, made requisitions upon several of the governors of the southern states for a large volunteer force. In consequence of this call, a large force was ultimately concentrated under General Taylor—more than was deemed needful, and they were dismissed, while General Gaines, though considered patriotic in his measures, was adjudged to have transcended his authority.
Before, however, any of the above troops had reached the camp of General Taylor, his situation had become alarming. His provisions were nearly exhausted. The Mexicans were surrounding him, and his communication with Point Isabel was liable to be interrupted. At length, leaving a garrison of 700 or 800 men at his works opposite Matamoras, he set out with his other forces on Friday, the 1st of May, for Point Isabel to give protection to that place, and re-establish his communication with his supplies.
This movement upon Point Isabel was effected, without encountering a single Mexican. In place of molesting General Taylor, the enemy concentrated his forces about the camp which he had just left. On the morning of the 3d, the American works were attacked by the Mexican batteries from the opposite side of the river, while a detachment of their forces made a simultaneous attack on this side of the Rio Grande, in the rear. The Americans returned the fire with so much effect as to silence, in a short time, the Mexican batteries, while the attack in the rear was still more easily repulsed. The Americans lost but a single man. The Mexican loss was considerable. Matamoras itself suffered considerably.
On the 7th General Taylor commenced his return to his camp. He anticipated opposition, but little did anyone apprehend such attacks and such victories as the Americans won.
On the 8th, the Mexican forces had reached Palo Alto, with an intention to intercept the American general, and if practicable to prevent his return to his camp. The two armies met, and for five hours such a battle raged as the annals of history seldom record. The Mexican force exceeded 5000 men, with seven pieces of artillery and 800 cavalry. The American troops were 2300, with but two eighteen pounders and two light batteries. The loss of the Americans was comparatively trifling. Two brave officers were severely wounded. Major Ringgold and Captain Page, the former of whom soon after died. The loss of the Mexicans, according to the official report of General Arista, was, in killed, 98—wounded and missing, 142. The American army encamped on the field.
On the following day, General Taylor again moved with his forces towards his camp opposite Matamoras; and, on reaching Resaca de la Palma, a few miles only from his destination, he again encountered the enemy, and a battle, shorter in its continuance, but far more severe, ensued. The Americans were still more triumphant, capturing eight pieces of artillery, with a large quantity of ammunition; three standards, and several hundred prisoners, among whom was General La Vega. The loss of the Americans in this action exceeded that of the preceding day. According to the report of General Taylor in both actions there were 3 officers and 40 men killed, and 13 officers and 400 men wounded. General Arista reported as killed, officers and men, 154; wounded, 205, and missing, 156; making a total of 515.