A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents. Volume 1, part 1: George Washington

by Unknown

In this view, it is evident that the fifth article neither enlarges nor abridges the stipulations of the third and fourth. The effect of the treaty would have been precisely the same had it been omitted altogether; consequently it may be truly said that the reservation by the United States in this article is completely useless. And it may be added with equal truth that the equivalent reservation by France is completely useless, as well as her previous abandonment of the same duty, and, in short, the whole article. Each party, then, remains free to raise or lower its tonnage, provided the change operates on all nations, even the most favored.

Without undertaking to affirm, we may obviously conjecture that this article has been inserted on the part of the United States from an overcaution to guard, nommément, by name, against a particular aggrievance, which they thought they could never be too well secured against; and that has happened which generally happens—doubts have been produced by the too great number of words used to prevent doubt.

II. The Court of France, however, understands this article as intended to introduce something to which the preceding articles had not reached, and not merely as an application of them to a particular case. Their opinion seems to be founded on the general rule in the construction of instruments, to leave no words merely useless for which any rational meaning can be found. They say that the reservation by the United States of a right to lay a duty equivalent to that of the 100 sols, reserved by France, would have been completely useless if they were left free by the preceding articles to lay a tonnage to any extent whatever; consequently, that the reservation of a part proves a relinquishment of the residue.

If some meaning, and such a one, is to be given to the last member of the article, some meaning, and a similar one, must be given to the corresponding member. If the reservation by the United States of a right to lay an equivalent duty implies a relinquishment of their right to lay any other, the reservation by France of a right to continue the specified duty to which it is an equivalent must imply a relinquishment of the right on her part to lay or continue any other. Equivalent reservations by both must imply equivalent restrictions on both. The exact reciprocity stipulated in the preceding articles, and which pervades every part of the treaty, insures a counter right to each party for every right ceded to the other.

Let it be further considered that the duty called tonnage in the United States is in lieu of the duties for anchorage, for the support of buoys, beacons, and light-houses, to guide the mariner into harbor and along the coast, which are provided and supported at the expense of the United States, and for fees to measurers, weighers, gangers, etc., who are paid by the United States, for which articles, among many others (light-house money excepted), duties are paid by us in the ports of France under their specific names. That Government has hitherto thought these duties consistent with the treaty, and consequently the same duties under a general instead of specific names, with us, must be equally consistent with it. It is not the name, but the thing, which is essential. If we have renounced the right to lay any port duties, they must be understood to have equally renounced that of either laying new or continuing the old. If we ought to refund the port duties received from their vessels since the date of the act of Congress, they should refund the port duties they have received from our vessels since the date of the treaty, for nothing short of this is the reciprocity of the treaty.

If this construction be adopted, then each party has forever renounced the right of laying any duties on the vessels of the other coming from any foreign port, or more than 100 sols on those coming coastwise. Could this relinquishment be confined to the two contracting parties alone, the United States would be the gainers, for it is well known that a much greater number of American than of French vessels are employed in the commerce between the two countries; but the exemption once conceded by the one nation to the other becomes immediately the property of all others who are on the footing of the most favored nations. It is true that those others would be obliged to yield the same compensation, that is to say, to receive our vessels duty free. Whether we should gain or lose in the exchange of the measure with them is not easy to say.

Another consequence of this construction will be that the vessels of the most favored nations paying no duties will be on a better footing than those of natives which pay a moderate duty; consequently either the duty on these also must be given up or they will be supplanted by foreign vessels in our own ports.

The resource, then, of duty on vessels for the purposes either of revenue or regulation will be forever lost to both. It is hardly conceivable that either party looking forward to all these consequences would see their interest in them.

III. But if France persists in claiming this exemption, what is to be done? The claim, indeed, is couched in mild and friendly terms; but the idea leaks out that a refusal would authorize them to modify proportionally the favors granted by the same article to our navigation. Perhaps they may do what we should feel much more severely, they may turn their eyes to the favors granted us by their arrets of December 29, 1787, and December 7, 1788, which hang on their will alone, unconnected with the treaty. Those arrets, among other advantages, admit our whale oils to the exclusion of that of all other foreigners. And this monopoly procures a vent for seven-twelfths of the produce of that fishery, which experience has taught us could find no other market. Near two-thirds of the produce of our cod fisheries, too, have lately found a free vent in the colonies of France. This, indeed, has been an irregularity growing out of the anarchy reigning in those colonies. Yet the demands of the colonists, even of the Government party among them (if an auxiliary disposition can be excited by some marks of friendship and distinction on our part), may perhaps produce a constitutional concession to them to procure their provisions at the cheapest market; that is to say, at ours.

Considering the value of the interests we have at stake and considering the smallness of difference between foreign and native tonnage on French vessels alone, it might perhaps be thought advisable to make the sacrifice asked, and especially if it can be so done as to give no title to other the most favored nations to claim it. If the act should put French vessels on the footing of those of natives, and declare it to be in consideration of the favors granted us by the arrets of December 29, 1787, and December 7, 1788 (and perhaps this would satisfy them), no nation could then demand the same favor without offering an equivalent compensation. It might strengthen, too, the tenure by which those arrets are held, which must be precarious so long as they are gratuitous.