A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents. Volume 2, part 1: James Monroe

by Unknown

I lay before the Senate the copy of a supplementary report, made by William Lambert, in relation to the longitude of the Capitol from Greenwich, in pursuance of a joint resolution of the two Houses of Congress of the 3d of March, 1821, and I subjoin an extract from the letter of Mr. Lambert submitting that report.

JAMES MONROE.

WASHINGTON, March 26, 1822.

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

Congress having suspended the appropriation, at the last session, for the fortification at Dauphine Island, in consequence of a doubt which was entertained of the propriety of that position, the further prosecution of the work was suspended, and an order given, as intimated in the message of the 3d of December, to the Board of Engineers and Naval Commissioners to examine that part of the coast, and particularly that position, as also the position at Mobile Point, with which it is connected, and to report their opinion thereon, which has been done, and which report is herewith communicated.

By this report it appears to be still the opinion of the Board that the construction of works at both these positions is of great importance to the defense of New Orleans and of all that portion of our Union which is connected with and dependent on the Mississippi and on the other waters which empty into the Gulf of Mexico between that river and Cape Florida. That the subject may be fully before Congress, I transmit also a copy of the former report of the Board, being that on which the work was undertaken and has been in part executed. Approving as I do the opinion of the Board, I consider it my duty to state the reasons on which I adopted the first report, especially as they were in part suggested by the occurrences of the late war.

The policy which induced Congress to decide on and provide for the defense of the coast immediately after the war was founded on the marked events of that interesting epoch. The vast body of men which it was found necessary to call into the field through the whole extent of our maritime frontier, and the number who perished by exposure, with the immense expenditure of money and waste of property which followed, were to be traced in an eminent degree to the defenseless condition of the coast. It was to mitigate these evils in future wars, and even for the higher purpose of preventing war itself, that the decision was formed to make the coast, so far as it might be practicable, impregnable, and that the measures necessary to that great object have been pursued with so much zeal since.

It is known that no part of our Union is more exposed to invasion by the numerous avenues leading to it, or more defenseless by the thinness of the neighboring population, or offers a greater temptation to invasion, either as a permanent acquisition or as a prize to the cupidity of grasping invaders from the immense amount of produce deposited there, than the city of New Orleans. It is known also that the seizure of no part of our Union could affect so deeply and vitally the immediate interests of so many States and of so many of our fellow-citizens, comprising all that extensive territory and numerous population which are connected with and dependent on the Mississippi, as the seizure of that city. Strong works, well posted, were therefore deemed absolutely necessary for its protection.

It is not, however, by the Mississippi only, or the waters which communicate directly with or approach nearest to New Orleans, that the town is assailable. It will be recollected that in the late war the public solicitude was excited not so much by the danger which menaced it in those directions as by the apprehension that, while a feint might be made there, the main force, landing either in the bay of Mobile or other waters between that bay and the Rigolets, would be thrown above the town in the rear of the army which had been collected there for its defense. Full confidence was entertained that that gallant army, led by the gallant and able chief who commanded it, would repel any attack to which it might be exposed in front. But had such a force been thrown above the town, and a position taken on the banks of the river, the disadvantage to which our troops would have been subjected, attacked in front and rear as they might have been, may easily be conceived. As their supplies would have been cut off, they could not long have remained in the city, and, withdrawing from it, it must have fallen immediately into the hands of the force below. In ascending the river to attack the force above, the attack must have been made to great disadvantage, since it must have been on such ground and at such time as the enemy preferred. These considerations shew that defenses other than such as are immediately connected with the city are of great importance to its safety.

An attempt to seize New Orleans and the lower part of the Mississippi will be made only by a great power or a combination of several powers, with a strong naval and land force, the latter of which must be brought in transports which may sail in shallow water. If the defenses around New Orleans are well posted and of sufficient strength to repel any attack which may be made on them, the city can be assailed only by a land force, which must pass in the direction above suggested, between the Rigolets and the bay of Mobile. It becomes, therefore, an object of high importance to present such an obstacle to such an attempt as would defeat it should it be made. Fortifications are useful for the defense of posts, to prevent the approach to cities and the passage of rivers; but as works their effect can not be felt beyond the reach of their cannon. They are formidable in other respects by the body of men within them, which may be removed and applied to other purposes.