A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents. Volume 2, part 3: Andrew Jackson, 1st term

by Unknown

But by making it "unlawful for any of the constituted authorities, whether of the United States or of the State, to enforce the laws for the payment of duties, and declaring that all judicial proceedings which shall be hereafter had in affirmance of the contracts made with purpose to secure the duties imposed by the said acts are and shall be held utterly null and void," she has in effect abrogated the judicial tribunals within her limits in this respect, has virtually denied the United States access to the courts established by their own laws, and declared it unlawful for the judges to discharge those duties which they are sworn to perform. In lieu of these she has substituted those State tribunals already adverted to, the judges whereof are not merely forbidden to allow an appeal or permit a copy of their record, but are previously sworn to disregard the laws of the Union and enforce those only of South Carolina, and thus deprived of the function essential to the judicial character of inquiring into the validity of the law and the right of the matter, become merely ministerial instruments in aid of the concerted obstruction of the laws of the Union.

Neither the process nor authority of these tribunals thus constituted can be respected consistently with the supremacy of the laws or the rights and security of the citizen. If they be submitted to, the protection due from the Government to its officers and citizens is withheld, and there is at once an end not only to the laws, but to the Union itself.

Against such a force as the sheriff may, and which by the replevin law of South Carolina it is his duty to exercise, it can not be expected that a collector can retain his custody with the aid of the inspectors. In such case, it is true, it would be competent to institute suits in the United States courts against those engaged in the unlawful proceeding, or the property might be seized for a violation of the revenue laws, and, being libeled in the proper courts, an order might be made for its redelivery, which would be committed to the marshal for execution. But in that case the fourth section of the act, in broad and unqualified terms, makes it the duty of the sheriff "to prevent such recapture or seizure, or to redeliver the goods, as the case may be," "even under any process, order, or decrees, or other pretext contrary to the true intent and meaning of the ordinance aforesaid." It is thus made the duty of the sheriff to oppose the process of the courts of the United States, and for that purpose, if need be, to employ the whole power of the county. And the act expressly reserves to him all power which, independently of its provisions, he could have used. In this reservation it obviously contemplates a resort to other means than those particularly mentioned.

It is not to be disguised that the power which it is thus enjoined upon the sheriff to employ is nothing less than the posse comitatus in all the rigor of the ancient common law. This power, though it may be used against unlawful resistance to judicial process, is in its character forcible, and analogous to that conferred upon the marshals by the act of 1795. It is, in fact, the embodying of the whole mass of the population, under the command of a single individual, to accomplish by their forcible aid what could not be effected peaceably and by the ordinary means. It may properly be said to be a relic of those ages in which the laws could be defended rather by physical than moral force, and in its origin was conferred upon the sheriffs of England to enable them to defend their county against any of the King's enemies when they came into the land, as well as for the purpose of executing process. In early and less civilized times it was intended to include "the aid and attendance of all knights and others who were bound to have harness." It includes the right of going with arms and military equipment, and embraces larger classes and greater masses of population than can be compelled by the laws of most of the States to perform militia duty. If the principles of the common law are recognized in South Carolina (and from this act it would seem they are), the power of summoning the posse comitatus will compel, under the penalty of fine and imprisonment, every man over the age of 15, and able to travel, to turn out at the call of the sheriff, and with such weapons as may be necessary; and it may justify beating, and even killing, such as may resist. The use of the posse comitatus is therefore a direct application of force, and can not be otherwise regarded than as the employment of the whole militia force of the county, and in an equally efficient form under a different name. No proceeding which resorts to this power to the extent contemplated by the act can be properly denominated peaceable.

The act of South Carolina, however, does not rely altogether upon this forcible remedy. For even attempting to resist or disobey, though by the aid only of the ordinary officers of the customs, the process of replevin, the collector and all concerned are subjected to a further proceeding in the nature of a distress of their personal effects, and are, moreover, made guilty of a misdemeanor, and liable to be punished by a fine of not less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000 and to imprisonment not exceeding two years and not less than six months; and for even attempting to execute the order of the court for retaking the property the marshal and all assisting would be guilty of a misdemeanor and liable to a fine of not less than $3,000 nor more than $10,000 and to imprisonment not exceeding two years nor less than one: and in case the goods should be retaken under such process it is made the absolute duty of the sheriff to retake them.

It is not to be supposed that in the face of these penalties, aided by the powerful force of the county, which would doubtless be brought to sustain the State officers, either that the collector would retain the custody in the first instance or that the marshal could summon sufficient aid to retake the property pursuant to the order or other process of the court.

It is, moreover, obvious that in this conflict between the powers of the officers of the United States and of the State (unless the latter be passively submitted to) the destruction to which the property of the officers of the customs would be exposed, the commission of actual violence, and the loss of lives would be scarcely avoidable.

Under these circumstances and the provisions of the acts of South Carolina the execution of the laws is rendered impracticable even through the ordinary judicial tribunals of the United States. There would certainly be fewer difficulties, and less opportunity of actual collision between the officers of the United States and of the State, and the collection of the revenue would be more effectually secured—if, indeed, it can be done in any other way—by placing the custom-house beyond the immediate power of the county.

For this purpose it might be proper to provide that whenever by any unlawful combination or obstruction in any State or in any port it should become impracticable faithfully to collect the duties, the President of the United States should be authorized to alter and abolish such of the districts and ports of entry as should be necessary, and to establish the custom-house at some secure place within some port or harbor of such State; and in such cases it should be the duty of the collector to reside at such place, and to detain all vessels and cargoes until the duties imposed by law should be properly secured or paid in cash, deducting interest; that in such cases it should be unlawful to take the vessel and cargo from the custody of the proper officer of the customs unless by process from the ordinary judicial tribunals of the United States, and that in case of an attempt otherwise to take the property by a force too great to be overcome by the officers of the customs it should be lawful to protect the possession of the officers by the employment of the land and naval forces and militia, under provisions similar to those authorized by the eleventh section of the act of the 9th of January, 1809.

This provision, however, would not shield the officers and citizens of the United States, acting under the laws, from suits and prosecutions in the tribunals of the State which might thereafter be brought against them, nor would it protect their property from the proceeding by distress, and it may well be apprehended that it would be insufficient to insure a proper respect to the process of the constitutional tribunals in prosecutions for offenses against the United States and to protect the authorities of the United States, whether judicial or ministerial, in the performance of their duties. It would, moreover, be inadequate to extend the protection due from the Government to that portion of the people of South Carolina against outrage and oppression of any kind who may manifest their attachment and yield obedience to the laws of the Union.