If circumstances did not render it certain, it would have been obvious from the language of Mr. Bankhead's note to the undersigned that the Government of His Britannic Majesty, when the instructions under which it was prepared were given, could not have been apprised of all the steps taken in the controversy between the United States and France. It was necessarily ignorant of the tenor of the two recent messages of the President to Congress—the first communicated at the commencement of the present session, under date of the 7th of December, 1835, and the second under that of the 15th of January, 1836. Could these documents have been within the knowledge of His Britannic Majesty's Government, the President does not doubt that it would have been fully satisfied that the disposition of the United States, notwithstanding their well-grounded and serious causes of complaint against France, to restore friendly relations and cultivate a good understanding with the Government of that country was undiminished, and that all had already been done on their part that could in reason be expected of them to secure that result. The first of these documents, although it gave such a history of the origin and progress of the claims of the United States and of the proceedings of France before and since the treaty of 1831 as to vindicate the statements and recommendations of the message of the 1st of December, 1834, yet expressly disclaimed the offensive interpretation put upon it by the Government of France, and while it insisted on the acknowledged rights of the United States and the obligations of the treaty and maintained the honor and independence of the American Government, evinced an anxious desire to do all that constitutional duty and strict justice would permit to remove every cause of irritation and excitement. The special message of the 15th January last being called for by the extraordinary and inadmissible demands of the Government of France as defined in the last official communications at Paris, and by the continued refusal of France to execute a treaty from the faithful performance of which by the United States it was tranquilly enjoying important advantages, it became the duty of the President to recommend such measures as might be adapted to the exigencies of the occasion. Unwilling to believe that a nation distinguished for honor and intelligence could have determined permanently to maintain a ground so indefensible, and anxious still to leave open the door of reconciliation, the President contented himself with proposing to Congress the mildest of the remedies given by the law and practice of nations in connection with such propositions for defense as were evidently required by the condition of the United States and the attitude assumed by France. In all these proceedings, as well as in every stage of these difficulties with France, it is confidently believed that the course of the United States, when duly considered by other Governments and the world, will be found to have been marked not only by a pacific disposition, but by a spirit of forbearance and conciliation.
For a further illustration of this point, as well as for the purpose of presenting a lucid view of the whole subject, the undersigned has the honor to transmit to Mr. Bankhead copies of all that part of the message of December 7, 1835, which relates to it and of the correspondence referred to therein, and also copies of the message and accompanying documents of the 15th of January, 1836, and of another message of the 18th of the same month, transmitting a report of the Secretary of State and certain documents connected with the subject.
These papers, while they will bring down the history of the misunderstanding between the United States and France to the present date, will also remove an erroneous impression which appears to be entertained by His Britannic Majesty's Government. It is suggested in Mr. Bankhead's note that there is no question of national interest at issue between France and the United States, and that there is no demand of justice made by the one party and denied by the other. This suggestion appears to be founded on the facts that the claims of the United States have been admitted by a treaty concluded between the two Governments and that the money due by France has been provided by the Chambers and placed at the disposal of the French Government for the purpose of being paid to the United States. But it is to be observed that the payment of the money thus appropriated is refused by the French Government unless the United States will first comply with a condition not contained in the treaty and not assented to by them. This refusal to make payment is, in the view of the United States, a denial of justice, and has not only been accompanied by acts and language of which they have great reason to complain, but the delay of payment is highly injurious to those American citizens who are entitled to share in the indemnification provided by the treaty and to the interests of the United States, inasmuch as the reduction of the duties levied on French wines in pursuance of that treaty has diminished the public revenue, and has been and yet is enjoyed by France, with all the other benefits of the treaty, without the consideration and equivalents for which they were granted. But there are other national interests, and, in the judgment of this Government, national interests of the highest order, involved in the condition prescribed and insisted on by France which it has been by the President made the duty of the undersigned to bring distinctly into view. That condition proceeds on the assumption that a foreign power whose acts are spoken of by the President of the United States in a message to Congress, transmitted in obedience to his constitutional duties, and which deems itself aggrieved by the language thus held by him, may as a matter of right require from the Government of the United States a direct official explanation of such language, to be given in such form and expressed in such terms as shall meet the requirements and satisfy the feelings of the offended party, and may in default of such explanation annul or suspend a solemn treaty duly executed by its constitutional organ. Whatever may be the responsibility of those nations whose executives possess the power of declaring war and of adopting other coercive remedies without the intervention of the legislative department, for the language held by the Executive in addressing that department, it is obvious that under the Constitution of the United States, which gives to the Executive no such powers, but vests them exclusively in the Legislature, whilst at the same time it imposes on the Executive the duty of laying before the Legislature the state of the nation, with such recommendations as he may deem proper, no such responsibility can be admitted without impairing that freedom of intercommunication which is essential to the system and without surrendering in this important particular the right of self-government. In accordance with this view of the Federal Constitution has been the practice under it. The statements and recommendations of the President to Congress are regarded by this Government as a part of the purely domestic consultations held by its different departments—consultations in which nothing is addressed to foreign powers, and in which they can not be permitted to interfere, and for which, until consummated and carried out by acts emanating from the proper constitutional organs, the nation is not responsible and the Government not liable to account to other States.
It will be seen from the accompanying correspondence that when the condition referred to was first proposed in the Chamber of Deputies the insuperable objections to it were fully communicated by the American minister at Paris to the French Government, and that he distinctly informed it that the condition, if prescribed, could never be complied with. The views expressed by him were approved by the President, and have been since twice asserted and enforced by him in his messages to Congress in terms proportioned in their explicitness and solemnity to the conviction he entertains of the importance and inviolability of the principle involved.
The United States can not yield this principle, nor can they do or consent to any measure by which its influence in the action of their political system can be obstructed or diminished. Under these circumstances the President feels that he may rely on the intelligence and liberality of His Britannic Majesty's Government for a correct estimation of the imperative obligations which leave him no power to subject this point to the control of any foreign state, whatever may be his confidence in its justice and impartiality—a confidence which he has taken pleasure in instructing the undersigned to state is fully reposed by him in the Government of His Britannic Majesty.
So great, however, is the desire of the President for the restoration of a good understanding with the Government of France, provided it can be effected on terms compatible with the honor and independence of the United States, that if, after the frank avowal of his sentiments upon the point last referred to and the explicit reservation of that point, the Government of His Britannic Majesty shall believe that its mediation can be useful in adjusting the differences which exist between the two countries and in restoring all their relations to a friendly footing, he instructs the undersigned to inform Mr. Bankhead that in such case the offer of mediation made in his note is cheerfully accepted.
The United States desire nothing but equal and exact justice, and they can not but hope that the good offices of a third power, friendly to both parties, and prompted by the elevated considerations manifested in Mr. Bankhead's note, may promote the attainment of this end.
Influenced by these motives, the President will cordially cooperate, so far as his constitutional powers may enable him, in such steps as may be requisite on the part of the United States to give effect to the proposed mediation. He trusts that no unnecessary delay will be allowed to occur, and instructs the undersigned to request that the earliest information of the measures taken by Great Britain and of their result may be communicated to this Government.
The undersigned avails himself of the occasion to renew to Mr. Bankhead the assurances of his distinguished consideration.
JOHN FORSYTH.