2. While the Treasury is in a state of extreme embarrassment, requiring every dollar which it can make available, and when the Government has not only to lay additional taxes, but to borrow money to meet pressing demands, the bill proposes to give away a fruitful source of revenue—which is the same thing as raising money by loan and taxation—not to meet the wants of the Government, but for distribution—a proceeding which I must regard as highly impolitic, if not unconstitutional.
A brief review of the present condition of the public finances will serve to illustrate the true condition of the Treasury and exhibit its actual necessities:
| On the 5th of August (Friday last) there was in the Treasury, in round numbers | $2,150,000 | |
| Necessary to be retained to meet trust funds | $360,000 | |
| Interest on public debt due in October | 80,000 | |
| To redeem Treasury notes and pay the interest | 100,000 | |
| Land distribution under the act of the 4th of September, 1841 | 640,000 | |
| ________ | 1,180,000 | |
| __________ | ||
| Leaving an available amount of | 970,000 |
The Navy Department had drawn requisitions on the Treasury at that time to meet debts actually due, among which are bills under protest for $1,414,000, thus leaving an actual deficit of $444,000.
There was on hand about $100,000 of unissued Treasury notes, assisted by the accruing revenue (amounting to about $150,000 per week, exclusive of receipts on unpaid bonds), to meet requisitions for the Army and the demands of the civil list.
The withdrawal of the sum of $640,000 to be distributed among the States, so soon as the statements and accounts can be made up and completed, by virtue of the provisions of the act of the 4th of September last (of which nearly a moiety goes to a few States, and only about $383,000 is to be divided among all the States), while it adds materially to the embarrassments of the Treasury, affords to the States no decided relief.
No immediate relief from this state of things is anticipated unless (what would most deeply be deplored) the Government could be reconciled to the negotiation of loans already authorized by law at a rate of discount ruinous in itself and calculated most seriously to affect the public credit. So great is the depression of trade that even if the present bill were to become a law and prove to be productive some time would elapse before sufficient supplies would flow into the Treasury, while in the meantime its embarrassments would be continually augmented by the semiannual distribution of the land proceeds.
Indeed, there is but too much ground to apprehend that even if this bill were permitted to become a law—alienating, as it does, the proceeds of the land sales—an actual deficit in the Treasury would occur, which would more than probably involve the necessity of a resort to direct taxation.
Let it be also remarked that $5,500,000 of the public debt becomes redeemable in about two years and a half, which at any sacrifice must be met, while the Treasury is always liable to demands for the payment of outstanding Treasury notes. Such is the gloomy picture which our financial department now presents, and which calls for the exercise of a rigid economy in the public expenditures and the rendering available of all the means within the control of the Government. I most respectfully submit whether this is a time to give away the proceeds of the land sales when the public lands constitute a fund which of all others may be made most useful in sustaining the public credit. Can the Government be generous and munificent to others when every dollar it can command is necessary to supply its own wants? And if Congress would not hesitate to suffer the provisions of the act of 4th September last to remain unrepealed in case the country was involved in war, is not the necessity for such a course now just as imperative as it would be then?
3. A third objection remains to be urged, which would be sufficient in itself to induce me to return the bill to the House with my objections. By uniting two subjects so incongruous as tariff and distribution it inevitably makes the fate of the one dependent upon that of the other in future contests of party. Can anything be more fatal to the merchant or manufacturer than such an alliance? What they most of all require is a system of moderate duties so arranged as to withdraw the tariff question, as far as possible, completely from the arena of political contention. Their chief want is permanency and stability. Such an increase of the tariff I believe to be necessary in order to meet the economical expenditures of Government. Such an increase, made in the spirit of moderation and judicious discrimination, would, I have no doubt, be entirely satisfactory to the great majority of the American people. In the way of accomplishing a measure so salutary and so imperatively demanded by every public interest, the legislative department will meet with a cordial cooperation on the part of the Executive. This is all that the manufacturer can desire, and it would be a burden readily borne by the people. But I can not too earnestly repeat that in order to be beneficial it must be permanent, and in order to be permanent it must command general acquiescence. But can such permanency be justly hoped for if the tariff question be coupled with that of distribution, as to which a serious conflict of opinion exists among the States and the people, and which enlists in its support a bare majority, if, indeed, there be a majority, of the two Houses of Congress? What permanency or stability can attach to a measure which, warring upon itself, gives away a fruitful source of revenue at the moment it proposes a large increase of taxes on the people? Is the manufacturer prepared to stake himself and his interests upon such an issue?