The Captain Meigs to whom the bill refers is Montgomery C. Meigs, a captain in the Corps of Engineers of the Army of the United States, who has superintended this work from its commencement under the authority of the late and present Secretary of War.
Had this appropriation been made in the usual form, no difficulty could have arisen upon it. This bill, however, annexes a declaration to the appropriation that the money is to be expended under the superintendence of Captain Meigs.
The first aspect in which this clause presented itself to my mind was that it interfered with the right of the President to be "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States." If this had really been the case, there would have been an end to the question. Upon further examination I deemed it impossible that Congress could have intended to interfere with the clear right of the President to command the Army and to order its officers to any duty he might deem most expedient for the public interest. If they could withdraw an officer from the command of the President and select him for the performance of an executive duty, they might upon the same principle annex to an appropriation to carry on a war a condition requiring it not to be used for the defense of the country unless a particular person of its own selection should command the Army. It was impossible that Congress could have had such an intention, and therefore, according to my construction of the clause in question, it merely designated Captain Meigs as its preference for the work, without intending to deprive the President of the power to order him to any other army duty for the performance of which he might consider him better adapted. Still, whilst this clause may not be, and I believe is not, a violation of the Constitution, yet how destructive it would be to all proper subordination and how demoralizing its effect upon the morale of the Army if it should become a precedent for future legislation! Officers might then be found, instead of performing their appropriate duties, besieging the halls of Congress for the purpose of obtaining special favors and choice places by legislative enactment. Under these circumstances I have deemed it but fair to inform Congress that whilst I do not consider the bill unconstitutional, this is only because, in my opinion, Congress did not intend by the language which they have employed to interfere with my absolute authority to order Captain Meigs to any other service I might deem expedient. My perfect right still remains, notwithstanding the clause, to send him away from Washington to any part of the Union to superintend the erection of a fortification or on any other appropriate duty.
It has been alleged, I think without sufficient cause, that this clause is unconstitutional because it has created a new office and has appointed Captain Meigs to perform its duties. If it had done this, it would have been a clear question, because Congress have no right to appoint to any office, this being specially conferred upon the President and Senate. It is evident that Congress intended nothing more by this clause than to express a decided opinion that Captain Meigs should be continued in the employment to which he had been previously assigned by competent authority.
It is not improbable that another question of grave importance may arise out of this clause. Is the appropriation conditional and will it fall provided I do not deem it proper that it shall be expended under the superintendence of Captain Meigs? This is a question which shall receive serious consideration, because upon its decision may depend whether the completion of the waterworks shall be arrested for another season. It is not probable that Congress could have intended that this great and important work should depend upon the various casualties and vicissitudes incident to the natural or official life of a single officer of the Army. This would be to make the work subordinate to the man, and not the man to the work, and to reverse our great axiomatic rule of "principles, not men." I desire to express no opinion upon the subject. Should the question ever arise, it shall have my serious consideration.
JAMES BUCHANAN.
VETO MESSAGES.[13]
WASHINGTON CITY, February 1, 1860.
To the Senate of the United States:
On the last day of the last Congress a bill, which had passed both Houses, entitled "An act making an appropriation for deepening the channel over the St. Clair flats, in the State of Michigan," was presented to me for approval.