Less than two years ago it appears to have been the deliberate judgment of Congress that tracts of land containing coal beds or coal fields should be sold, after three months' notice, to the bidder at public auction who would give the highest price over $20 per acre, and that a citizen engaged in the business of actual coal mining on the public domain should only secure a tract of 160 acres, at private entry, upon payment of $20 per acre and formal and satisfactory proof that he in all respects came within the requirements of the statute. It can not be that the coal fields of Montana have depreciated nearly twenty fold in value since July, 1864. So complete a revolution in the land policy as is manifested by this act can only be ascribed, therefore, to an inadvertence, which Congress will, I trust, promptly correct.
Believing that the preemption policy—so deliberately adopted, so long practiced, so carefully guarded with a view to the disposal of the public lands in a manner that would promote the population and prosperity of the country—should not be perverted to the purposes contemplated by this bill, I would be constrained to withhold my sanction even if this company were, as natural persons, entitled to the privileges of ordinary preemptors; for if a corporation, as the name and the absence of any designation of individuals would denote, the measure before me is liable to another fatal objection.
Why should incorporated companies have the privileges of individual preemptors? What principle of justice requires such a policy? What motive of public welfare can fail to condemn it? Lands held by corporations were regarded by ancient laws as held in mortmain, or by "dead hand," and from the time of Magna Charta corporations required the royal license to hold land, because such holding was regarded as in derogation of public policy and common right. Preemption is itself a special privilege, only authorized by its supposed public benefit in promoting the settlement and cultivation of vacant territory and in rewarding the enterprise of the persons upon whom the privilege is bestowed. "Preemption rights," as declared by the Supreme Court of the United States, "are founded in an enlightened public policy, rendered necessary by the enterprise of our citizens. The adventurous pioneer, who is found in advance of our settlements, encounters many hardships, and not unfrequently dangers from savage incursions. He is generally poor, and it is fit that his enterprise should be rewarded by the privilege of purchasing the spot selected by him, not to exceed 160 acres."
It may be said that this company, before they obtain a patent, must prove that within two years they "have erected and have in operation in one or more places on the said lands iron works with a capacity for manufacturing at least 1,500 tons of iron per annum." On the other hand, they are to have possession for two years of more than 12,000 acres of the choice land of the Territory, of which nearly 2,000 acres are to contain iron ore and coal and over 10,000 acres to be of timber land selected by themselves. They will thus have the first and exclusive choice. In fact, they are the only parties who at this time would have any privilege whatever in the way of obtaining titles in that Territory. Inasmuch as Montana has not yet been organized into a land district, the general preemption laws for the benefit of individual settlers have not yet been extended to that country, nor has a single acre of public land in the Territory yet been surveyed. With such exclusive and extraordinary privileges, how many companies would be willing to undertake furnaces that would produce 5 tons per day in much less time than two years?
It is plain the pretended consideration on which the patent is to issue bears no just proportion to that of the ordinary preemptor, and that this bill is but the precursor of a system of land distribution to a privileged class, unequal, unjust, and which ought not to receive the sanction of the General Government. Many thousand pioneers have turned their steps to the Western Territories, seeking, with their wives and children, homesteads to be acquired by sturdy industry under the preemption laws. On their arrival they should not find the timbered lands and the tracts containing iron ore and coal already surveyed and claimed by corporate companies, favored by the special legislation of Congress, and with boundaries fixed even in advance of the public surveys—a departure from the salutary provision requiring a settler upon unsurveyed lands to limit the boundaries of his claim to the lines of the public survey after they shall have been established. He receives a title only to a legal subdivision, including his residence and improvements. The survey of the company may not accord with that which will hereafter be made by the Government, while the patent that issues will be descriptive of and confer a title to the tract as surveyed by the company.
I am aware of no precedent for granting such exclusive rights to a manufacturing company for a nominal consideration. Congress have made concessions to railway companies of alternate sections within given limits of the lines of their roads. This policy originated in the belief that the facilities afforded by reaching the parts of the country remote from the great centers of population would expedite the settlement and sale of the public domain. These incidental advantages were secured without pecuniary loss to the Government, by reason of the enhanced value of the reserved sections, which are held at the double minimum. Mining and manufacturing companies, however, have always been distinguished from public-improvement corporations. The former are, in law and in fact, only private associations for trade and business on individual account and for personal benefit. Admitting the proposition that railroad grants can stand on sound principle, it is plain that such can not be the case with concessions to companies like that contemplated by this measure. In view of the strong temptation to monopolize the public lands, with the pernicious results, it would seem at least of doubtful expediency to lift corporations above all competition with actual settlers by authorizing them to become purchasers of public lands in the Territories for any purpose, and particularly when clothed with the special benefits of this bill. For myself, I am convinced that the privileges of ordinary preemptors ought not to be extended to incorporated companies.
A third objection may be mentioned, as it exemplifies the spirit in which special privileges are sought by incorporated companies.
Land subject to Indian occupancy has always been scrupulously guarded by law from preemption settlement or encroachment under any pretext until the Indian title should be extinguished. In the fourth section of this act, however, lands held by "Indian title" are excepted from prohibition against the patent to be issued to the New York and Montana Iron Mining and Manufacturing Company.
The bill provides that the patent "shall convey no title to any mineral lands except iron and coal, or to any lands held by right of possession, or by any other title, except Indian title, valid at the time of the selection of the said lands." It will be seen that by the first section lands in "Indian reservations" are excluded from individual preemption right, but by the fourth section the patent may cover any Indian title except a reservation; so that no matter what may be the nature of the Indian title, unless it be in a reservation, it is unprotected from the privilege conceded by this bill.
Without further pursuing the subject, I return the bill to the Senate without my signature, and with the following as prominent objections to its becoming a law: