ANDREW JOHNSON.
Mr. Stanbery then submitted the following motion:
In the matter of the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States.
Henry Stanbery, Benjamin R. Curtis, Jeremiah S. Black, William M. Evarts, and Thomas A.R. Nelson, of counsel for the respondent, move the court for the allowance of forty days for the preparation of the answer to the articles of impeachment, and in support of the motion make the following professional statement:
The articles are eleven in number, involving many questions of law and fact. We have during the limited time and opportunity afforded us considered as far as possible the field of investigation which must be explored in the preparation of the answer, and the conclusion at which we have arrived is that with the utmost diligence the time we have asked is reasonable and necessary.
The precedents as to time for answer upon impeachments before the Senate to which we have had opportunity to refer are those of Judge Chase and Judge Peck.
In the case of Judge Chase time was allowed from the 3d of January until the 4th of February next succeeding to put in his answer—a period of thirty-two days; but in this case there were only eight articles, and Judge Chase had been for a year cognizant of most of the articles, and had been himself engaged in preparing to meet them.
In the case of Judge Peck there was but a single article. Judge Peck asked for time from the 10th to the 25th of May to put in his answer, and it was granted. It appears that Judge Peck had been long cognizant of the ground laid for his impeachment, and had been present before the committee of the House upon the examination of the witnesses, and had been permitted by the House of Representatives to present to that body an elaborate answer to the charges.
It is apparent that the President is fairly entitled to more time than was allowed in either of the foregoing cases. It is proper to add that the respondents in these cases were lawyers, fully capable of preparing their own answers, and that no pressing official duties interfered with their attention to that business; whereas the President, not being a lawyer, must rely on his counsel. The charges involve his acts, declarations, and intentions, as to all which his counsel must be fully advised upon consultation with him, step by step, in the preparation of his defense. It is seldom that a case requires such constant communication between client and counsel as this, and yet such communication can only be had at such intervals as are allowed to the President from the usual hours that must be devoted to his high official duties.
We further beg leave to suggest for the consideration of this honorable court that, as counsel careful as well of their own reputation as of the interests of their client in a case of such magnitude as this, so out of the ordinary range of professional experience, where so much responsibility is felt, they submit to the candid consideration of the court that they have a right to ask for themselves such opportunity to discharge their duty as seems to them to be absolutely necessary.