The prohibitory duties forced upon them by the policy of Spain shut out much that we might supply. Their tropical productions, for instance, are too valuable to allow their lands to be given up to the growth of breadstuffs; yet, instead of taking these articles from the superabundant fields of their nearest neighbors, they are forced to go to the distant plains of Spain. It will be for the interest of the United States to shape its general policy so that this relation of imports and exports shall be altered in Cuba when peace is restored and its political condition is satisfactorily established.
With none of the other Spanish American States in North and South America are our commercial relations what they should be. Our total imports in the year ending June 30, 1869, from these countries were less than $25,000,000 (or not one-half the amount from Cuba alone), and our exports for the same time to them were only $17,850,313; and yet these countries have an aggregate population nearly or quite as great as that of the United States; they have republican forms of government, and they profess to be, and probably really are, in political sympathy with us.
This Department is not able to give with entire accuracy the imports and exports of Great Britain with the same countries during the corresponding period. It is believed, however, the following figures will be found to be not far from correct: Imports to Great Britain, $42,820,942; exports from Great Britain, $40,682,102.
It thus appears that notwithstanding the greater distance which the commerce has to travel in coming to and from Great Britain, notwithstanding the political sympathy which ought naturally to exist between republics, notwithstanding the American idea which has been so prominently and so constantly put forward by the Government of the United States, notwithstanding the acknowledged skill of American manufacturers, notwithstanding the ready markets which the great cities of the United States afford for the consumption of tropical productions, the inhabitants of the Spanish American continent consume of the products of Great Britain more than twice the quantity they take of the products of the United States, and that they sell to us only three-fifths of the amount they sell to Great Britain.
The Secretary of State appends to this report the tables on which these statements are founded. That their commerce with the United States is not large may be partially explained by the fact that these States have been subject to many successive revolutions since the failure of the congress of Panama. These revolutions not only exhaust their resources and burden them with debt, but they check emigration, prevent the flow of foreign capital into the country, and stop the enterprise which needs a stable government for its development.
These suggestions are, however, applicable to the British commerce as well as to our own, and they do not explain why we, with the natural advantages in our favor, fall so far behind. The Isthmus of Panama is the common point where the commerce of the western coasts of Mexico and South America meets. When it arrives there, why should it seek Liverpool and London rather than New York?
The political causes which have operated to divert this commerce from us the Secretary of State has endeavored to explain. A favorable time has now come for removing them—for laying the foundation of an American policy which shall bind in closer union the American Republics. Let them understand that the United States do not covet their territories; that our only desire is to see them peaceful, with free and stable governments, increasing in wealth and population, and developing in the lines in which their own traditions, customs, habits, laws, and modes of thought will naturally take them. Let them feel that, as in 1826, so now, this Government is ready to aid them to the full extent of its constitutional power in any steps which they may take for their better protection against anarchy. Let them be convinced that the United States is prepared, in good faith and without ulterior purposes, to join them in the development of a peaceful American commercial policy that may in time include this continent and the West Indian Islands. Let this be comprehended, and there will be no political reason why we may not "secure to the United States that proportionate share of the trade of this continent to which their close relations of geographical contiguity and political friendship with all the States of America justly entitle them."
It may not be enough to remove the political obstacles only. The financial policy which the war made necessary may have operated injuriously upon our commerce with these States. The resolution of the Senate calls, on these points, for detailed information which is not within the control of the Secretary of State, and for recommendations for the future which he is not prepared to give without that information. To fully answer the Senate's call, it would probably be necessary to employ some competent agent, familiar with the Spanish American States, to collate and arrange the information asked for. For this there is no appropriation by Congress.
Respectfully submitted.
HAMILTON FISH.