The declarations of war against France and Spain, made by us and Holland, are dated within a few days of each other. In that published by the States, they say very truly That "they are nearest, and most exposed to the fire; that they are blocked up on all sides, and actually attacked by the Kings of France and Spain; that their declaration is the effect of an urgent and pressing necessity;" with other expressions to the same purpose. They "desire the assistance of all kings and princes," &c. The grounds of their quarrel with France, are such as only affect themselves, or at least more immediately than any other prince or state; such as, "the French refusing to grant the Tariff promised by the treaty of Ryswick; the loading the Dutch inhabitants settled in France, with excessive duties, contrary to the said treaty; the violation of the Partition Treaty, by the French accepting the King of Spain's will, and threatening the States, if they would not comply; the seizing the Spanish Netherlands by the French troops, and turning out the Dutch, who by permission of the late King of Spain were in garrison there; by which means that republic was deprived of her barrier, contrary to the treaty of partition, where it was particularly stipulated, that the Spanish Netherlands should be left to the archduke." They alleged, that "the French king governed Flanders as his own, though under the name of his grandson, and sent great numbers of troops thither to fright them: That he had seized the city and citadel of Liège, had possessed himself of several places in the archbishopric of Cologne, and maintained troops in the country of Wolfenbuttel, in order to block up the Dutch on all sides; and caused his resident to give in a memorial, wherein he threatened the States to act against them, if they refused complying with the contents of that memorial."
The Queen's declaration of war is grounded upon the grand alliance, as this was upon the unjust usurpations and encroachments of the French king; whereof the instances produced are, "his keeping in possession a great part of the Spanish dominions, seizing Milan and the Spanish Low Countries, making himself master of Cadiz, &c. And instead of giving satisfaction in these points, his putting an indignity and affront on Her Majesty and kingdoms, by declaring the pretended Prince of Wales, K. of England, &c.," which last was the only personal quarrel we had in the war; and even this was positively denied by France, that king being willing to acknowledge Her Majesty.
I think it plainly appears by both declarations, that England ought no more to have been a principal in this war, than Prussia, or any other power, who came afterwards into that alliance. Holland was first in the danger, the French troops being at that time just at the gates of Nimeguen. But the complaints made in our declaration, do all, except the last, as much or more concern almost every prince in Europe.
For, among the several parties who came first or last into this confederacy, there were but few who, in proportion, had more to get or to lose, to hope or to fear, from the good or ill success of this war, than we. The Dutch took up arms to defend themselves from immediate ruin; and by a successful war, they proposed to have a larger extent of country, and a better frontier against France. The emperor hoped to recover the monarchy of Spain, or some part of it, for his younger son, chiefly at the expense of us and Holland. The King of Portugal had received intelligence, that Philip designed to renew the old pretensions of Spain upon that kingdom, which is surrounded by the other on all sides, except towards the sea, and could therefore only be defended by maritime powers. This, with the advantageous terms offered by K. Charles,[35] as well as by us, prevailed with that prince to enter into the alliance. The Duke of Savoy's temptations and fears were yet greater: The main charge of the war on that side was to be supplied by England, and the profit to redound to him. In case Milan should be conquered, it was stipulated that his highness should have the Duchy of Montferrat, belonging to the Duke of Mantua, the provinces of Alexandria and Valencia, and Lomellino, with other lands between the Po and the Tanaro, together with the Vigevenasco, or in lieu of it, an equivalent out of the province of Novara, adjoining to his own state; beside whatever else could be taken from France on that side by the confederate forces. Then, he was in terrible apprehensions of being surrounded by France, who had so many troops in the Milanese, and might have easily swallowed up his whole duchy.
The rest of the allies came in purely for subsidies, whereof they sunk considerable sums into their own coffers, and refused to send their contingent to the emperor, alleging their troops were already hired by England and Holland.
Some time after the Duke of Anjou's succeeding to the monarchy of Spain, in breach of the partition treaty, the question here in England was, Whether the peace should be continued, or a new war begun. Those who were for the former alleged the debts and difficulties we laboured under; that both we and the Dutch had already acknowledged Philip for King of Spain; that the inclinations of the Spaniards to the house of Austria, and their aversion for that of Bourbon, were not so surely to be reckoned upon, as some would pretend; that we thought it a piece of insolence, as well as injustice, in the French to offer putting a king upon us; and the Spaniards would conceive, we had as little reason to force one upon them; that it was true, the nature and genius of those two people differed very much, and so would probably continue to do, as well under a king of French blood, as one of Austrian; but, that if we should engage in a war for dethroning the D. of Anjou, we should certainly effect what, by the progress and operations of it, we endeavoured to prevent, I mean an union of interest and affections between the two nations; for the Spaniards must of necessity call in French troops to their assistance: This would introduce French counsellors into King Phillip's court; and this, by degrees, would habituate and reconcile the two nations: That to assist King Charles by English or Dutch forces, would render him odious to his new subjects, who have nothing in so great an abomination, as those whom they hold for heretics: That the French would by this means become masters of the treasures in the Spanish West Indies: That, in the last war, when Spain, Cologne, and Bavaria were in our alliance, and by a modest computation brought sixty thousand men into the field against the common enemy; when Flanders, the seat of war, was on our side, and His Majesty, a prince of great valour and conduct, at the head of the whole confederate army; yet we had no reason to boast of our success: How then should we be able to oppose France with those powers against us, which would carry sixty thousand men from us to the enemy, and so make us, upon the balance, weaker by one hundred and twenty thousand men at the beginning of this war, than of that in 1688?
On the other side, those whose opinion, or some private motives, inclined them to give their advice for entering into a new war, alleged how dangerous it would be for England, that Philip should be King of Spain; that we could have no security for our trade, while that kingdom was subject to a prince of the Bourbon family; nor any hopes of preserving the balance of Europe, because the grandfather would, in effect, be king, while his grandson had but the title, and thereby have a better opportunity than ever of pursuing his design for universal monarchy. These and the like arguments prevailed; and so, without offering at any other remedy, without taking time to consider the consequences, or to reflect on our own condition, we hastily engaged in a war which hath cost us sixty millions; and after repeated, as well as unexpected success in arms, hath put us and our posterity in a worse condition, not only than any of our allies, but even our conquered enemies themselves.
The part we have acted in the conduct of this whole war, with reference to our allies abroad, and to a prevailing faction at home, is what I shall now particularly examine; where I presume it will appear, by plain matters of fact, that no nation was ever so long or so scandalously abused by the folly, the temerity, the corruption, the ambition of its domestic enemies; or treated with so much insolence, injustice and ingratitude by its foreign friends.
This will be manifest by proving the three following points.
First, That against all manner of prudence, or common reason, we engaged in this war as principals, when we ought to have acted only as auxiliaries.