A handbook of Freethought

by Unknown

“This being the case, it is important to discover how miracles perform their function as the indispensible evidence for a Divine Revelation, for with this disability they do not seem to possess much potentiality. Archbishop French then offers the following definition of the function of miracles: ‘A miracle does not prove the truth of a doctrine or the divine mission of him that brings it to pass. That which alone it claims for him at the first is a right to be listened to; it puts him in the alternative of being from heaven or from hell. The doctrine must first commend itself to the conscience as being good, and only then can the miracle seal it as divine.’ But the first appeal is from the doctrine to the conscience, to the moral nature of man. Under certain circumstances, he maintains their evidence is utterly to be rejected. ‘But the purpose of the miracle’ he says, ‘being as we have seen, to confirm that which is good, so, upon the other hand, where conscience and mind witness against the doctrine, not all the miracles in the world have a right to demand submission to the word which they seal. On the contrary, the great act of faith is to believe, against, and in despite of them all, in what God has revealed to, and implanted in the soul of the holy and the true; not to believe another gospel, though an angel from heaven, or one transformed into such should bring it ([Deut. 13 : 3]; [Gal. 1 : 8]); and instead of compelling assent, miracles are then rather warnings to us that we keep aloof, for they tell us that not merely lies are here, for to that the conscience bore witness already, but that he who utters them is more than a common deceiver, is eminently a liar and anti-Christ, a false prophet; standing in more immediate connection than other deceived and evil men to the kingdom of darkness, so that Satan has given him his power ([Rev. 13 : 2]); is using him to be an especial organ of his, and to do a special work for him.’ And he lays down the distinct principle that: ‘The miracle must witness for itself, and then, and then only, the first is capable of witnessing for the second.’

“These opinions are not peculiar to the Archbishop of Dublin, but are generally held by divines, although Dr. French expresses them with unusual absence of reserve. Dr. Mozley emphatically affirms the same doctrine when he says: ‘A miracle cannot oblige us to accept any doctrine which is contrary to our moral nature or a fundamental principle of religion.’ Dr. Mansel speaks to the same effect: ‘If a teacher claiming to work miracles proclaims doctrines contrary to previously established truths, whether to the conclusions of natural religion or to the teaching of a former revelation, such a contradiction is allowed even by the most zealous defenders of the evidential value of miracles, to invalidate the authority of the teacher. But the right conclusion from this admission is not that true miracles are invalid an evidences, but that the supposed miracles in this case are not true miracles at all; that is, are not the effects of divine power, but of human deception or of some other agency.’ A passage from a letter written by Dr. Arnold, which is quoted by Dr. French in support of his views, both illustrates the doctrine and the necessity which has led to its adoption. ‘You complain,’ says Dr. Arnold, writing to Dr. Hawkins, ‘of those persons who judge of a revelation not by its evidence, but by its substance. It has always seemed to me that its substance is a most essential part of its evidence; and that miracles wrought in favor of what was foolish or wicked would only prove Manicheism. We are so perfectly ignorant of the unseen world, that the character of any supernatural power can only be judged by the moral character of the statements which it sanctions. Thus only can we tell whether it be a revelation from God or from the Devil.’ In another place Dr. Arnold declares: ‘Miracles must not be allowed to overrule the gospel; for it is only through our belief in the gospel that we accord our belief in them.’

“It is obvious that the mutual dependence which is thus established between miracles and the doctrines in connection with which they are wrought destroys the evidential force of miracles, and that the first and final appeal is made to reason. The doctrine in fact proves the miracles instead of the miracle attesting the doctrine. Divines, of course, attempt to deny this, but no other deduction from their own statements is logically possible. Miracles according to scripture itself, are producible by various supernatural beings and may be satanic as well as divine: man on the other hand, is so ignorant of the unseen world that avowedly, he cannot, from the miracle itself, determine the agent by whom it was performed; the miracle, therefore, has no intrinsic evidential value. How, then, according to divines, does it attain any potentiality? Only through a favorable decision on the part of reason on the ‘moral nature of man’ regarding the character of the doctrine. The result of the appeal to reason respecting the morality and credibility of the doctrine determines the evidential status of the miracle. The doctrine therefore, is the real criterion of the miracle which, without it, is necessarily an object of doubt and suspicion.

“We have already casually referred to Dr. Newman’s view of such a relation between miracle and doctrine, but may here more fully quote his suggestive remarks. ‘Others by referring to the nature of the doctrine attested,’ he says, ‘in order to determine the author of the miracle, have exposed themselves to the plausible charge of adducing, first the miracle to attest the divinity of the doctrine, and then the doctrine to prove the divinity of the miracle.’ This argument he characterizes as one of the ‘dangerous modes’ of removing a difficulty, although he does not himself point out a safer, and in a note, he adds: ‘There is an appearance of doing honor to the Christian doctrines in representing them as intrinsically credible, which leads many into supporting opinions which, carried to their full extent, supercede the need of miracles altogether. It must be recollected, too, that they who are allowed to praise have the privilege of finding fault, and may reject, according to their a priori notions, as well as receive. Doubtless the divinity of a clearly immoral doctrine could not be evidenced by miracles; for our belief in the moral attributes of God, is much stronger than our conviction of the negative proposition, that none but he can interfere with the system of nature. But there is always the danger of extending this admission beyond its proper limits, of supposing ourselves judges of the tendency of doctrines; and because, unassisted reason informs us what is moral and immoral in our own case, of attempting to decide on the abstract morality of actions.... These remarks are in nowise inconsistent with using (as was done in a former section) our actual knowledge of God’s attributes, obtained from a survey of nature and human affairs, in determining the probability of certain professed miracles having proceeded from him. It is one thing to infer from the experience of life another to imagine the character of God from the gratuitous conceptions of our own minds.’ Although Dr. Newman apparently fails to perceive that he himself thus makes reason the criterion of miracles and therefore incurs the condemnation with which our quotation opens, the very indecision of his argument illustrates the dilemma in which divines are placed. Dr. Mozley, however, still more directly condemns the principle we are discussing, that the doctrine must be the criterion of the miracle, although he also, as we have seen elsewhere, substantially affirms it. He says: ‘The position that the revelation proves the miracle, and not the miracles the revelation, admits of a good qualified meaning; but taken literally, it is a double offense against the rule, that things are properly proved by the proper proof of them; for a supernatural fact is the proper proof of supernatural doctrine, while a supernatural doctrine on the other hand is certainly not a proper proof of a supernatural fact.’

“This statement is obviously true, but it is equally undeniable that, their origin being uncertain, miracles have no evidential force. How far then, we may inquire in order thoroughly to understand the position, can doctrines prove the reality of miracles or determine the agency by which they are performed? In the case of moral truths within the limits of reason, it is evident that doctrines, which are in accordance with our idea of what is good and right do not require miraculous evidence at all. They can secure acceptance by their own merits alone. At the same time it is universally admitted that the truth or goodness of a doctrine could not attest the divine origin of a miracle. Such truths, however, have no proper connection with revelation at all. ‘These truths,’ to quote the words of Bishop Atterbury, ‘were of themselves sufficiently obvious and plain, and needed not a divine testimony to make them plainer. But the truths which are necessary in this manner to be attested, are those which are of positive institution; those which if God had not pleased to reveal them, human reason could not have discovered; and those, which, even now, they are revealed, human reason cannot fully account for, and perfectly comprehend.’ How is it possible then that reason, or the ‘moral nature of man’ can approve as good, or appreciate the fitness of, doctrines which in their very nature are beyond the criterion of reason. What reply, for instance, can reason give to any appeal to it regarding the doctrine of the trinity or of the incarnation? If doctrines, the truth and goodness of which are apparent, do not afford any evidence of divine revelation, how can doctrines which reason can neither discover nor comprehend attest the divine origin of miracles? Dr. Mozley clearly recognizes that they cannot do so. ‘The proof of a revelation,’ he says, and we may add, the proof of a miracle—itself a species of revelation—‘which is contained in the substance of a revelation has this inherent check or limit in it; namely: that it cannot reach to what is undiscoverable by reason.’ ‘Internal evidence is itself an appeal to reason, because at every step the test is our own appreciation of such and such an idea or doctrine, our own perception of its fitness; but human reason cannot in the nature of the case prove that which, by the very hypotheses, lies beyond reason.’ It naturally follows that no doctrine which lies beyond reason, and therefore requires the attestation of miracles, can possibly afford that indication of the source and reality of miracles which is necessary to endow them with evidential value, and the supernatural doctrine must, therefore, be rejected in the absence of miraculous evidence of a decisive character.

“Canon Mozley labors earnestly, but unsuccessfully, to restore to miracles as evidence some part of that potentiality of which these unfortunate limitations have deprived them. ‘Whilst on the one hand,’ he says, ‘we must admit indeed an inherent modification in the function of a miracle as an instrument of proof,’ he argues that this is only a limitation, and no disproof of it, and he contends that: ‘The evidence of miracles is not negatived because it has conditions.’ His reasoning, however, is purely apologetic, and attempts by the unreal analogy of supposed limitations of natural principles and evidence to excuse the disqualifying limitations of the supernatural. He is quite conscious of the serious difficulty of the position: ‘The question’ he says, ‘may at first sight create a dilemma.—If a miracle is nugatory on the side of one doctrine, what cogency has it on the side of another? Is it legitimate to accept its evidence when we please and reject it when we please?’ The only reply he seems able to give to these very pertinent questions is the remark which immediately follows them: ‘But in truth a miracle is never without an argumentative force, although that force may be counterbalanced.’ In other words, a miracle is always an argument, although it is often a bad one. It is scarcely necessary to go to the supernatural for bad arguments.

“It might naturally be expected that the miraculous evidence selected to accredit a divine revelation should possess certain unique and marked characteristics. It must at least, be clearly distinctive of divine power and exclusively associated with divine truth. It is inconceivable that the Deity, deigning thus to attest the reality of a communication from himself of truths beyond the criterion of reason, should not make the evidence simple and complete, because the doctrines proper to such a revelation, not being appreciable from internal evidence, it is obvious that the external testimony for them,—if it is to be of any use—must be unmistakable and decisive. The evidence which is actually produced, however, so far from satisfying these legitimate anticipations, lacks every one of the qualifications which reason antecedently declares necessary. Miracles are not distinctive of divine power but are common to Satan, and they are admitted to be performed in support of falsehood as well as in the service of truth. They bear, indeed, so little upon them the impress of their origin and true character, that they are dependent for their recognition upon our judgment of the very doctrines to attest which they are said to have been designed.

“Even taking the representation of miracles, therefore, which divines themselves give, they are utterly incompetent to perform their contemplated functions. If they are superhuman they are not supersatanic, and there is no sense in which they can be considered miraculously evidential of anything. To argue as theologians do, that the ambiguity of their testimony is intended as a trial of our faith is absurd, for reason being unable to judge of the nature either of supernatural fact or of supernatural doctrine it would be mere folly and injustice to subject to such a test beings avowedly incapable of sustaining it. Whilst it is absolutely necessary, then, that a divine revelation should be attested by miraculous evidence to justify our believing it the testimony so called seems in all respects unworthy of the name, and presents anomalies much more suggestive of human invention than divine originality. We are, in fact, prepared by the scriptural account of miracles to expect that further examination will supply an explanation of such phenomena which will wholly remove them from the region of the supernatural.

“We have seen that a divine revelation is such only by virtue of communicating to us something which we could not know without it, and which is in fact undiscoverable by human reason; and that miraculous evidence is absolutely requisite to establish its reality. It is admitted that no other testimony could justify our believing the specific revelation which we are considering, the very substance of which is supernatural and beyond the criterion of reason, and that its astounding announcements, if not demonstrated to be miraculous truths, must inevitably be pronounced ‘the wildest delusions.’ On examining the supposed miraculous evidence, however, we find that not only is it upon general grounds antecedently incredible, but that the testimony by which its realty is supported, so far from establishing the inferences drawn from the supposed supernatural phenomena, is totally insufficient even to certify the actual occurrence of the events narrated.

“Even if the reality of miracles could be substantiated, their value as evidence for the divine revelation is destroyed by the necessary admission that miracles are not limited to one source, but that there are miracles satanic which are to be disbelieved, as well as divine and evidential ones to be believed.