A handbook of Freethought

by Unknown

We learn from the little care which nature takes of single individuals. Thousands of them are sacrificed without hesitation or repentance in the plenty of nature. Even with regard to man we make the same experience. Not one half of the human race reach the second year of their age, but die almost without having known that they ever lived. We learn this very thing also from the misfortunes and mishaps of all men, the good as well as the bad, which cannot well be made to agree with the special preservation or co-operation of the creator. (Feuerbach’s “Essence of Religion.”)

But with the conception of a supreme beneficence this gratuitous infliction of misery, in common with other terrestrial creatures capable of feeling, is also absolutely incompatible.—Spencer.

In short, there can be no hypothesis of a “moral government” of the world which does not implicitly assert an “immoral government.” (Fisk’s “Cosmic Philosophy,” vol. 2, p. 407.)

But the believer in the inspiration of the Bible is compelled to declare that there was a time when slavery was right—when men could buy, and women could sell, their babes. He is compelled to insist that there was a time when Polygamy was the highest form of virtue; when wars of extermination were waged with the sword of mercy; when religious toleration was a crime, and when death was the just penalty for having expressed an honest thought. He must maintain that Jehovah is just as bad now as he was four thousand years ago, or that he was just as good then as he is now, but that human conditions have so changed that slavery, polygamy, religious persecutions, and wars of conquest are now perfectly devilish. Once they were right—once they were commanded by God himself; now, they are prohibited. There has been such a change in the conditions of man that, at the present time, the Devil is in favor of slavery, polygamy, religious persecution, and wars of conquest. That is to say, the Devil entertains the same opinion to-day that Jehovah held four thousand years ago, but in the meantime Jehovah has remained exactly the same—changeless and incapable of change.... A very curious thing about these commandments is that their supposed author violated nearly every one. From Sinai, according to the account, he said: “Thou shalt not kill,” and yet he ordered the murder of millions; “Thou shalt not commit adultery,” and yet he gave captured maidens to gratify the lust of captors; “Thou shalt not steal,” and yet he gave to Jewish marauders the flocks and herds of others; “Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s house, nor his wife,” and yet he allowed his chosen people to destroy the homes of neighbors and to steal their wives; “Honor thy father and thy mother,” and yet this same God had thousands of fathers butchered, and with the sword of war killed children yet unborn; “Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor,” and yet he sent abroad “lying spirits” to deceive his own prophets, and in a hundred ways paid tribute to deceit. So far as we know, Jehovah kept only one of these commandments—he worshipped no other God. (“Ingersoll’s Reply to Black.”)

It is said of Christ that he was infinitely kind and generous, infinitely merciful because when on earth he cured the sick, the lame, and the blind. Has he not as much power now as he had then? If he has and is the God of all worlds, why does he not now give back to the widow her son? Why does he withhold light from the blind, and why does one who had the power miraculously to feed thousands allow millions to die for want of food? Where is he now? (“Ingersoll’s Interviews.”)

First Cause.

Assuming then, the existence of a First Cause, let us inquire for a moment into its nature. The First Cause must be infinite. For if we regard it as finite, we regard it as bounded or limited, and are thus compelled to think of a region beyond its limits, which region is uncaused. And if we admit this, we virtually abandon the doctrine of causation altogether. We, therefore, have no alternative but to regard the First Cause an infinite.

We are no less irresistibly compelled to regard the First Cause as independent. For if it be dependent, that on which it depends must be the First Cause. The First Cause can therefore have no necessary relation to any other form of being; since if the presence of any other form of existence is necessary to its completeness, it is partially dependent upon such other form of existence, and cannot be the First Cause. Thus the First Cause, besides being infinite, must be complete in itself, existing independently of all relations,—that is, it must be absolute.

To such conclusions, following the most refined metaphysical philosophy of the day, are we easily led. By the very limitations of our faculties, we are compelled to think of a First Cause of all phenomena; and we are compelled to think of it as both infinite and absolute.