De Wet's subsequent movements greatly puzzled his pursuers. He divided his column into two portions which did not always march in the same direction, and it was therefore difficult to discern the ruling movement of his trek. At one time it appeared that he was about to re-cross into the Free State, and the plans for the northward pursuit were temporarily suspended; to be resumed when he had received an allowance of one day's start. It is probable that his original intention had been to return to his own country as soon as he had put Steyn and the officials into the Transvaal, leaving them with an escort to find their own way to Kruger, and that he was prevented by the appearance of a strong column under Kitchener on the left bank. As a Free Stater, moreover, he would be disinclined to give his services to the Transvaal.
Kitchener crossed the Vaal on August 8, and hung to De Wet's right rear, Methuen hanging on to the left rear; but neither was able to do more than clutch vainly at the skirts of the elusive column. In front of De Wet, Smith-Dorrien was holding the Klerksdorp railway, but again he misled his pursuers, and instead of trekking north after he had crossed the Gatsrand, a movement which Smith-Dorrien anticipated and provided for, he changed direction, and on August 11 passed over the railway at a section which had been left unoccupied on Smith-Dorrien's right flank.
Lord Roberts saw that Methuen's and Kitchener's pursuit would probably fail, and that De Wet would reach the Magaliesberg. Ian Hamilton was instructed to prevent him crossing it, and on August 11 he was specifically ordered to occupy Olifant's Nek. Commando Nek was held by Baden-Powell. There was a third pass, the Magato Nek, a few miles west of Rustenburg, for which De Wet was apparently making, and which seemed to be his only possible way of escape, as it was confidently assumed that the other passes were held by British troops. It was, therefore, only necessary to head him from Magato Nek, and this was done by Methuen. But the movement threw De Wet towards Olifant's Nek, which to his great astonishment was not occupied, and through which he passed with Steyn on August 14 and shook off his pursuers. Ian Hamilton had not been made to understand that the actual closing of Olifant's Nek was an urgent matter; and he, in fact, informed Lord Roberts that he did not propose to do so except indirectly by a movement which would command the approach to it.
In this, the first of the De Wet hunts, nearly 30,000 British troops were directly or indirectly engaged in heading or pursuing over an area of 7,000 square miles. Nine columns blindly zigzagged and divagated to false scents and imperfect information in chase of one man encumbered with a civil government on the run and several hundred wagons. Again and again the fowler's net was cast upon the migrant, who always wriggled through the meshes. In one month he trekked 270 miles from the Brandwater Basin to the north of the Magaliesberg, with British troops continuously to his flanks, his front, and his rear.
It would have been regarded as the most notable personal exploit of the war if De Wet had not himself twice repeated it under circumstances of even greater difficulty. It must be acknowledged that his daring and resolution deserved success. He did not attain it by the means of followers eager to serve a trusted and beloved leader, for they by no means rose to him. When he reached the Vaal he was careful to throw the burghers' wagons across the river first of all, knowing that their unwillingness to leave the Free State would be overcome by their greater reluctance to sever themselves from their oxen and stuff. He owed his success mainly to the power of a strong will to make weaker wills work for it; and in a less degree to the accuracy of the information which Theron, his chief scout, obtained for him.
It is at least doubtful whether Lord Roberts did not take De Wet too seriously. Was the capture of a guerilla leader worth the withdrawal of so many British troops from the main operations, and would not the sounder strategy have been to ignore him? If he had been severely let alone, he would hardly have done more than that which he did with the strength of an Army Corps against him, and his prestige with his own people would not have been so surely set up.
The escape of De Wet was an incident of war, which, having regard to all the circumstances of the campaign, could not be made impossible. Columns working independently under directions from Head Quarters cannot be made aware of all that each has or has not done, and must take many things for granted; and the information of the enemy's movements which reaches them from the same source must often be received too late for effective action. If Lord Roberts had listened to Baden-Powell's protest against the evacuation of Rustenburg and Olifant's Nek, De Wet would probably have followed Cronje to St. Helena; but that does not prove that the policy of withdrawing from remote and exposed positions was unsound. All that can be said against it is that it chanced to be carried out a few days too soon.
Steyn and the officials left for Machadodorp. De Wet felt that his own country had a claim upon his services, and desired to return to it without delay. He divided his force, leaving the greater part under Steenekamp north of the Magaliesberg, himself going south with a small commando. The division materially aided his return, for it was not known for certain at Head Quarters with which portion he was marching. While he was in imagination being chased north of Pretoria, he was in fact scaling a rough mountain path, for all the passes had been closed, near Commando Nek, and looking down from the heights upon a British force by which he was not discovered. On August 21, after an absence of sixteen days, he recrossed the Vaal, and entered the Free State. The net result of all the labour, all the efforts, and all the consequent distress and exhaustion to which the British troops had willingly subjected themselves, was to re-establish De Wet as a greater power for mischief than ever.
The Free Staters under Steenekamp joined Grobler of Waterberg, but the combination was hustled to the north out of striking distance of Pretoria by Baden-Powell, whose purely military service in South Africa ceased soon after. He had been selected to raise and to command the South African Constabulary, a semi-military body, which it was hoped the approaching end of the war would ere long permit to take over some of the duties of the troops.