The Enemy continued to carry on their Works[23] upon the Hill, and brought some Pieces of Cannon to bear upon our advanced Guard, and upon the General's Quarters, but with very little Effect. The General signified to the Admiral by Letter, that he had endeavoured to cut off the Communication[24] of the City of Carthagena with the Country, by the neck of Land lying upon the Sea, but found that any Detachment sent thither, would be intirely in the Enemy's Power, as being at too great a distance from the Camp to be sustained, nor had he any Boats on the Lake, for the supplying them with Provisions and Water; and proposed that some small Man of War, should be sent for that Purpose to lie near the Shore: The Admiral signified in his Answer, that he would order in a Ship and a Sloop.
The Admiral was this Day pleased to put on Shore from the Men of War a further Detachment from the Americans;[25] but excepting 30 or 40, all that he would spare of Lord James Cavendish's, and Colonel Bland's Regiments, were already landed: Nor were these People sent on Shore, as the Author affirms in his Pamphlet, (Page 37) in consequence of any Representation made of the increasing Sickness, but of a demand of a Reinforcement from the Fleet; first made by the General, and afterwards by the Council of War, which was never fully complied with.
April the 8th, the Council of War being reassembled, it appear'd from the Report of the principal Engineer[26] that so large a Number of Men, and so much time would be wanting to cut thro' the Wood, and to raise a Battery, as in our Circumstances rendered it impracticable; the sickly Season was now come in, and the Water in the Cisterns began to grow low: There seeming therefore to be no Choice left, but either to make a bold Push for the surprising Fort St. Lazar, or to return on Board; it was resolved[27] to attempt it the next Morning, the scaling Ladders having been this Day put on Shore, and not before. What further determined the Council to come to this Resolution, was fresh Intelligence received from Deserters and Prisoners, confirm'd by the Observations of some of the Engineers, who had viewed the Fort very near, viz. That the Walls were not too high for our Ladders; nor was there any Ditch at the foot of them; (as had been before represented) that the Road leading up the Hill on the right was broad, and of an easy Ascent; and that there was a wooden Door on the left of the Fort, which might be forced without much Difficulty, and to which a Deserter offered himself as a Guide.
A further Motive, perhaps might be of Weight with some of the Members, viz. the Admiral's vehemently pressing the Attack "without a Breach," and his insisting that it was scarcely possible to miscarry in the Attempt. And in all probability, if the Attack had not been made, it might have been alledged and possibly credited at Home, that had the Experiment been tried, the City must have infallibly fallen into our Hands.
The rest of the Day was employed in preparing for the Attack: In the Evening the Council of War being reassembled, a Disposition for it was laid before them, which having been examined and approved, was by the Brigade Majors immediately communicated to all the principal Officers.
April the 9th, the Troops appointed for the Attack, were order'd to parade on the Strand, at two in the Morning;[28] where having formed, they advanced towards the Fort, and a little before Break of Day, began to mount the Hill. But that Division, which was, by Order, to have gone up an open, accessible Road, which lay upon the Right of the Fort, was in the dark, by a fatal Mistake (as it was said of the Guide) led up the Center, where the Ascent is very steep, and the Ground broken: Some of the most forward gained the Top, and pushed on to the Enemy's Entrenchments; but not being immediately sustained, by Reason of the great Difficulty found in mounting the Hill, and that the rest of the Plattoons advanced slowly with the Street firing, they were most of them killed or wounded.