[8] Fascines and Pickets (vide the beginning of the Note f) had not only been cut during the Fleet's watering at Hispaniola, but after our landing on Tierra Bomba, all possible Diligence was daily used, to compleat the Number required for erecting the Batteries. Nothing can be more absurd than to imagine that so skilful an Engineer, as was Mr. Moor, could be so widely mistaken as to the Quantity. As soon as the Ground was cleared, and proper Works thrown up to cover the Workmen, he began with such Materials as were ready, and had from the Fleet no other Assistance than 18 Carpenters for laying the Platforms; the Seamen were employed, (and that was properly their Province) in landing the Stores and Cannon; in getting the latter up to the Battery, and they afterwards assisted in firing of it; (most of the Gunners being at that time either Dead, or disabled by Sickness) besides 150 of them were for one or two Days employed to cut Fascines, but were so ungovernable as to be of little Service.
How far the Author may be qualified to judge of the Knowledge of the Sub-Engineers, Time may discover; was Mr. Moor still living, he could well answer for the Construction of his Battery. He rais'd it not exactly parallel to the Face where the Breach was made, for a very powerful Reason: to prevent its being flank'd from the Barradera Battery, and by that means preserved the Lives of a great many Men, who must otherwise have been lost. It is not improbable, that the Author believ'd the Line of Communication, between the great Gun-Battery and the Camp, to have been expos'd to the Enemy's Shot, and therefore never came near it; or he must have known that it was neither enfiladed from the Castle, nor the Shipping, and that the few Men who were killed there, fell by Shot which glanced from the Trees, and did not exceed 7 or 8 during the whole Time the Troops lay before the Castle. (vide Note b)
[9] The Troops were certainly annoyed in their Camp by the Enemy's Cannon, and particularly by the Fascine Battery: an Inconvenience which, in their Circumstances, was absolutely necessary to be supported, as by their removing to so great a Distance, as to be out of the reach of their Shot, the great Gun-Battery must have been expos'd to be insulted, which would at least have for some Time retarded the taking of the Castle, if not oblig'd us to retire.
The base Insinuation relating to the Troops being moved without regular Orders, is absolutely groundless: The Independants from Jamaica, not arriving till after the Camp was formed, they were ordered to clear the Ground upon the Left, and there to pitch their Tents; where 200 Americans, and part of Lord James Cavendish's and of Col. Bland's Regiments, joined them from the Fleet. To make the more Room for the Artillery-Park, Harrison's Regiment was, by Order, removed to the same Ground; as afterwards were those Regiments, which were the most exposed to the Fire from the Fascine Battery, and had suffered greatly in their Tents, Arms, &c. Nor, till then, did any of the General Officers remove to the new Encampment; which was indeed in some Measure covered by a Rock from the Fire of the Fascine Battery, but was not the less exposed to that from the Shipping and the Castle, by which Lieutenant Col. Sandford and several others there lost their Lives.
[10] Nothing can be more false than what the Author of the Pamphlet asserts in his Note (e) of no Application having been made, nor any particular Scheme form'd for landing the Cannon and Stores. March the 10th, the Day after the Grenadiers had taken Possession of the two Forts, the General went in Person on board the Admiral to concert Measures with him for putting on Shore the Cannon, Ammunition, &c. and was by him, the Admiral, informed, that a Captain of a Man of War appointed for that Service, was gone on board the Ordnance Ships to give the proper Directions; the General, without Delay, order'd his Barge to row thither, and signify'd to the said Captain (who is since dead) both the Quantity and Species of Stores proper to be landed; and at the same time particularly mentioned to him the Inconvenience which would attend the putting on Shore more than were necessary for present Service. Notwithstanding (probably from the Want of Time and Means for sorting the Stores, &c.) whatever first came to hand, was thrown into the Boats, sent to Shore, and confusedly cast upon the Beach. Whence they were removed by Matrosses and Soldiers appointed for that Service, and secured in the best Manner our Circumstances would admit of; but (excepting that some of the Powder received Damage from its having been placed by the Sailors upon the Shore within the Reach of the Surf of the Sea) none of the Stores were wash'd away, which indeed might possibly have happen'd, if timely Care had not been taken to prevent it.
[11] This bold and surprising Enterprize (as the Author of the Pamphlet is pleased to stile it in his Note i) seems to be celebrated with all the Rhetorick he is Master of: It is observable, that he makes no mention of the two hundred Soldiers, who were detached on the same Occasion, which possibly he may have forgot; as likewise, that, tho' by the Admiral's Disposition, the Soldiers were posted in the Rear; when landed, they were called for to advance, and a Lane made for their passing towards the Front, which probably might be occasioned by their being armed more properly than the Sailors, for returning the Fire of the Enemy's small Arms. I cannot, without doing Injustice to Capt. Washington, the Honourable Mr. Murray, and to the rest of the Land Officers, who were detach'd on this Occasion, join with the Author in passing over their gallant Behaviour in Silence; nor would I be wanting in the Praises due to Capt. Boscawen, Capt. Watson, Capt. Coates, &c. who commanded the Sailors, who, as they have ever done, performed their Duty with great Bravery and Resolution, and particularly Lieutenant, now Captain Forrest, who, with the foremost, enter'd the Battery Sword in Hand; the Enemy having fled with Precipitation into the Woods, and the Soldiers being posted upon the Avenues, the Seamen set about spiking the Guns, destroying the Carriages, and tearing up the Platforms; but one of them having imprudently put Fire to the Guard House, they were discovered by the Enemy, and consequently exposed to the Fire from the Castle, &c. the Commandant therefore thought it advisable to retire, before the Battery could be effectually demolish'd.
[12] Two or three Boats were observed to pass between the Castle and the Barradera Battery (not hundreds of Men as the Author alledges in Note l) who carry'd People sufficient so far to repair the Damage, which had been done, as in a short time to renew the Fire; an evident Proof both to the Army, and to the Navy, that the Battery had not been effectually demolish'd.
That the Army had work'd to some purpose (tho' the Author insinuates the contrary) plainly appears from their having made two Coupures thro' the Woods, cut the Fascines and Pickets, raised the Battery, and conveyed thither the Stores and Ammunition; in which last they had some Assistance from the Sailors, and not a great deal from the Negroes. Had the Army the least Room for Resentment before, the sixty Gun Ship was sent in to interrupt the Enemy's repairing the Fascine Battery, any Thing she perform'd, could by no Means cool it; for the fired at so great a Distance, as to give the Enemy very little Disturbance.
[13] The Author of the Pamphlet, in his extraordinary Note, Letter (m) mentions, five hundred Sailors to have been employed in erecting the Battery, tho' in Fact the Navy contributed to it, only 18 Carpenters. He adds, that, "as more Time and Men were employed in it than were necessary, much Execution may be expected therefrom." What more could be expected from it, than forcing the Enemy to abandon the Castle? "but the Engineers could not out-do themselves; they erected the Battery in a Wood." They might not out-do themselves, but they certainly did perfectly well; for by erecting their Battery under the Cover of the Wood, many Mens Lives were saved, and the Work was carried on without the Enemy's being able to interrupt their Progress.
He is likewise pleased to condemn them for not clearing more Ground than was necessary; a Circumstance, which, I should think, rather deserves his Approbation, as they avoided, improperly, to fatigue the Workmen, but this Caution, it seems was used, that the Enemy might not see the Army; if such a Sight would have given the Enemy any Satisfaction, I much doubt; or whether it would have answer'd to have obliged them at the Expence of cutting down 600 or 700 Paces of thick Wood, which intercepted their View of the Camp; but that the Army did not decline either then, or on any other Occasion, to look the Enemy in the Face, there have been too evident Proofs. No Man, who saw the Position of the Battery, could have the least Room to doubt of its bearing upon the Castle, as soon as a narrow Screen of Wood, which cover'd it, should be cut away. What is alledged, that no Guns could be brought to bear upon the Enemies Shipping, is absolutely false; there were no less than seven, of which two were thought sufficient for that Purpose, which fir'd red hot Balls, and did good Execution. It is most certain, that if no Epaulment had been thrown up, the Battery might have been rak'd, which was easily foreseen, and timely prevented. The Sailors behaved well, and would have done better, had they been more under Direction; but they did no more than their Duty, either in assisting to erect the Battery, in which they had but a very small Share, or in firing of it, as they were expressly order'd so to do by his Majesty. Without all Doubt it was Mr. Moor's Intention to batter the western Face of the Bastion, and to beat down its Defences, which was evident, not only from the Construction, but from the Effect of the Battery. I must own I cannot but admire at the Author's Conclusion, that the Success was owing to Chance, because, if the Enemy had cleared more Ground round the Castle, the Undertaking would have been more difficult. I readily join with him, that it would have been so; tho' in the Beginning of this Note, the Engineers are condemn'd for making the best Advantage of the Wood, which the Enemy had so imprudently left standing. "The Engineers could by no Means out-do themselves; the Battery was constructed in a Wood."