The defendant requested (inter alia) an instruction, that there was no evidence to warrant a verdict on the third count. This request was refused.
The judge instructed the jury as follows:—
“Now there is a third count to which attention must be called. If the jury should find that there was no bodily injury to the plaintiff direct from the acts of the conductor, that is, no person was thrown against the plaintiff, if that statement is not accurate, the plaintiff still contends that if the manner of the removal was such that it occasioned fright and nervous shock that resulted in bodily injury, that she is still entitled to recover for that bodily injury. And I have to say to you as matter of law, that if the wrongful acts of the conductor, on the occasion of removing the disorderly passenger, did occasion fright and nervous shock to the plaintiff, by reason of which she sustained bodily injury, that she can recover compensation for that injury.
“It is settled law in this State that a person cannot recover for mere fright, fear or mental distress occasioned by the negligence of another, which does not result in bodily injury.
“But when the fright or fear or nervous shock produces a bodily injury, then there may be recovery for that bodily injury, and for all the pain, mental or otherwise, which may arise out of that bodily injury. The brain and the nervous system are so closely connected with the mind, are the instruments by which the mind communicates with the body and operates upon it, that we sometimes deal with the nervous conditions as if they were mental conditions, and possibly the testimony has to some extent treated them as one. But for the purpose of the principle which I am now stating, a clear distinction exists between what is mental and what is nervous. The nervous system, the brain and the nerve fibres, are a part of the body, and injury to them is bodily injury. Now if by the wrongful acts of this defendant or its agents, there was a mental shock, fright, and it ended with that, there can be no recovery. But if that mental shock produced a bodily injury, a disturbance of the brain or nervous system which continued and caused subsequent suffering, there may be recovery for that bodily injury and all that follows from it.”
To the above instructions, the defendant excepted.
Verdict for plaintiff.
Allen, J. This case presents a question which has not heretofore been determined in this Commonwealth, and in respect to which the decisions elsewhere have not been uniform. It is this: whether in an action to recover damages for an injury sustained through the negligence of another, there can be a recovery for a bodily injury caused by mere fright and mental disturbance. The jury were instructed that a person cannot recover for mere fright, fear or mental distress occasioned by the negligence of another, which does not result in bodily injury,[[47]] but that when the fright or fear or nervous shock produces a bodily injury, there may be a recovery for that bodily injury, and for all the pain, mental or otherwise, which may arise out of that bodily injury.
In Canning v. Williamstown, 1 Cush. 451, it was held, in an action against a town to recover damages for an injury sustained by the plaintiff in consequence of a defective bridge, that he could not recover if he sustained no injury to his person, but merely incurred risk and peril which caused fright and mental suffering. In Warren v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 163 Mass. 484, the evidence tended to show that the defendant’s train struck the carriage of the plaintiff, thereby throwing him out upon the ground, and it was held to be a physical injury to the person to be thrown out of a wagon, or to be compelled to jump out, even although the harm consists mainly of nervous shock. It was not therefore a case of mere fright, and resulting nervous shock.