Action for libel.
The libel was contained in a report, published in a Manchester newspaper, by the defendants, the proprietors, of the proceedings at a meeting of the board of guardians for the Altrincham poor-law union, at which ex parte charges were made against the plaintiff, the medical officer of the union workhouse at Knutsford, of neglect in not attending the pauper patients when sent for.
At the trial it appeared that the charges were unfounded in fact, but it was admitted that the report was accurate and bona fide. A verdict was taken by consent for the plaintiff, with nominal damages and costs, judgment to be entered accordingly, with leave to move to enter judgment for the defendants, if the court should be of opinion that the publication was privileged.
The Common Pleas Division refused the motion, ordering judgment to stand for the plaintiff. 1 C. P. D. 781.
The libel, &c., are set out at length in the report in the court below.
The defendants appealed.
Mellish, L. J.[[473]] I am of the same opinion. We are asked to extend the law of privilege as to the report of proceedings of a public body to an extent beyond what it has as yet been carried. In Lord Campbell’s time it was supposed that the privilege only extended to the proceedings in a court of law. A report of such proceedings has always been held privileged, because all her Majesty’s subjects have a right to be present, and there would, therefore, be nothing wrong in putting the rest of the public in the position of those who were actually present. The privilege has been extended to the publication of debates in parliament, and properly extended, as they stand on the same principle as the proceedings in courts of law. There is no doubt this distinction: that as to courts of law the public have a right to be present, but they are only admitted to the debates in either House of Parliament when the House chooses to permit them to be present. The House has a discretion, but when the debates are held in public, it is clear that a newspaper ought not to be held to commit an offence by putting those who were not present in the same position as those who were. It is argued that this privilege ought to be extended as to a variety of other public bodies. I express no decided opinion, and I desire, with the Lord Chief Justice, to be understood as expressing no opinion; but at the same time I am clearly of opinion that the privilege ought not to be extended to such a case as the present. A board of guardians have a discretion whether or not they will admit the public to their meetings; and whether they choose to exclude or choose to admit, the public have no right to complain. But I cannot think that the courts of law are to be bound by the mode in which the guardians exercise their discretion in admitting or excluding strangers. Although they admit the public on an occasion when ex parte charges are made against a public officer, which may affect his character and injure his private rights, it is most material that there should be no further publication; there is no reason why the charges should be made public before the person charged has been told of the charges, and has had an opportunity of meeting them; and I cannot see any inconvenience in holding that the publication is not privileged; in holding otherwise we should be depriving the individual of his rights without any commensurate advantage. The law on the subject of privilege is clearly defined by the authorities. Such a communication as the present ought to be confined in the first instance to those whose duty it is to investigate the charges. If one of the guardians had met a person not a ratepayer or parishioner, and had told him the charge against the plaintiff, surely he would have been liable to an action of slander. I do not mean to say that the matter was not of such public interest as that comments would not be privileged if the facts had been ascertained. If the neglect charged against the plaintiff had been proved, then fair comments on his conduct might have been justified. But that is a very different thing from publishing ex parte statements, which not only are not proved, but turn out to be unfounded in fact. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that the occasion of the publication was not privileged, and that the judgment for the plaintiff ought to be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.[[474]]
BARROWS v. BELL
Supreme Judicial Court, Massachusetts, October, 1856.
Reported in 7 Gray, 301.
Shaw, C. J.[[475]] The present is an action of tort, brought to recover damage for a publication alleged to be a libel upon the plaintiff, consisting of an article published in the Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, under the direction of the defendant.