Defendant, Baker, having been called for the defence, was asked the questions following, to which he made answers as follows, all against the objection and exception of the plaintiff:
(1) “Did you believe the report of the city recorder to be true? Answer. I did believe it to be true. (This report was that from which, as defendants in the alleged libel charged or insinuated, it appeared that plaintiff had failed to account for all the money received by him from the county treasurer.)
(2) “What was your object in publishing the article? Answer. I published it for the general public interest.
(3) “Did you have any other object in publishing the article? Answer. I did not.
(4) “You have stated that you had no other purpose than doing a public duty in publishing the article. I want to know what your object was,—to charge somebody with a crime, or whether you had some other object? Answer. To draw attention to the discrepancy of the two reports. I had seen what purported to be the official report of the county auditor, and I had seen the city recorder’s; and the county auditor’s showed that Marks, as city treasurer, had received from the county, during the fiscal year, $115.02 more than the city recorder’s report showed that he had received from the county for the same time. (These are the two reports between which the discrepancy was charged to exist.)
(5) “Did you, by publishing the article, intend to charge the plaintiff with embezzling any sum whatever?” Answer. “I did not.”
The defence set up in the answer is, in effect, that the publication complained of is a privileged communication.
The rule is that a communication made in good faith upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, public or private, either legal, moral, or social, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, is privileged; that in such case the inference of malice which the law draws from defamatory words is rebutted, and the onus of proving actual malice is cast upon the person claiming to have been defamed. Toogood v. Spyring, 1 Cr. M. & R. 181; 2 Addison on Torts, § 1091; Harrison v. Bush, 5 E. & B. 544; Moak’s Underhill on Torts, 146; Quinn v. Scott, 22 Minn. 456. That the subject-matter of the communication is one of public interest in the community of which the parties to the communication are members, is sufficient, as respects interest, to confer the privilege. Purcell v. Sowler, 2 C. P. D. 215; Palmer v. City of Concord, 48 N. H. 211; Cooley on Torts, 217. The subject-matter of the communication in the case at bar was one of public interest in the city of Mankato, where the publication was made, and one in which the defendants had an interest as residents and tax-payers of the city. It was, therefore, a privileged communication, within the rule mentioned, if made in good faith.[[499]]
Judgment affirmed.[[500]]