It follows, therefore, that libel is an assault upon character resulting in some injury to reputation. The injury must be traceable to the assault, and the damage must be the proximate result of the injury. Every one recognizes the blighting effect of scandalous utterances directed against the character, conduct, or reputation of men. Every one recognizes that such assaults, publicly made, tend injuriously to affect the reputation and standing of the one so assailed among his fellows. It is from the recognition of this that the law implies damages, without allegation or proof of special damages.
Defamation consists in maliciously poisoning the minds of others against the party assaulted by printing, writing, &c., thereby bringing on them some of the consequences provided against in the statute. The statute is intended to, and does, prohibit the malicious poisoning of the minds of others against a citizen, under the protection of the law, by the use of public printing, &c., and this inhibition attaches whether done directly by the wording of the thing complained of, or indirectly by insinuation, imputation, or suggestion. The statute is intended to protect one in a right, and to deny to others the liberty to invade that right.
With no explanation from the defendants, we may rightly assume that they prepared and mailed this card for the purpose hereinbefore indicated, and that the consequences charged in the petition were the consequences that naturally flowed from the thing done. We think the pleading was sufficient to present the question to the jury. As supporting what we have said, see Call v. Larabee, 60 Iowa, 212, 14 N. W. 237; Hollenbeck v. Ristine, 105 Iowa, 488, 75 N. W. 355, 67 Am. St. Rep. 306; Halley v. Gregg, 74 Iowa, 564, 38 N. W. 416. In the latter case it is said, in substance, that if the act charged constitutes a libel, as defined by the statute, it is actionable per se. See Zier v. Hofflin, 33 Minn. 66, 21 N. W. 862, 53 Am. Rep. 9, in which it is said:
“Words which may be innocent of themselves may be rendered libellous by the place and circumstances of their publication, for such place and circumstances may impress on them a meaning and suggestion which, standing alone, they do not have. Thus, though the words here do not of themselves impute wrong, they might be published in such a place or under such circumstances as to make them capable of naturally conveying the impression that plaintiff had been guilty of dishonest practices, either in contracting the debt or in withholding payment of it.... What meaning they would naturally convey was for the jury to determine in view of the circumstances of their publication.” State of Missouri v. Armstrong, 106 Mo. 395, 16 S. W. 604, reported in 13 L. R. A. 419, 27 Am. St. Rep. 361, together with citations and annotations; Nichols v. Daily, 30 Utah, 74, 83 Pac. 573, 3 L. R. A. N. S. 339, 116 Am. St. Rep. 296, 8 Ann. Cas. 841.
We find no case directly in point on the questions here considered. We think, however, the plaintiff presented a fair question for the jury, and the court erred in sustaining the demurrer, and the cause is therefore reversed.
Reversed.
Evans, C. J., and Ladd, J., concur. Salinger, J., special concurrence.
Salinger, J. There is language in the opinion which indicates there may be libel which is not libel per se. I do not wish to be bound by it. I think it is settled by our cases that whatever is libellous is libellous per se; that the action for libel rests on the fact that a “crime has been committed,” and that, therefore, the law presumes damage if a libel is established.[[547]]
WESTMINISTER LAUNDRY CO. v. HESSE ENVELOPE CO.
St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri, May 6, 1913.
Reported in 174 Missouri Appeal Reports, 238.
Nortoni, J. This is a suit for damages, in which plaintiff recovered a verdict for one dollar. On this verdict, judgment was given, and defendant prosecutes an appeal therefrom.