An action was then brought by Flood and Taylor against three persons, viz., Allen, the London delegate; Jackson, the chairman; and Knight, the general secretary of the Boilermakers’ Society.[[597]] The plaintiffs’ allegations were: that the defendants, maliciously and wrongfully and with intent to injure the plaintiffs, procured and induced the Glengall Company to break their contract with the plaintiffs and not to enter into new contracts with them; and also, maliciously, etc., intimidated and coerced the Glengall Company to break their contract with plaintiffs and not to enter into new contracts, and also unlawfully and maliciously conspired with others to do the above acts.
The case was tried by jury before Kennedy, J.
The learned judge ruled that there was not “a shred of evidence of any conspiracy at all;” that there was “no evidence of anything amounting to intimidation or coercion in any legal sense of the term;”[[598]] and that there was no breach of contract.
The following questions, among others, were put to the jury:—
1. Did the defendant Allen maliciously induce the Glengall Iron Company to discharge the plaintiffs or either of them from their employment?
2. Did the defendant Allen maliciously induce the Glengall Iron Company not to engage the plaintiffs or either of them?
In putting these questions to the jury, Kennedy, J., gave some explanations, portions of which are, in substance, as follows:[[599]] “The word ‘malice’ is a word of art in law, and it does not mean in this case a personal dislike, a personal feeling of resentment against the two plaintiffs. It is clear from the evidence of the men and of their employers that there was no such personal feeling in this case. The question that I want you to answer is, that, if you find he induced the Glengall Iron Company, by the threat which is suggested by the plaintiffs of calling out all the men on strike, did he do that with the malicious intention which I have endeavored to explain, that is, merely, not for the purpose of forwarding that which he believed to be his interest as a delegate of his union in the fair consideration of that interest but for the purpose of injuring these plaintiffs, and preventing them doing that which they were each of them entitled to do. ‘Maliciously’ means, connected with the word ‘induce,’ this,—that it was not for the mere purpose of forwarding fairly Allen’s own interests, but from the indirect motive of doing a mischief to the plaintiffs in their lawful business.”
The jury answered both questions in the affirmative; and also found that each plaintiff had suffered 20l. damages.
After consideration, Kennedy, J., entered judgment for the plaintiffs against Allen for 40l. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (Lord Esher, M. R., Lopes and Rigby, L.JJ.); L. R. (1895) 2 Q. B. 21.
Against these decisions, Allen brought the present appeal to the House of Lords. The appeal was first argued in December, 1895. Their Lordships having required further argument, the appeal was reargued in March and April, 1897. The following Judges were summoned to attend[[600]] at the second argument: Hawkins, Mathew, Cave, North, Wills, Grantham, Lawrence, and Wright, JJ.